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 The United States military has continually strived to develop systems and 
procedures that attempt to maximize the effectiveness and improve the 
collaborative effects of fire support across the spectrum of warfare.  Despite 
improvements in the interoperability of the Department of Defense service 
components, there continue to be difficulties involved with executing emergent 
Joint Fires in a timely manner in support of the commander.  In this context, the 
Joint Fire Support in 2020 project applied systems engineering procedures and 
principles to develop functional, physical, and operational architectures that 
maximize rapid battlefield effects through efficient target-provider pairings.  The 
unplanned, immediate joint fire support requests, and the architectures that 
enable the rapid pairing and tasking of fire support providers to fulfill those 
requests, were the emphasis of the study.  Through modeling, simulation, and 
qualitative assessments of existing and planned command and control systems 
and organizations, a Centralized Joint Fire Support Network that incorporates 
and consolidates the various cross-service fire support functions, was chosen as 
the preferred evolutionary development path to a fully Distributed Joint Fire 
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VHF Very High Frequency 
VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol 
WCS Weapons Control System 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
WOC Wing Operations Center 




Analysts:  A type of stakeholder. Individuals of groups that evaluate the effective 
needs which assisted in determining the projected performance of various 
system alternatives to determine the most efficient and effective alternative. 
Area of Operations (AO):  An operational area defined by the joint force 
commander for land and naval forces.  Areas of operations do not typically 
encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should 
be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and 
protect their forces. 
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS):  AFATDS is an 
integrated fire support system used by Army and Marine Corps.  It processes fire 
mission and other related information to coordinate the use of fire support assets, 
including mortars, field artillery, cannon, missile, attack helicopters, air support, 
and limited naval gunfire.   
Advanced Tomahawk Weapons Control System (ATWCS):  ATWCS is an 
upgrade to the initial Tomahawk system.  The ATWCS improvements include 
hardware, software, and firmware modifications.  The added capabilities include:  
contingency-strike operations planning, embedded training at all levels, and a 
simplified man-machine interface.  It is used for the planning, execution, and 
launch of the Tomahawk missile aboard naval ships and submarines. 
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS):  AWACS provides  
all-weather surveillance, command, control and communications needed by 
commanders of U.S. and NATO air defense forces. 
Applique System: The appliqué system is an experimental battlefield 
digitization computer system consisting of four basic versions of hardware 
installed on vehicles and used by individual soldiers, connected by a radio 
system. 
Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS):  The 
Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS) developed by 
General Dynamics is a joint mission management software application. It 
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provides a suite of tools and interfaces for horizontal and vertical coordination 
across battlespace functional areas. 
Clients:  Agencies or groups of people that will have substantial input as to the 
development of the solution set or system. 
Close Air Support (CAS):  Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against 
hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require 
detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of  
those forces. 
Danger Close:  In close air support, artillery, mortar, and naval gunfire support 
fires, it is the term included in the method of engagement segment of a call for 
fire which indicates that friendly forces are within close proximity of the target.  
The close proximity distance is determined by the weapon and munition fired.   
Command Post of the Future (CPOF):  A system currently deployed at the 
division level. Enables division and brigade commanders to discuss and 
collaborate when processing information, share ideas, and attend virtual 
meetings without assembling at one place. 
Decision Makers:  A type of stakeholder.  Personnel or organizations who have 
the authority to make impacting and final project decisions. 
Electronic Warfare (EW):  Any military action involving the use of 
electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or 
to attack the enemy. 
Enhanced Position Location and Reporting System (EPLRS):  A system that 
provides secure, jam-resistant, near real-time data communications support for 
the five Battlefield Functional Areas of the Army Tactical Command and Control 
System (ATCCS). 
Fire Support Coordination:  The planning and executing of fire so that targets 
are adequately covered by a suitable weapon or group of weapons. 
Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC):  A single location in which are 
centralized communications facilities and personnel incident to the coordination 
of all forms of fire support. 
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Fires:  The effects of lethal or nonlethal weapons. 
Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2):  The FBCB2 
consists of Applique hardware, software and EBC Software integrated into the 
various platforms at brigade and below, as well as appropriate Division and 
Corps slices necessary to support brigade operations.  It interconnects platforms 
through a communications infrastructure called the Tactical Internet consisting of 
existing EPLRS and SINCGARS nets to pass Situation Awareness data and 
conduct Command and Control.  Primary functions are to send out and receive 
automatic position location reports, and to send and receive command and 
control message traffic and graphics for display. 
Global Command and Control System (GCCS):  The Global Command and 
Control System (GCCS) is an automated information system designed to support 
deliberate and crisis planning with the use of an integrated set of analytic tools 
and the flexible data transfer capabilities. 
Global Information Grid (GIG):  A net-centric system operating in a global 
context to provide processing, storage, management, and transport of 
information to support all Department of Defense (DoD), national security, and 
related intelligence community missions and functions-strategic, operational, 
tactical, and business-in war, in crisis, and in peace. 
Joint:    Activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or 
more Military Departments participate. 
Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2):  JBMC2 consists 
of the processes, architectures, systems, standards, and command- and-control 
operational concepts employed by the joint force commander.  The joint force 
commander executes joint operations by employing the entire array of JBMC2 
capabilities during the planning, coordinating, directing, controlling, and 
assessing of joint force operations from interface with the strategic level through 
the tactical level. 
Joint Fires (JF):  Fires produced during the employment of forces from two or 
more components in coordinated action toward a common objective. 
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Joint Fire Support (JFS):  Joint fires that assist land, maritime, amphibious, and 
special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, 
and key waters. 
Joint Force Commander (JFC):  A general term applied to a combatant 
commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to 
exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a 
joint force. 
Joint Operations:  A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint 
forces or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority) 
which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. 
Joint Surveillance, Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS):  Long-range,  
air-to-ground surveillance system designed to locate, classify and track ground 
targets in all weather conditions. 
Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB):  A group formed by the Joint 
Force Commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may 
include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing 
targeting guidance and priorities, and preparing and/or refining joint target lists.  
The board is normally comprised of representatives from the joint force staff, all 
components, and if required, component subordinate units. 
Naval Fires Control System (NFCS):  NFCS is a battle management system 
that enables for surface land attack in net-centric warfare. NFCS supports 
mission planning for 5"/62 - Advanced Gun System and Extended Range Guided 
Munitions (ERGM). 
Rules of Engagement (ROE):  Directives issued by competent military authority 
which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States 
forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces 
encountered. 
Single Channel Ground and Air Radio System (SINCGARS):  SINCGARS is a 
family of VHF-FM combat net radios which provides the primary means of 
command and control for Infantry, Armor and Artillery Units. SINCGARS is 
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designed on a modular basis to achieve maximum commonality among the 
various ground and airborne system configurations. 
Sponsors:  A type of stakeholder.  Offices or groups of people that provide 
financial support, which may include technical support or support in the form of 
special studies or specialized information. 
Stakeholders:  Stakeholders are a group of people (users, owners, 
manufacturers, maintainers, trainers, etc.) for whom a system is being built. 
Target Location, Designation and Handoff System (TLDHS):  A modular, 
man-portable equipment suite that will provide the ability to quickly acquire 
targets in day, night, and near-all-weather visibility conditions.  Operators will be 
able to accurately determine their own location as well as that of their targets, 
digitally transmit (hand-off) data to supporting arms elements, and designate 
targets for laser-seeking Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) and Laser Spot 
Trackers (LST). 
Theater Air Control System (TACS):  The Theater Air Control System (TACS) 
provides the Air Force Component Commander (AFCC) and the Joint Forces Air 
Component Commander (JFACC) the capability to plan and conduct theater air 
operations, including joint US operations and combined operations with allied 
forces.  The TACS supports the Air Force doctrine of centralized control and 
decentralized execution of theater air support assets. 
Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS):  Provides the Combat Air 
Forces (CAF) and the Joint/Combined Forces with an automated and integrated 
capability to plan and execute the air battle plan for operations and intelligence 
personnel at the force and unit levels. 
Troops in Contact (TIC):  A close air support situation where the friendly troops 
are within 1 kilometer of the intended targets unless the ground commander 
determines otherwise.  JTACS and aircrews must carefully weigh the choice of 
ordinance and delivery profile in relation to the risk of fratricide in a TIC situation. 
Users:  A type of stakeholder.  Agencies or groups of people that will actually 

































The Joint Fire Support in 2020 project represents a cooperative research 
study involving the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Systems Engineering and 
Analysis (SEA) curriculum, other student groups on campus, and more than 10 
NPS faculty members.  The impetus for this undertaking was a request by US 
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) to both NPS and the Air Force Institute of 
Technology (AFIT) to study and analyze possible joint war fighting 
improvements.  Analysis was performed in one of the many study areas 
described in the Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2) 
Roadmap published by JFCOM in 2005.  The seven SEA-10 students in the Joint 
Fires Support Project Team utilized a tailored Systems Engineering Design 
Process (SEDP), an iterative procedure that facilitated a methodical approach to 
solve the design problem, composed of three phases:  Problem Definition, 
Design and Analysis, and Decision Making. 
During the Problem Definition phase, the Joint Fires Team conducted an 
extensive analysis of existing and proposed fire support systems.  Stakeholders 
were identified and interviewed and an Effective Need was developed.  This 
Effective Need was to define an operationally feasible Joint Fires request, 
coordination, and tasking architecture to provide rapid battlefield effects to the 
Commander.  This type of request system would allow for fire support that is 
effects-based rather than fire support that is service-centric. 
Metrics were identified to evaluate the performance of the competing 
alternatives ability to meet the objectives of the Effective Needs statement.  
These metrics were: average processing time for a request to be serviced, the 
pairing effects ratio of tasked providers, and the number of systems, decision 
points, steps, and process gaps involved in the request-to-task process. 
Alternative system architectures were developed that would achieve the 
objectives presented in the Effective Need.  After considering current program 
development and realistic technological advances, three distinct alternatives 
were evaluated as feasible architectures for a future joint fire support system. 
  xxviii
The Status Quo Plus alternative is an expansion of the current “as is” fire 
support systems.  It is based on the growth path of existing programs of record 
and published fire support related roadmaps.  This system will benefit from 
improvements in both capabilities and materiel during this timeframe, but it 
retains most of the current fire support system organizations and processes. 
The Centralized Joint Fires Support Network (CJFSN) capitalizes on the 
DoD transformation to a force with improved communications connectivity.  A 
defining component of this alternative is the Joint Fire Cell.  It is the key to 
horizontal and vertical consolidation of functionally-equivalent organizations.  The 
Joint Fires Cell will receive, acknowledge, process, pair, and task joint fire 
requests to a provider.  This will enable a request for fire to be sent to a single 
decision-making organization that will collectively choose and task the best joint 
asset available.  Overall processing, pairing, and decision making is expected to 
be faster because the JFS resource owners are organizationally intertwined and 
combined. 
The Distributed Joint Fires Support Network (DJFSN) represents a fully 
networked force, enabled to share fire requests and tasking information.  This 
alternative assumes common, fully interoperable Command and Control (C2) 
data at lower echelon units including battalions, ships, and aircraft.  In this 
alternative, the fire support requests are sent to a fire support database via the 
Global Information Grid (GIG). All participating fire support providers evaluate 
engagement capabilities with automated algorithms.  Commonality of Command 
Control, Communication, and Intelligence (C3I) and automated pairing algorithms 
will allow for selection and tasking of an agreed “preferred shooter.”  The Joint 
Force Commander exercises oversight and command by negation as a 
participating unit throughout the process. 
Qualitative and quantitative modeling and simulation were used to assess 
the complexity and performance of these alternatives. Overall modeling 
performance convinced the Project Team to rank the DJFSN as the best system 
and CJFSN as better than Status Quo Plus. 
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A subjective assessment of the implementation challenges and 
operational risks of the alternatives with respect to expected missions was 
conducted.  The team rated each alternative’s overall risk by assessing the 
scope of changes required to implement while simultaneously maintaining 
current operations.  The Status Quo Plus was estimated to have the lowest risk, 
the CJFSN moderate risk, and the DJFSN was estimated to present the highest 
implementation risk. 
Overall, the DJFSN represents the alternative with the greatest risk to 
implement but most opportunity for operational benefit.  Because of the expected 
performance, the DJFSN was chosen as the preferred architecture.  While Status 
Quo Plus has little risk to implementation, it also has low expected benefit. 
The path to implementing the DJFSN can be achieved at a much lower 
risk to day-to-day operations by transitioning to a CJFSN first.  The CJFSN is the 
logical first evolutionary step towards the DJFSN.  This “build a little, test a little” 
approach will allow gradual development of the required doctrinal, organizational, 
and procedural changes.  
To implement the CJFSN alternative, the team recommends several 
changes be made immediately to the realm of Joint Fire Support.  The 
functionally equivalent organizations should be consolidated in order to 
overcome the cumbersome C2 process of the planned joint fire support 
organization.  The joint responsibilities, and explicit command and decision 
making relationships, should be clearly established.  The tactics, training, and 
procedures for immediate unplanned fire support should be clarified and 
integrated into widely-disseminated Joint Tactical Doctrine and Procedures. 
Tactical decision aides should be developed in support of capability-based 
operations.  The Joint Fires Cell processing time and efficiency would benefit 
from these automated tactical decision aides.  Additionally, they will form the 
basis for fully automated prioritization, pairing, and deconfliction algorithms 
required by the DJFSN alternative.   
  xxx
The DJFSN requires a fully joint common operational picture.  To achieve 
commonality and timeliness of the information, the team recommends a single 
Joint PEO to provide oversight in the design, acquisition, and fielding of a 
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 The purpose of this report is to document and detail the conduct and 
results of the Wayne E. Meyer Institute’s cross-campus study entitled Joint Fire 
Support in 2020:  Development of a Future Joint Fires Systems Architecture for 
Immediate, Unplanned Targets.  Conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) from July through December 2006, this study was led and managed by 
students in the Systems Engineering and Analysis (SEA) curriculum and includes 
the academic efforts and intellectual contributions of numerous members of the 
NPS student and faculty community.  The purpose of the study was to provide 
insight into the theory and execution of Joint Fire Support in order to improve its 
application in future conflicts.  This project fulfills a major portion of the SEA 
student’s academic requirements to be awarded the Masters of Science degree 
in Systems Engineering and Analysis. 
1.2 TASKING 
 Working with their project advisors, students in SEA Cohort Ten (SEA-10), 
were tasked to lead a six-month systems engineering and analysis study to 
investigate alternative architectures to improve the US Department of Defense’s 
(DoD) execution of Joint Fire Support (JFS) in 2020.  Stemming from background 
issued in the Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2) 
Roadmap, study and analysis was conducted of JFS concepts as they pertain to 
the current and planned DoD doctrinal, organizational, and equipment constructs.  
The broad tasking was to “design a conceptual system of systems to enable 
future Joint Close Air Support, Time Sensitive Targeting, and Joint Fires 
missions.”1  The scope of the tasking allowed for exploration of a wide variety of 
topics to determine an area of study with potential for significant impact or 
                                                 
1 Frank. E. Shoup, “SEA-10 Capstone Project Objectives,” Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, 3 April 2006. 
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insight.  Focus areas identified in the tasking were: to identify capability gaps; 
options for the integration of different service air, surface, and subsurface fires; 
and to address Concepts of Operation (CONOPS), systems capabilities, and 
training issues as part of a system of systems for the missions and capability 
gaps identified.2 
 The diverse professional makeup of the SEA-10 Project Team was 
significant to the selection of Joint Fires Support as the area of study.  The team 
consisted of four US Navy officers, two US Air Force officers, and one US Army 
officer.  Each member of this unique team brought with them extensive 
operational experience:  in USN and USAF tactical aviation, USN surface and 
undersea warfare, USN and USA communications and networking operations, 
and USAF acquisition and aircraft maintenance projects. 
 In addition to conducting the bulk of the project work, the team led and 
managed the effort, supported by other student and faculty teams from across 
NPS.  Our team employed the project management tools and methodology 
studied in their course work at NPS. 
1.3 PROJECT METHODOLOGY 
The Project Team utilized a Systems Engineering Design Process (SEDP) 
that fused design and methodology elements from several recognized System 
Engineering experts, including Buede, Blanchard, Fabrycky, and Paulo.3  The 
SEDP is an iterative process that facilitates a methodical approach to a design 
problem.  A tailored SEDP was utilized in the Joint Fires project that was 
composed of three phases:  Problem Definition, Design and Analysis, and 
Decision Making. 
The products of each of the SEDP phases combined to form an overall 
systems architecture for the project.  The systems architecture used follows the 
                                                 
2 F.E. Shoup, “SEA-10 Capstone Project Objectives,” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA, 3 April 2006. 
3 E.P. Paulo, “Systems Engineering and Architecture,” (Class Notes), Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, 2006. 
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model attributed to Buede.4  He describes the overall systems architecture as 
being composed of a functional, physical, and operational architecture.  
Throughout the process of developing and assessing the proposed system of 
systems, the team considered each of the three architectures in the framework of 
the DOTMLPF model (Doctrine, Organization, Tactics and Training, Materiel, 
Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities). 
The purpose of a functional architecture is to provide a framework for all of 
the interactions within a system and within the environment in which the system 
will exist.  It identifies the connections between all of the functional parts of the 
system.  According to Buede, 
The functional architecture defines what the system must do, that 
is, the system’s functions and the data that flows between those 
functions.  The functional architecture of a system contains a 
hierarchical model of the functions performed by the system,…a 
data model of the system’s items; and a tracing of input/output 
requirements to both the system’s functions and items.5 
 
A physical architecture defines the resources and components which 
comprise the system identified in the functional architecture.  These resources 
are identified in a “top-down” manner that creates a hierarchical architecture.  
Buede states, 
The physical architecture of a system is a hierarchical description of 
the resources that comprise the system.  This hierarchy begins with 
the system and the system’s top-level components and progresses 
down to the configuration items (CIs) that comprise each 
intermediate component.  The CIs can be hardware or software 
elements or combinations of hardware and software, people, 
facilities, procedures, and document’s. The physical architecture 
provides resources for every function identified in the functional 
architecture.6 
 
The last architecture to be developed is the operational architecture.  The 
operational architecture combines the elements of the functional and physical 
                                                 
4 D.M. Buede, The Engineering Design of Systems, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000, p. 175. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., pp. 215-216. 
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architectures to completely describe the system design.  This architecture is 
specific enough to begin modeling and conducting analysis of alternatives.  
Buede describes the operational architecture as follows: 
The development process for the operational architecture is the 
activity during which the entire design comes together.  The 
operational architecture integrates the requirements decomposition 
with the functional and physical architectures.7 
 
The process of developing these architectures, described in detail in 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4, enabled us to propose alternative solutions and analyze 
them during the Design and Analysis Phase.  Several alternative system designs 
were assessed and comparisons included analysis of modeling and simulation 
results.  Details of this process and the modeling performed are described in 
Chapter 4 of this report.  Cost, risk, and reliability assessments are discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6.  The Decision-Making Phase was the final step in this project, 
and the rationale and analysis for those decisions are described in the Chapter 7 
of this report. 
1.4 JOINT FIRES EXPLORATION 
 Joint Fire Support (JFS) can be most simply described as coordinated fire 
support from more than one service component.  Because of the challenges 
involved in coordination between services, JFS has historically been an area 
where the reality of joint operations performance falls short of expectations.  
According to the Defense Science Board, 
To take advantage of the full potential for joint fires and close air 
support in a future characterized by non-linear battlespace 
operations, zero tolerance for fratricide and collateral damage and 
emerging expanded capabilities in coordinate-seeking weapons 
(CSW), there must be a commensurate improvement in the 
                                                 
7 D.M. Buede, The Engineering Design of Systems, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000,  
pp. 245-246. 
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approach that our forces employ in command and control for fires, 
both within the Services and in joint fire support across Services.8 
 
The potential benefits of truly “joint” fire support where all services can potentially 
interoperate with all other service are enticing.  By applying a methodical study 
process based on a top-down view of this area of opportunity, the Project Team 
attempted to identify areas of improvement with both Materiel and non-Materiel 
solutions in the context of the DOTMLPF concept. 
1.5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
 The modern battlefield contains a wide variety of weapon systems, each 
with unique capabilities, limitations, tactics, and technology.  Employing these 
weapons, and their associated lethal or nonlethal effects, in a synchronized 
manner to achieve a desired outcome is the essence of fire support.  The 
weapon systems that will be used to affect JFS operate from different 
environments (land, air, sea) and may be operated by different service 
components. The mechanisms by which a commander can improve the 
synergistic effects of these weapons systems can be anything from a small 
organizational structure change to the development of large, complex battle 
management systems. The tactical complexity of this type of situation has 
challenged past leaders and continues to challenge current efforts to deploy a 
system that efficiently utilizes all available resources on the battlefield. 
As a historical reaction to this complexity, major weapon systems and the 
fire support they provide have been deployed and controlled along service and 
functional guidelines.  For example, the methodology and routing for requesting 
artillery support is completely different from the methodology and routing for 
Close Air Support (CAS) requests.  In a similar way, although the methodologies 
for requesting US Army or Marine artillery support are very similar, the routings of 
the requests are through different channels.  Similar distinctions exist for naval 
                                                 
8 Department of Defense, “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Integrated 
Fire Support in the Battlespace,” Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, October 2004, p. 55. 
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fire support providers and close air support, to include a conspicuous separation 
between the Navy/Marine aviation and Air Force aviation request and tasking 
systems.  Despite the differences in request formats and methodologies, the 
basic target information is all essentially identical throughout these processes. 
These organizational or functional fire support request “stovepipes” were 
intended to simplify the problem and allow for relatively efficient movement of 
requests and tasking within the associated systems, but they inhibit the 
movement of requests and/or tasking across these stovepipes.  This placed the 
burden for selection of a fire support asset on the requesting unit, and assumes 
the unit possesses the equipment, training, and routing knowledge to send their 
request.  It also required duplication of capabilities between stovepipes in order 
to minimize response time within each stovepipe. 
The current system can be described using the simplified example in the 
graphical depiction shown in Figure 1.  A forward element, represented by the 
figure at the bottom of the graphic, has identified a target and determined that fire 
support is required.  In the current system, that forward element must choose a 
fire support provider and the associated functional stovepipe to send their fire 
support request through.  In this example, the forward element is capable of 
sending their request through four request pathways: Army artillery, Air Force 
CAS, Marine CAS, or naval gun fire.  There is no way for the forward element to 
know which request pathway will provide the most effective response, in terms of 
both response time and response effects.  If a request is vetted through a 
stovepipe and there are no weapons or providers available to service the 
request, the forward element must then re-send the request through a different 
stovepipe.  These delays and repetitive requests add delays and reduce the 
effectiveness of the response. 
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Figure 1:  Current Fire Support Request System Stovepipes 
An improved concept for Joint Fires should effectively eliminate these 
stovepipes in order to more efficiently use the wide variety of systems deployed 
on, above, or near the battlefield.  The conceptual design could be built to 
efficiently pass requests and tasking orders across these functional or service-
specific stovepipes, or it could eliminate the stovepipes altogether and route all 
requests and tasking orders through a single pathway or methodology.  A 
conceptual system that strikes a balance between these two alternatives may be 
the most effective.  This type of system would transition those requests into the 
appropriate fire support provider stovepipe for tasking and response.  In much 
the same way that a “911” call center connects callers with the appropriate 
emergency response agency (police, fire, ambulance), this conceptual system 
could allow all units with compatible equipment to receive any of the available fire 
support from any available providers.  Using the simplified example and available 
fire support providers shown in Figure 1, the same forward element no longer 
has to choose the functional stovepipe to contact.  The conceptual system shown 
in Figure 2 allows the requesting element to use a common methodology and 
  8
routing to send a request for fire support.  This request is then tasked to the 
“best” available provider.  The choice of which provider is “best” is defined by 
numerous factors including, but not limited to: intent of the request and/or the 
force commander, the availability of the weapon systems, the degree to which 
the weapons are capable of meeting the requested effect, and the characteristics 
of the target. This type of request system would allow for fire support that is 
effects-based rather than fire support that is service-centric.  This conceptual 
system could improve the efficiency of JFS; and when combined with the 
improvements in weapon lethality and precision, it could affect a dramatic 
increase in JFS effectiveness. 
 
Figure 2:  Concept of Operations 
1.6 INITIAL PROBLEM FORMULATION AND SCOPE 
The transformation of the DoD from traditional roles and equipment into 
scalable, expeditionary units demands effective JFS.  The overall reduction in the 
organic fire support capability of proposed future ground and littoral forces is 
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driving a requirement for responsive and reliable fire support from any available 
weapon, regardless of service component.  There is an increased risk to any 
military mission if it cannot get the fire support it needs at the time and place 
needed.  This risk can be reduced through sound operational planning, but not all 
fire support needs can be anticipated.  Military elements that are presented with 
unplanned opportunities that could benefit from effective JFS may not be able to 
take advantage of them due to a lack of timely support. 
It is essential, therefore, that integrated functional, physical, and 
operational architectures are developed that efficiently link joint fires requests 
with weapon system tasking.  Within these architectures, the mechanisms and 
entities processing and tasking the requests to the weapon systems need to be 
identified and assessed.  The most basic needs of such a construct would 
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2.0 PROBLEM DEFINITION 
2.1 NEEDS ANALYSIS 
 In order to understand the challenges of designing a joint fires system, the 
purpose and functions of the proposed system must be completely understood.  
According to Blanchard and Fabrycky, “The identification of a problem and 
associated definition of need provides a valid and appropriate starting point for 
design at the conceptual level.”9  The Needs Analysis that was performed for the 
Joint Fire Support in 2020 began with the identification of a “desire” for Joint Fire 
Support that was based on a real deficiency in execution.  The remainder of the 
Needs Analysis translates the “broadly defined ‘want’ into a more specific 
system-level requirement.”10  By addressing questions such as: What are the 
functions that the system needs to perform? And When and how often does the 
system need to perform these functions?, the Needs Analysis defines the 
WHATs of the problem and avoids the HOWs.11 
2.1.1 Context and Components 
 In order to provide a useful and accurate solution, the designer must first 
completely understand the problem and the context in which it exists.  To do this, 
we must define all of the elements and components that affect the system.  Fires 
are “the effects of lethal or nonlethal weapons” and fire support is defined as 
“fires that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations 
forces to engage enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in pursuit of 
tactical and operational objectives.”12  Joint Fires are simply “fires produced 
during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated 
action toward a common objective.”13  Those fires may be from similar weapon 
                                                 
9 B.S. Blanchard and W.J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis, 4th ed., Pearson 
Prentice Hall, 2006, p. 54. 
10 Ibid, p. 56. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Department of Defense, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, Joint Pub3-09, May 1998, p. I-1. 
13 Ibid. 
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systems like Air Force, and Navy aircraft,  or from completely dissimilar weapon 
systems. 
The challenges to joint fires execution may include the weapon tactics, the 
weapon release authority, or the deconfliction of weapon effects.  Joint Fires are 
not specific to weapon systems or missions, but are defined by their effects and 
the component source.  According to the Joint Pub, 
Joint Fire Support may include, but is not limited to, the lethal 
effects of close air support (CAS) by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, 
NSFS, artillery, mortars, rockets, and missiles, as well as nonlethal 
effects such as EW.14 
 
A common tool used to describe the necessary sequence of events 
leading to destruction of a target is called the Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, 
Assess (F2T2EA) model.15  This sequence of events is often referred to as the 
“kill chain” and covers the entire lifespan of a target, from discovery through 
confirmed destruction.  Although several DoD components, government 
agencies, and contractors have defined alternative models to describe this 
process, the basic process is identical in all of these models.  In the context of 
the F2T2EA model, the proposed system examines the JFS process from the 
end of the track phase through targeting to the beginning of engagement.  The 
F2T2EA model and the portions of the kill chain studied in this project are shown 
in Figure 3. 
                                                 
14 Department of Defense, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, Joint Pub 3-09, May 1998, p. I-1. 
15 US JFCOM, Joint Networked Fires Capabilities JNFC Roadmap, 30 September 2004, p.10. 
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Figure 3:  F2T2EA Concept and Design Area 
 The design challenge of this project was to create a framework for an 
improved system, but the multifaceted nature of JFS required boundaries on the 
areas addressed by this study.  The scope of this project included the actual 
request for fire support, but not the means by which the target was found, 
identified, and tracked nor the methods and equipment by which the necessary 
request data was compiled into the request.  This is the final step of the Track 
phase.  Likewise, future engagements will undoubtedly utilize tactics and 
weapons that are impossible to predict accurately.  For these reasons, this 
design only included the tasking of the weapon to service a target and not the 
future hardware that will be used to send and acknowledge the tasking.  It also 
does not specify the methods or tactics by which the target should be engaged or 
the required outcome from that engagement.  This is the first step in the Engage 
phase.  Additionally, this system design does not include a mechanism for Battle 
Damage Assessment (BDA) of tasked targets or the ability of BDA results to 
force another engagement of the target. 
Another large facet of JFS that was not specifically tackled in this report 
was the deconfliction of joint fires.  Deconfliction of fires is a task that must be 
accomplished throughout fire support planning, tasking, and execution.  This 
includes not only deconfliction between weapon systems (i.e., artillery and CAS), 
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but also deconfliction between weapons effects and the environment (i.e., 
fratricide and collateral damage).  Deconfliction is an area that requires 
considerable future study and although this project does not specifically address 
it, many of the insights gained from this study can be leveraged towards 
improved deconfliction. 
Additionally, the hardware system and methodology used to prioritize 
requests was not studied in this report.  The mechanisms by which the fire 
support requests will be prioritized are assumed to exist.  There are numerous 
methods for prioritization of requests and a future system will have to be built to 
perform a prioritization.  The choice of the best way to prioritize requests is 
another area that will require additional study and analysis outside of this report. 
2.1.1.1 Evolution of Fire Support 
As the lethality and mobility of weapons improves, the process by 
which those weapons are employed should also improve to take full advantage of 
new capabilities.  JFS, as we think of it today, epitomizes the complexity of 
modern warfare and its evolution from battles won by virtue of mass towards 
battles won through synergistic effects.  Fire support for forward ground units is 
not a new concept and it has been, for the most part, the sole dominion of the 
artillery since well before Napoleon.  Although naval gunfire was sometimes used 
in preparation for a ground assault or amphibious landing, it was not used in 
concert with ground force maneuvers until much later.  In fact, the concept of 
non-artillery fire support of ground forces was not practiced until the evolution of 
CAS around the beginning of the 20th century.  Until then, the weapons available 
to each military branch didn’t possess enough range and accuracy to effectively 
support the other and therefore didn’t merit the coordination and training involved 
to do so.  Each service component essentially fought by itself—Army supported 
Army and Navy supported Navy.  As a result of this exclusivity, the organizations 
and procedures for fire support were tailored to the capabilities of the weapons 
systems being employed.  In a simultaneous growth process, the procedures and 
methods of fire support were developed in parallel with the capabilities of the 
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weapon and communication abilities.  This has led to organizations that were 
built to fit the weapon and integrate it into the service branch.  Even today, that 
legacy continues to an extent in the organizations and control systems being 
developed to “include” new weapons into the battlespace. 
The complexity of executing effective fire support can present 
daunting DOTMLPF challenges to military leaders that can result in lost or 
passed up opportunities in training and battle.  Despite the expanded capabilities 
of today’s joint fires, military leaders are sometimes reluctant to completely rely 
on those capabilities or engage the enemy in a way that challenges historical 
truisms.  For instance, despite the plethora of long-range, joint fires available to 
today’s ground commander, they are typically reluctant to advance at a faster 
rate than their artillery support can sustain.  With regard to CAS,  
Recent conflicts in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan have shown Joint 
Close Air Support successes and failures. Since the evolution of 
Close Air Support in Vietnam, the Army and Air Force had grown 
apart. Successes were forgotten and correct doctrine was not 
documented. Differences in equipment, doctrine, attitude and 
outlook inhibited integration.16 
 
Despite the evolution of equipment on and above the battlefield, for the most part 
the fire support integration measures and techniques developed during the 
Vietnam Conflict are still being used today. 
The evolution of technology and its proliferation onto the battlefield 
has enabled changes in the Joint Fires integration processes, but the measures 
used to integrate those fires have not changed significantly.  Due to historical or 
other reasons, the service components have “paired up” and declared 
themselves joint; the Army with the Air Force and the Navy with the Marines.  
Unfortunately, these pairings have not adopted similar organizational structures 
and methodologies that could also be applied to components outside of the pair.  
Fires that are truly “Joint” will include and synchronize weapons from across the 
                                                 
16 A.E. Lindahl, “Integrating Naval Surface Fire Support into an Improved Joint Close Air 
Support Architecture,” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California,  
June 2006, p. 15. 
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spectrum of the armed forces, including traditional air power from all service 
components, artillery, naval fires, guided missiles, and unmanned vehicles.  
Effective Joint Fire Support will be the fusion of these diverse weapons 
capabilities and limitations into a usable benefit for the supported commander.  
Despite this straightforward description, Joint Fires is difficult to execute 
effectively, primarily due to the number of entities and conflicting requirements 
involved. 
JFS in the future should continue to evolve into a system that is 
focused on the effects of the weapon instead of the employment of the weapon.  
This evolved system will be flexible with respect to the weapons available and 
employed because effects can be applied regardless of the weapon.  This 
approach will enable the service components to standardize and restructure their 
JFS organizations into units that are built around generic weapon capabilities or 
functions, not a specific type of weapon. 
2.1.2 Existing Command and Control (C2) Relationships 
 Although sometimes used synonymously, Command and Control are 
separate functions that are applied simultaneously by the military leader.  
Command concepts are primarily applied to organization and authority 
relationships whereas the concepts of Control deal primarily in the flow of 
information and intent.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff define Command and Control as  
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander over assigned and attached forces in the 
accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions 
are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, 
communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a 
commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling 
forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.17 
 
C2 systems bring all applicable information together for collation and decision 
making.  C2 systems, personnel, equipment, and a variety of related procedures 
support the execution of JFS missions. Unity of effort is one of the keys to the 
                                                 
17 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms, Joint Pub 1-02, 12 April 2001, p. 101. 
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effective coordination of JFS.  Vertical and horizontal coordination is also 
essential for effective JFS.  For this reason, service and functional components 
currently provide a hierarchy of fire support coordinators, fire support 
coordination agencies, and liaison officers.  These fire support entities have one 
goal in common—to efficiently direct the use of fire support to accomplish the 
mission.  However, the number and sheer variety of C2 systems challenges 
these entities to comprehend different information from different systems in order 
to make fire support decisions.  For example, the screen displays of a few of the 
more prevalent C2 systems are shown in Figure 4.  Although the information 
displayed by these systems is similar, the presentation of that information is very 




Figure 4:  Sample of C2 System Duplicity 
Currently, each of DoD’s service components use different C2 systems to 
manage its operations.  For example, the Marine Corps maintains the Command 
and Control, Personal Computer (C2PC) as its primary C2 system.  The Army 
maintains the Command Post of the Future (CPOF), part of the Maneuver 
Control System (MCS), at its division level but has separately developed systems 
at other levels, such as Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2) 
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and Blue Force Tracker (BFT).  The Air Force maintains the Global Command 
and Control System, Air Force (GCCS-AF) and the Theater Battle Management 
Core System (TBMCS) as its primary C2 systems.  The Navy maintains a 
completely different version of GCCS called Global Command and Control 
System-Maritime (GCCS-M) as its primary C2 system.  However, the Navy also 
has a capability to receive inputs from TBMCS and is projecting a level of 
interoperability with C2PC.   
 The C2 required for JFS requires intensive coordination between affected 
agencies.  Two interrelated functions account for the complexity of this 
coordination: planning and coordination, and execution planning.  The first of 
these functions is the overall C2 planning process for employing fire support 
assets within a service or functional component during joint operations.  This 
process includes fire support planning and coordination, tactical fire direction 
procedures, air operations procedures, and other general supervisory tasks. 
The second interrelated function involves the tactical planning required to 
execute JFS missions.  This execution planning provides the requisite technical 
parameters—including weather data, terrain, target location data, defenses, and 
weapon system data—needed to deliver accurate JFS.  The many different 
platforms and training and execution requirements set by each of the services 
complicates the process further.  This often leads to a wide variability in the 
execution of Joint Fires between commanders.  For this reason, technical 
execution planning is normally accomplished within a single service or functional 
component, although some input of data may come from outside the service or 
functional component.18 
2.1.3 Existing Organizational Components 
As a result of many years of organizational and leadership refinement, 
today’s military operations are executed under the construct of the Joint Force 
Commander (JFC).  In this chain of command, the JFC is the single responsible 
                                                 
18 Department of Defense, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, Joint Pub 3-09, May 1998, p. II-5. 
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agent for the Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO).  Each military branch which 
operates within the JFAO aligns its service-specific chain of command under the 
JFC and provides its most senior leadership to his support staff.  Establishing 
supported and supporting command relationships among or between 
components helps the Joint Force Commander integrate operations inside the 
JFAO. Although sometimes challenged by service parochialisms, command 
relationships are defined and clarified in the Joint Publications issued by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff.19  However, because every theater of operations is unique, the 
overall military commander must specifically define the command relationships 
within their area of operations.  A generic joint task force upper-echelon 
command hierarchy is illustrated in Figure 5. 
                                                 




Figure 5:  Possible Joint Force Organization (From20) 
Successful military campaigns depend on how effectively all the elements 
of joint fires are coordinated within a Joint Force Area of Operations.  Within the 
JFAO, a high density of friendly weapons systems and air power vehicles, with 
overlapping operating envelopes and flight profiles, must contribute maximum 
combat effectiveness without interfering with each other. All weapon platforms 
must be coordinated effectively without hindering the blue force combat 
maneuvers.  The JFC, through his component commanders, with the assistance 
of their staffs, controls the JFAO at the Joint Operations Center (JOC).  These 
staffs are responsible for the organization, personnel, procedures, and 
                                                 
20 Department of Defense, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint Pub 0-2,  
10 July 2001, p. V-3. 
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equipment necessary to plan, direct, and control joint fires operations by 
coordinating fires amongst the services (and allied forces, when required). 
To execute a plan for Joint Fires, it is imperative that the services be 
flexible, versatile, and have a common understanding of joint doctrinal matters 
and terminology.  Even when speaking the same language, communicating intent 
jointly across the services has been a stumbling block due to cultural and service 
differences in terminology and organization and translating the understanding 
into actionably items that have the intended results.  For example, each service 
has an organization and/or an individual, who plans for the use of air power, 
controls the function of air defense, coordinates air-to-ground support operations, 
and coordinates ground fires.  Each of these entities performs similar, if not 
identical, functions within their service but depending on the component, each 
organization or individual has a different title and command relationship. 
The combatant commanders, through subordinate commands, assign 
responsibilities, establish or delegate appropriate command and support 
relationships, and establish coordinating instructions to effect Joint Fires 
coordination.  Fire support coordination includes efforts to deconflict attacks, 
avoid fratricide, reduce duplication of effort, and assist in shaping the 
battlespace.21  As an example of the complexity of these relationships, the 
coordination of air-to-ground fires is connected through the organizations or 
systems shown in Figure 6.  Keep in mind that Figure 6 only shows the lines of 
authority and communication for air-to-ground fire support (i.e., CAS) and not the 
entire fire support organization.  A complete list of the acronyms used in Figure 6 
is provided in Table 1 following the figure. 
                                                 




Figure 6:  Theater Air Ground System Coordination Links (From22)
                                                 
22 Department of Defense, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, Joint Pub 3-09, May 1998, p. III-8. 
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ABCCC          airborne battlefield command and control 
                        center  
ACE          aviation combat element  
ADA          air defense artillery  
AFARN         Air Force Air Request Net 
AFFOR          Air Force forces  
AFSOC          Air Force special operations component  
AME          air mobility element  
AMLS          airspace management liaison section  
AOC          air operations center (USAF)  
ASOC          air support operations center  
AWACS          airborne warning and control system  
BCD          battlefield coordination detachment  
BDE          brigade  
BN          battalion  
CCT          combat control team  
CRC          control and reporting center  
CRE          control and reporting element  
DIRMOBFOR  Director of Mobility Forces  
DIV          division  
FAC(A)          forward air controller (airborne)  
FSCC          Fire Support Coordination Center  
GLO          Ground Liaison Officer  
JAOC        joint air operations center  
JFACC        joint force air component commander  
JMCC       Joint Movement Control Center  
JOC       Joint Operations Center  
JSTARS        joint surveillance, target attack radar system  
MAGTF        Marine air-ground task force  
MARLO        Marine liaison officer  
MEF        Marine expeditionary force  
MLE        Marine liaison element  
NALE        naval and amphibious liaison element  
RECCE        reconnaissance  
SF        special forces  
SOLE        special operations liaison element  
TAC(A)        tactical air coordinator (airborne)  
TACC        tactical air command center (USMC); 
                      tactical air control center (USN); 
                      tanker airlift control center (USAF)  
TACP        tactical air control party  
TARN       Tactical Air Request Net  
TALCE        tanker airlift control element  
TADC        Tactical Air Direction Center  
WOC        Wing Operations Center 
 
 
Table 1:  Theater Air-to-Ground System Coordination Agencies 
In order to better understand these existing organizational components, 
the following sections (arranged by service component) describe the functions of 
these key service organizations that advise commanders on the use of  
Joint Fires. 
2.1.3.1 Army Fire Support Organizations 
The Army provides the Army Forces Commander (ARFOR) to the 
JFC staff.  ARFOR is responsible for all Army forces within the JFAO and is 
subordinate to the JFC. 
ARFOR establishes a staff to assist him in the execution of his 
duties.  With respect to the coordination of battlefield functions, a Battlefield 
Coordination Detachment (BCD) is created.  The BCD provides direction to 
subordinate army units and acts as the senior liaison between ARFOR and the 
other services.  The BCD is usually collocated with the Air Operations Center 
(AOC) or Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC).  The BCD is also the army’s 
primary liaison with other specialized functions like the Air Force Air Mobility 
Element (AME), the Marine Liaison Officer (MARLO), the Naval and Amphibious 
Liaison Element (NALE), and the Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE).  
  24
The BCD interface includes exchanging current intelligence and operational data.  
The BCD is not a Fire Support Element (FSE), but acts as the ARFOR senior 
liaison element and also can perform many fire support functions.  Figure 7 




































Figure 7:  Simplified Army Organizational Structure for Fire Support 
At the company level, the basic fire support organization is called 
the Fire Support Team (FIST).  The FIST is led by the company Fire Support 
Officer (FSO).  The FIST coordinates field artillery and mortar fire support for the 
company.  When it is available, the FIST initiates the request and helps 
coordinate the delivery of CAS and naval fires.  In addition to the FSO, the FIST 
may directly interface with other specially trained personnel such as the Forward 
Air Controller (FAC), Forward Observer (FO), Air Liaison Officer (ALO), Navy 
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Ground Liaison Officer (NGLO), Combat Lasing Teams, or others. 
At the battalion and brigade levels, the basic fire support 
organization is called the Fire Support Cell (FS Cell).  The FS Cell is led by the 
Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD).  Typically, the senior field artillery 
commander is designated the FSCOORD and therefore serves as the maneuver 
commander’s principal assistant for the integration and application of fire support.  
The FS Cells coordinate field artillery and mortar fire support for subordinate 
FISTs and between adjacent fielded units.  Additionally, the FS Cell helps 
coordinate CAS and naval fires.  The FS Cells are located in the maneuver 
Tactical Operations Center (TOC). 
The division also maintains a FS Cell.  In addition to coordinating 
artillery and mortar support, these units also support specialized functions like 
the Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC), coordination with Army aviation 
units, Electronic Warfare (EW) support elements, Air Force Tactical Air Control 
Party (TACP) planning, and others. 
The Army uses a wide variety of equipment to complete its fire 
support missions.  The equipment fielded today will no doubt be improved in the 
future.  The following discussion of particular systems, in addition to providing a 
general background in the topic, is designed to outline the desired functions of 
such systems so they may be reproduced in the overall system design. 
In order to conduct coordinated artillery and mortar fire support 
efficiently, each FIST team is equipped with a Target Location, Designation, and 
Hand-off System (TLDHS) or similar equipment that is compatible with the 
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS).  The TLDHS allows 
operators to accurately determine their own location, the location of their targets, 
and digitally transmit (hand-off) this data to supporting arms elements through 
AFATDS.  Once received by AFATDS, AFATDS terminals at the FS Cell provide 
fully automated support for planning, coordinating, controlling, and executing fires 
and effects.  The TLDHS and AFATDS combination may be networked from the 
FIST to the BCD, providing a common operating picture to connected units. 
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Portions of this network (usually at the battalion and below) are 
maintained via FM radio links (SINCGARS/JTRS radios) which have low data 
rates (1-10 kb/s).  Above the battalion, more robust connectivity via the TCP/IP 
backbone significantly reduces network latency.  However, since virtually all of 
the requests for fires originate from a company FIST or a battalion FS Cell, data 
rates remain a concern. 
The primary method to request Close Air Support (CAS) involves a 
VHF/UHF radio and the Air Force Air Request Network (AFARN).  While 
targeting information may have been collected via TLDHS/AFATDS, the CAS 
request will be sent by voice and recorded manually onto a DD Form 1972, Joint 
Tactical Air Strike Request (The AFARN will be described in the Air Force  
section below). 
2.1.3.2 Navy Fire Support Organizations 
 The Navy provides the Naval Forces Commander (NAVFOR) to the 
JFC staff.  NAVFOR is responsible for all Navy forces within the JFAO and is 
subordinate to the JFC.  Due to the close ties with the Marine Corps, NAVFOR 
has two primary divisions under him: the Commander, Task Force (CTF), which 
deals with the fleet, and the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), which 
deals with all Navy support to the Marine Corps.  A Marine Expeditionary Force 
(MEF) can be compared directly to a MAGTF and their differences have more to 
do with overall campaign timing than organizational structure. 
The CTF has three divisions that cover Navy operations from the 
shore to the open ocean:  the Commander, Landing Forces (CLF), the 
Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF), and the Commander, Carrier 
Strike Group (CSG).  A simplified Navy organizational structure for fire support is 
shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8:  Simplified Navy Organizational Structure for Fire Support 
 In order to effectively and efficiently address the dynamics of Navy 
and Marine landing operations, two, cross-service, single point-of-contact 
organizations have been created.  The first of these is the Supporting Arms 
Coordination Center (SACC), which coordinates all artillery and most naval 
surface fires.  The second is the Tactical Air Coordination Center (TACC), which 
coordinates air support from Marine or Navy aviation units.  The SACC and 
TACC serve the requirements of both the Navy and Marine Corps.  
Organizationally, the SACC and TACC usually report directly to CATF, but there 
are many other formal and informal command and control links which evolve 
during an operation. 
During the initial phase of an amphibious operation, while control 
and coordination responsibility of supporting arms is still afloat, the Marine Air-
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) typically provides the landing force representation 
in the Navy’s Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC).  Functioning as a 
Fire Support Element for the naval forces, the SACC is supervised by the 
supporting arms coordinator. 
In an amphibious operation, the Commander, Amphibious Task 
Force (CATF) exercises the overall responsibility for coordination of Naval 
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Surface Fire Support (NSFS), air support, and landing force artillery fire support.  
When the Commander, Landing Force (CLF), normally the MAGTF commander, 
is established ashore, the CATF may pass this responsibility to the CLF.  Once 
the passage of control ashore is executed, the CLF will coordinate fires within the 
AO.  When control is afloat, the senior naval fire support coordination agency is 
the SACC.  The SACC is then the primary agency that coordinates and controls 
all supporting fires for the CATF in order to establish the landing force ashore. 
Despite the operation of the SACC, control of the naval surface fire 
assets (i.e., the ships which carry the naval guns, rockets, and missiles) is 
retained by the CVBG.  The carrier battle group maintains strike planning and 
operations staffs to deconflict SACC direction and to perform specialized support 
for certain assets.  These relationships are further defined in Joint Pub 3-02, 
“Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations,” and Joint Pub 3-02.1, “Joint Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures for Landing Force Operations.” 
The Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) controls all air operations 
within the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA). Like the Air Force Air Operations 
Center (AOC), the TACC is responsible for planning and conducting Close Air 
Support (CAS).  Its air support control section coordinates with the SACC to 
integrate CAS and other supporting arms.  The organizational relationships of 
these Navy and Marine organizations are illustrated in Figure 9. 
Within the TACC, the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) is the 
central coordination point for all aircraft support.  The DASC assigns direct air 
support aircraft to terminal control agencies, provides aircraft ingress and egress 
route instructions, disseminates advisory information, and other key tasks.  The 
DASC conducts its operations via a communications network referred to as the 
Tactical Air Request Net (TARN). 
 A number of specially trained personnel are required to provide 
comprehensive support.  The Navy has established the positions of Air and 
Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer 
(NGLO), and Forward Air Controller (FAC). 
 The Navy has fielded the Naval Fire Control System (NFCS) to 
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assist in the coordination of most naval fires.  A few other, stand-alone, systems 
are required in certain cases.  In the future, NFCS should have a degree of 
interoperability with AFATDS.  These systems have significant capability overlap 
which has been noted by various government agencies including the General 
Accounting Office.23 
The primary method to request CAS involves a VHF/UHF radio to send 
the request via voice over the TARN.  While targeting information may have been 
collected via NFCS or AFATDS (if a Marine unit), the CAS request will be 
translated by a human operator into a Joint Tactical Air Strike Request. 
2.1.3.3 Marine Corps Fire Support Organizations 
The Marine Corps provides the Marine Forces Commander 
(MARFOR) to the JFC staff.  MARFOR is responsible for all Marine Corps forces 
within the JFAO and is subordinate to the JFC. 
The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) or Marine 
Expeditionary Force (MEF) command element organizes a Force Fires 
Coordination Center (FFCC), which is responsible for fire support coordination 
within the Marine Corps and the primary interface with the SACC for coordinated 
actions. At each level below the MEF command element (division, regiment, and 
battalion), a Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) is established as an 
advisory and coordination agency within the Ground Combat Element (GCE). 
The FFCC and each FSCC is staffed with representatives of the various Marine 
Corps and Navy supporting arms. 
The Marine Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) establishes and 
maintains facilities for liaison and communications between supported units and 
appropriate control agencies. An air officer leads the TACP, normally with two 
teams assigned per maneuver battalion.  Their mission is to inform and advise 
the supported ground unit commander on the employment of supporting aircraft 
and to request and coordinate air support missions.  In addition, the TACP 
provides final attack control for CAS missions.  A simplified Marine organizational 
                                                 
23 Department of Defense, Acquisition of the Naval Fires Control System, Office of the 
Inspector General Report No. D-2002-036, January 8, 2002, pp. 1-49. 
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Figure 9:  Simplified Marine Organizational Structure for Fire Support 
The supporting Marine Corps artillery battalions provide Shore Fire 
Control Parties (SFCPs) to supported units. The SFCP consists of a liaison team 
and a spot team.  The liaison team is headed by a Navy officer and is located in 
the supported battalion’s Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC).  The FSCC 
is a single location that centralizes communications facilities and personnel for 
the coordination of all forms of fire support.  The FSCC is organized and 
supervised by the FSCOORD and is collocated with, and in support of, the 
operations officer.  The SFCP spot team is led by a Marine Corps officer and is 
normally employed with the maneuver companies. 
 There are very few differences in fire support between the Marine 
Corps and Army below the brigade (Army) and regiment (Marine Corps) levels.  
Army FSEs and Marine FSCCs are virtually identical in function and the fire 
support execution methods and data processing equipment used are the same.  
  31
Even though they are organizationally tied to the Navy, the Marine Corps has 
designated the AFATDS, not NFCS, as their preferred system for fires support. 
2.1.3.4 Air Force Fire Support Organizations 
The Air Force provides the Air Forces Commander (AFFOR) to the 
JFC staff.  AFFOR is responsible for all Air Forces within the JFAO and is 
subordinate to the JFC. 
The Air Force component commander exercises operational control 
over assigned forces through the Air Operations Center (AOC) or Joint Air 
Operations Center (JAOC).  The AOC implements the Theater Air Control 
System (TACS).  Subordinate TACS elements perform the tasks of planning, 
coordinating, monitoring, controlling, reporting, surveillance, and executing air 
operations.  This includes creating and distributing the daily plan for flying 
operations called the Air Tasking Order (ATO).  The TACS elements include: the 
Air Support Operations Center (ASOC), the Control and Reporting Center (CRC), 
the Control and reporting Element (CRE), Tanker and Air Lift Control Element 
(TALCE), and TACPs.  TACS functions may also be executed from airborne 
assets such as the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), the Joint 
Surveillance, Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), and/or an Airborne 
Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC).  The AOC coordinates CAS 
and other joint air operations that support land, amphibious, and maritime forces.  
It does so through the ASOC, TACPs, Forward Air Controllers (FACs), and Air 
Liaison Officers (ALOs). The following paragraphs describe key Air Force 
elements that relate to JFS. 
The ASOC is the key Air Force TACS agency involved in 
coordinating CAS for ground forces.  It performs coordination, direction, and 
control of the air effort to support land forces’ maneuver objectives, usually at 
Army corps level and below.  The ASOC is an operational component of the 
TACS, subordinate to the AOC.  The ASOC processes requests for “immediate 
CAS” which have been submitted by ground maneuver forces.  These requests 
are sent via voice over the AFARN in the Joint Tactical Air Strike Request format.  
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The ASOC also tasks aircraft to service those requests in accordance with 
command guidance.  The established TACS organization between the Air Force 
and Army elements is depicted in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10:  Air Force/Army Coordination Links (From24) 
Additional information on the functions of specific Air Force C2 
elements can be found in Joint Pub 3-09.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS),” and Joint Pub 3-56.1, “Command and 
Control for Joint Air Operations.” 
The Air Force TACP is a control element usually stationed with and 
supporting an Army combat unit.  Air Force TACPs are not normally aligned with 
Marine Corps combat units.  Located at Army corps, division, brigade, and 
battalion levels, TACPs are tailored to the unit they support.  The TACP provides 
the interface between the unit it supports and the TACS system.  The TACP 
advises the ground commander on the capabilities and limitations of tactical 
aircraft and weapons and assists in planning for tactical air support.  The TACP 
also provides final attack control for CAS missions.  However, TACPs above 
brigade do not normally perform Forward Air Controller (FAC) functions.25  
                                                 
24 Department of Defense, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, Joint Pub 3-09, May 1998, p. II-13. 
25 Department of the Army, Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone,  
Field Manual 100-103, October 1987, p 1-8. 
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TACPs are under the operational control of the ASOC or senior TACP element 
deployed. 
The FAC, also known as a Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC), 
is a member of the TACP who executes control of close air support aircraft and 
integrates air attacks with fire and maneuver of supported ground forces.  He 
may operate from an aircraft airborne or from a ground position.  The FAC 
maintains contact with the CAS aircraft, other TACS elements, and the 
appropriate fire support coordinator or ground commander. His airspace 
functions include coordination of air attacks with field artillery, Air Defense 
Artillery (ADA), and appropriate aviation elements of the supported force in the 
target area.26 
The Control and Reporting Center (CRC) is directly subordinate to 
the TACC and is the primary TACS radar element concerned with decentralized 
execution of air defense and airspace control functions.  Within its area of 
responsibility, the CRC directs the region or sector air defense; provides threat 
warnings to friendly aircraft; provides aircraft guidance or monitoring for both 
offensive and defensive missions; relays mission changes to airborne aircraft; 
coordinates control of missions with subordinate TACS elements and other 
agencies; and provides positive identification of aircraft.  During joint operations, 
the CRC assigns appropriate hostile airborne targets to the Army air defense 
system through the air defense liaison officer (ADLO) located within the CRC.27  
The AWACS aircraft provides radar control and surveillance of air traffic.  It can 
also function as an alternate CRC and as a limited-capability AOC.  As a result of 
its elevated line-of-sight, the AWACS can establish communication linkages with 
the ground AOC allowing it to also communicate warnings and surveillance 
reports to other designated liaison agencies, such as an ASOC. 
Joint Surveillance, Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) is a joint 
surveillance, targeting, and battle management C2 system designed to provide 
near real time, wide-area surveillance and targeting information on moving and 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 Department of the Army, Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone,  
Field Manual 100-103, October 1987, p. 1-8. 
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stationary ground targets.  JSTARS is a component of the theater wide battle 
management system and/or a C2 platform that conducts ground surveillance to 
develop an understanding of the enemy situation and supports attack operations.  
These functions support the primary mission of JSTARS, which is to provide 
dedicated support of ground commander requirements.  However, the JFC 
determines the most effective use of JSTARS based on the situation and the 
concept of operations. 
 The Air Force does not have an automated system to process 
requests for fires that could be closely compared to TLDHS, AFATDS, or NFCS.  
Wide variation in the installed equipment across the fighter/bomber fleet would 
create serious interoperability challenges for such a system.  JFIIT has compiled 
a matrix of system compatibility, which is included in Appendix A.  While there 
have been numerous exercises and demonstrations that have, in some fashion, 
connected the “sensor-to-shooter,” none of these solve the problem across  
the organization. 
2.1.3.5 Special Operations Forces Fire Support 
Organizations 
The Joint Forces Special Operations Component Commander 
(JFSOCC) (or Joint Special Operations Task Force [JSOTF] commander, if 
established) is the commander within a unified command, subordinate unified, or 
JTF on the proper employment of SOF.  The JFSOCC is responsible for 
establishing planning and coordinating Special Operations (SO) or accomplishing 
such operational missions as they may be assigned.  The JFSOCC will normally 
be the commander with the preponderance of SOF and the requisite C2 
capabilities. When the geographic combatant commander designates a JFC, the 
theater special operations command may be designated as the JFSOCC. The 
JFSOCC exercises overall responsibility for coordination of all fire support in 
support of SO and, when tasked, fire support using SOF assets in support of 
other elements of the joint force.  A simplified SOF organizational structure for 





















Figure 11:  Simplified SOF Operational Structure for Fire Support 
The Joint Special Operations Air Component Commander 
(JSOACC) is the commander within the joint force special operations component 
responsible for planning and executing joint special air operations and for 
coordinating and deconflicting such operations with conventional, non-SO air 
activities. The JSOACC normally will be the commander with the preponderance 
of assets and/or greatest ability to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, control, and 
support the assigned joint special operations aviation assets.  The JSOACC may 
be subordinate to the JFSOCC (or JSOTF commander) or to any non-SO 
component or directly subordinate to the JFC.  The Special Operations 
Command and Control Element (SOCCE) is the focal point for the 
synchronization of SOF activities with land and maritime operations.  The 
SOCCE is normally employed when SOF conduct operations in conjunction with 
a conventional force.  It is collocated with the command element of the supported 
commander and performs C2 or liaison functions directed by the JFSOCC (or 
JSOTF commander).  The focus of the coordination is on the synchronization of 
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effects and deconfliction of fires.  To do this, the Special Operations Liaison 
Element (SOLE), who works directly for the JFSOCC, places liaison officers 
where required with the JFACC and/or JFC staff as appropriate within service 
component C2 facilities and operations centers.  The SOLE coordinates during 
development of the ATO to reconcile duplicate targeting, resolve airspace 
deconfliction, and prevent fratricide of SOF contingents spread across  
the battlefield. 
Naval SOF assigned to the JFSOCC are normally under the C2 of 
a Naval Special Warfare Task Group (NSWTG) or Naval Special Warfare Task 
Unit (NSWTU).  The NSWTG is a naval special warfare organization that plans, 
conducts, and supports SO in support of fleet commanders and JFSOCCs (or 
JSOTF commanders).  The NSWTU is a subordinate unit of a NSWTG. 
The Special Operations Coordination Element (SOCOORD) serves 
as the primary advisor to an Army corps or MEF commander with regard to SOF 
integration, capabilities, and limitations.  The SOCOORD is a functional staff 
 
element of the corps (or MEF) operations officer (G-3) and serves as the J-3 SO 
advisor, with augmentation, if the corps (or MEF) is established as a JTF. 
2.1.3.6 Summary of Existing Fire Support Organizations 
 Each of the services has tailored its own organizations, personnel, 
and systems/equipment to aid them in prosecuting targets.  This has resulted in 
duplicate systems and agencies.  In many instances, direct comparisons 
between organizations can be made both in terms of capabilities and span of 
control.  Additionally, the diversity of these systems and organizations has 
created personnel training requirements that are different but parallel.  The 
understanding that an Army FS Cell is functionally comparable to a Marine Corps 
FSCC would come easily to all involved.  However, in some areas, like in C2 
systems of record and favored fires support systems, the differences are 
designed into the system and much harder to reconcile.  For example, if each 
service uses different information systems to maintain their C2 common 
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operating picture, no one can be certain that decisions made across the services 
have comparable quality.  Even if the input data to these systems is identical, the 
different presentations and functions may not permit comparable analysis by the 
decision makers.  The growth of unmanned systems, especially unmanned 
vehicles, continues to complicate these C2 systems further.  A comparison of the 
C2 differences between the services is illustrated in Table 2. 
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Table 2:  Parallel Organizational Structures 
2.2 CURRENT FIRE SUPPORT REQUEST SYSTEM 
 Within the organizational structure of these units there are processes and 
methodologies for requesting fire support.  There are currently three basic 
categories of fire support request systems in the DoD:  Land-Based Indirect Fire 
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Support, Naval Fires Support, and Close Air Support.  Each of these categories 
utilizes a different fire support request system or method and often has service-
specific differences within each functional category. 
Land-based Indirect Fire Support is lethal or nonlethal fires that are 
provided to a forward element from an artillery or rocket battery within weapons 
range.  For the purposes of this study, this fire support comes from another unit 
and does not include indirect fire systems that are organic to the requesting unit, 
such as mortars.  Land-Based Indirect Fire Support is discussed in further detail 
in Section 2.2.1. 
Naval Fires Support is lethal or nonlethal fire support provided to a forward 
element by a naval vessel.  This category of fires typically encompasses naval 
gunfire from surface ships, but can also include missiles launched from 
subsurface assets.  It does not include naval aviation strike assets.  Naval Fire 
Support is described in further detail in Section 2.2.2. 
Close Air Support is fire support from the air by fixed and rotary-wing 
aircraft against targets in such close proximity to friendly forces that detailed 
integration with the fire and movement of those forces is required.  CAS is 
currently being employed by all service components, although Army doctrine 
refers to it as “Close Combat Attack” instead of CAS.28  CAS request systems 
also vary between services.  CAS is described in detail in Section 2.2.3. 
Each of these individual fire support request systems has been doctrinally 
established to work independently of the others and they do not possess a robust 
capability to interface with the other systems.  With few exceptions, there are no 
established capabilities to redirect a request to another fire support category if for 
some reason it cannot be fulfilled by the requested method.  These request 
systems are isolated in both communications and organizational pathways.  
Complicating the situation, the service components are not doctrinally obligated 
to provide support equally to the other services.  Section 2.2.4 describes the 
                                                 
28 T. Crutchfield, W.T. Golden, IV, and T. Throne, Jr., "Close Combat Support," 
[http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_00-9_part1.htm], Sep 06. 
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challenges to the current JFS request routing system.  A simplified summary of 
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Table 3:  Summary of Service Doctrinal Obligations for Fire Support 
2.2.1 Land-Based Indirect Fire Support 
 In land warfare, the generation of maximum combat power results from 
the most efficient use of firepower.  Firepower is defined as the battlefield effects 
produced by all weapons and attack systems available to the force commander. 
Many of these weapons and attack systems are in the category of land-based 
indirect fire support.  Army Field Manual 6-20 describes fire support as follows: 
Indirect fire support is the collective and coordinated use of land-
based indirect-fire weapons, and other lethal and nonlethal means 
in support of a battle plan. Fire support includes mortars, field 
artillery, air defense artillery in secondary mission, and air-delivered 
weapons.  Nonlethal means are EW capabilities of military 
intelligence organizations, illumination, and smoke. The force 
commander employs these means to support his scheme of 
maneuver, to mass firepower, and to delay, disrupt, or destroy 
enemy forces in depth. Fire support planning and coordination exist 
at all echelons of maneuver. Fire support destroys, neutralizes, and 
suppresses enemy weapons, enemy formations or facilities, and 
fires from the enemy rear area. In most land-based large-scale 
conflict, fire support systems such as field artillery or mortars could 
be the principal means of destroying enemy forces.29 
 
                                                 
29 Department of the Army, Fire Support in The Airland Battle, Field Manual 6-20, May 1988, 
p. 1-2. 
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 A typical unplanned request for Army artillery support from an Army unit 
should follow the chains of command and communication as detailed below and 



















Figure 12:  Typical Request Routing for Army Unplanned Artillery Support 
 A soldier alerts the company FIST team of a target.  A TLDHS is used to 
accurately fix the target position.  The TLDHS data is transferred into AFATDS 
and additional target information is added as required.  The AFATDS file is 
transmitted up the organizational chain of command via a radio network (EPLRS, 
JTRS, or other).  The AFATDS file is reviewed within the battalion, brigade, and 
division as required.  At the brigade level and higher, C2 information from the 
CPOF system is also reviewed.  The FSCOORD within the division FS Cell 
determines which artillery battery should provide support and assigns  
the tasking. 
 At this point, the artillery battery receives the AFATDS file for action and 
other organizations, like the BCD or involved FS Cells, also can review the 
updated file for their information.  Up to this point, the target data has remained in 
the AFATDS system and has been transmitted via radio networks.  However, 
within the artillery battery’s Fire Direction Center, key data from the AFATDS file 
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(i.e. target coordinates, etc) are now re-entered into the artillery control system.  
Additionally, the artillery battery must now make voice contact with the originating 
FIST team to coordinate the fire mission.  Voice communications confirm the 
firing solutions and ordnance type, etc.  This process is described in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13:  Artillery Call for Fire Process (After30) 
For planned fires, this organizational construct may be tailored to a more 
direct connection from the FIST or FS Cell to the artillery battery.  However, for 
unplanned fire support, coordination through the division FS Cell and FSCOORD 
are required.  In any event, even in the more complicated case, decision making 
is completed at a maximum of the O-5 level and the majority of the steps are 
completed within the AFATDS system. 
                                                 
30 Department of the Army, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire, Field 
Manual 6-30, July 1991. 
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2.2.2 Naval Fire Support 
 Naval Fire Support includes all weapons, other than naval aircraft, that are 
launched from the maritime environment.  This includes naval gunfire from 
surface ships and missile fires from surface and subsurface ships.  Naval guns 
are employed from cruisers (CG-47 class with two 5-inch guns) and destroyers 
(DDG-51 with one 5-inch gun; and DD-1000 with two 155 mm or 5-inch guns 
planned).  Tomahawk Land-Attack cruise Missiles (TLAM) can be launched from 
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, depending on loaded inventories. 
Employment of naval fires support currently requires a qualified forward 
observer team (FO) ashore to propose a target to the applicable Fire Support 
Element (FSE).  This request is forwarded up the chain of command (Marine 
Corps) to the senior FSE known as the shore based Fire Support Coordination 
Center (FSCC).  A Forced Fire Coordination Center (FFCC) may also exist at the 
MAGTF/MEF level. 
The FFCC directs both the TACC (for air support) and regiment or 
battalion FSE (for artillery and naval guns).  To provide naval gun fire support, 
the FFCC contacts the navy Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC) to 
have a ship tasked for support of the request.  The ship is assigned to support 
the requesting FO either for a single mission, a designated period of time, or until 
further notice.  The ship then establishes radio communication with the FO and 
provides fire support as requested.  When an FSCC is not established ashore, 
the forward observers report directly to the SACC.  Ships will then typically be 
pre-assigned as gun fire support units and will be available for tasking by 
designated FO. 
TLAM employment is directed by the Commander, Joint Task Force 
(CJTF) strike cell.  A formalized record message exchange, along with mission 
plans are sent to the ship and the weapons are employed as directed.  
Employment of tactical Tomahawk missiles is expected to be ordered by the 
CJTF to the JFMCC then the ship or submarine.  The initial request for fires 
would come from the forward observer, be validated at the CJTF level then 
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tasked.  If release authority and mission planning software was available to the 
SACC (or firing unit), the communication flow would follow that used for  
naval gunfire. 
Current employment of naval guns in a fire support role closely resembles 
the employment of artillery.  A qualified forward observer establishes and 
authenticates radio contact on a specified frequency with the pre-designated fire 
support ship. Calls for fire are passed via voice to the ship and repeated back to 
the observer to ensure that they were correctly understood.  The coordinates are 
entered into the gun weapon system aboard the ship, which calculates aiming 
parameters, and spotting round(s) are shot.  Corrections from the impact of the 
spotting round(s) are passed by voice from the forward observer and additional 
spotting shots, if required, are made until the aim point is correct.  The target is 
then engaged with the requested volume and type of fire. 
 Errors in initial round impact stem from a variety of sources.  Position error 
of both the ship and forward observer even with GPS can be several meters.  
Accuracy of the map in regards to the datum used will also introduce errors in 
positioning.  Aerodynamic effects on the round, especially at longer ranges 
achieved by the new Extended Range Guided Munitions (ERGM) may not be 
consistent throughout the fires mission and cannot be perfectly evaluated prior to 
shooting.  Precision in the quality of the target position is inherently difficult due 
to equipment limitations.  Laser range finder accuracy in range determination is 
very good, but the lack of portable laser ring gyroscopes limits bearing accuracy 
to that obtainable by a digital magnetic compass.  These errors combine to 
produce a “danger close” range of 750 meters which require direct 
communication between the firing ship and forward observer to “walk” the 
spotting rounds onto the target.31 
The installation of the Mk 160 5-inch/62 caliber upgraded gun weapon 
system on cruisers and destroyers, along with the automated Naval Fires Control 
System (NFCS) provides a digital interface from the forward observer to the 
                                                 
31 Department of the Army, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire,  
Field Manual 6-30, July 1991, p. 4-4. 
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SACC and fire support ships.  NFCS receives and processes digital data 
requests from various USMC fire support systems via radio frequency data links 
from a Military Ruggedized Tablet (MRT) or Personal Digital Assistant (PDA)-
based system via AFATDS or directly depending upon specific system 
configuration.  Fire missions are planned within NFCS and tasked to the support 
ships.  NFCS also displays a common operational picture of the littoral area of 
operations and highlights conflicts of air, sea, and land assets with respect to 
fires response.32 
NFCS is used along with AFATDS and Command and Control Personal 
Computer (C2PC) to maintain a coherent operational picture of the battlespace.  
Transfer of data between these systems is transitioning to a fully automated 
digital information exchange.  Data link information is also received from USAF 
Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS) Air Tasking Orders and Air 
Control Orders.  NFCS displays conflicts with air assets along the 5-inch 
projectile flight path, but these displays are dependant upon the quality of the 
inputs for aircraft positions from these other systems and operator interaction.  
One advantage of naval surface fires is the ability to reposition the firing ship.  
This action may allow for a suitable gun-target line to resolve airspace conflicts. 
Another Naval Fire Support weapon is the Tomahawk.  Improved TLAMs 
and the Tactical Tomahawk variants are both expected to be in the inventory in 
2020.  Currently, TLAM missions are designed by planning system detachments, 
either land-based or afloat on the carrier.  The mission data is then sent to the 
shooter (surface ship or submarine) via tactical data link along with the tasking 
and authority to fire.  Ship’s company plots the missile flight path to the first pre-
planned waypoint, ensuring the missile is deconflicted with nearby air and naval 
traffic, and fires the TLAM.  Planned improvements in the Tomahawk Afloat 
Planning System (TAPS) will allow the battle group commander to plan or modify 
TLAM missions while at sea.33 
                                                 
32 G. T. Kollar, “Naval Fire Control System,” Field Artillery, March/April 2005. 
33 Federation of American Scientists, “MK 37 TOMAHAWK Weapon System (TWS), Afloat 
Planning System (APS), Theater Mission Planning Center (TMPC),” [http://www.fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/ship/weaps/tmpc-aps.htm], Oct 06. 
  46
“Tactical Tomahawk has the capability to be reprogrammed in-flight to 
strike any of 15 preprogrammed alternate targets or redirect the missile to any 
Global Positioning System (GPS) target coordinates”.34  This capability for GPS 
targeting allows for rapid mission planning to be conducted by the firing unit 
(CG/DDG/SS(G)N) as a potential time sensitive fire support response.  While this 
planning and re-tasking option will reduce the time required for response, the 
TLAM as a weapon is not well-suited for un-planned targets.  One reason for this 
is the subsonic fly-out of the TLAM that limits response time, especially for long 
range targets. Although the range of a TLAM is nearly 1000 miles, at 600 mph 
only targets within 100 miles could be reached within 10 minutes.  “Tactical 
Tomahawk will have a limited capability against time-sensitive targets. Unlike an 
armed unmanned aerial vehicle or the unmanned combat aerial vehicle, Tactical 
Tomahawk cannot be recalled, and its ability to loiter over the battlefield is limited 
by its relatively short endurance.”35 
In a typical request for Naval Surface Fires from an ashore Marine Corps 
combat element should follow the chains of command and communication as 
shown in Figure 14. 
                                                 
34 Federation of American Scientists, “BGM-109 Tomahawk,” [http://www.fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/smart/bgm-109.htm], Oct 06. 
35 S. Morrow, “What Comes after Tomahawk?,” Proceedings, retrieved on October 2, 2006, 











































Figure 14:  Marine Requests for Artillery or CAS 
The Marine Corps GCE uses a TLDHS to accurately fix the target position.  
As before, the TLDHS data is transferred into AFATDS where additional target 
information is added as required.  The AFATDS file is transmitted up the chain of 
command to the battalion, regiment, and division FSEs, the FSCC, and/or the 
FFCC via a radio network (EPLRS, JTRS, or other).  At the FFCC, for a Marine 
Corps-only scenario, C2 information from the C2PC system is also reviewed.  If 
this fires request will involve naval surface fires, C2 information from GCSS-M is 
also considered. 
For the case where Marine Corps mortars/artillery will support, the FFCC 
director tasks the appropriate providing battery.  Again, while the AFATDS file is 
forwarded to the providing battery, key targeting data is re-entered into the 
artillery weapon control systems.  Also, a voice link from the providing battery to 
a forward observer (usually in the originating FSE) is established to coordinate 
the fire mission. 
For the case where Naval Surface fires will support, the FFCC must 
interface with the SACC.  At this point, the original AFATDS request is re-entered 
into NFCS.  GCSS-M is also reviewed.  Once the SACC decides on a course of 
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action for potential NSF support, leadership for the MAGTF, CATF, and or CTF 
must be notified (also known as the Supported and Supporting commanders in 
some theaters).  A tasking message for the Commander of the providing ship is 
generated and the NFCS targeting information is passed to that ship via standard 
ship-to-ship communication networks.  The providing ship makes voice contact 
with a FO within the requesting organization to direct fires.  The CAS case will be 
described in the following section. 
In the Marine-supporting-Marine example, decision making is completed 
at a maximum of the O-5 level and the majority of the steps are completed within 
the AFATDS system.  However, in order to get support from the Navy, the level 
of leadership complexity increases to the O-7 level with a corresponding number 
of extra steps.  From a communications/networking perspective, re-entering the 
data into NFCS and the integration of a separate C2 system, GCCS-M, is 
problematic.  It is unlikely that a Marine FO, using his AFATDS system, will be 
completely in synch with the providing ship, using its NFCS system.  So the 
coordination step requires comprehensive voice communications support, which 
is often difficult for ship-to-shore message traffic.  The same dilemma is posed by 
using different C2 “systems of record” which, by definition, display  
information differently. 
2.2.3 Close Air Support 
 According to Joint Pub 3-09.3, “CAS is air action by fixed- and rotary-wing 
aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and 
that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of 
those forces.”36  CAS includes a variety of weapons delivered from Air Force, 
Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft.  These weapons include guided and unguided 
bombs, rockets, and missiles as well as nonkinetic effects delivered by aircraft.  
CAS effects on the target vary dramatically according to the weapons employed 
and the platform that employs them. 
                                                 
36 Department of Defense, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support 
(CAS), Joint Publication 3-09.3, Change 1, 2 September 2005, p. GL-7. 
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Close Air Support engagements are inherently difficult to perform well due 
to coordination and integration challenges.  This employment difficulty stems 
from several sources, including the physical differences between the land and air 
environments, the contrasts in equipment speeds, and the communications 
challenges between these two settings.  These are some of the many reasons 
why CAS employment typically requires a qualified FAC or JTAC who is 
intimately familiar with the supported friendly force status and intent.  The JTAC 
and the TACP, which the JTAC is a part of, is the ground commander’s sole 
conduit to CAS fires and the primary mechanism he uses to maximize the 
employment of CAS.  Joint Pub 3-09.3 describes the commander’s 
responsibilities for CAS employment: 
CAS is an element of joint fire support.  Synchronizing CAS in time, 
space, and purpose with supported maneuver forces increases the 
effectiveness of the joint force…The supported commander 
establishes the priority, timing, and effects of CAS fires within the 
boundaries of the land, maritime, SOF, or amphibious force’s area 
of operations.37 
 
The “synchronization” of CAS in time and space with other fires is an art 
that requires training, practice, and understanding of the ground situation  
and intent. 
CAS requests can be divided into two categories: planned CAS and 
immediate CAS.  Planned CAS is typically requested to support offensive 
operations or as a preventative measure based on anticipated target 
opportunities.  Immediate CAS requests are reactive by nature and are 
unplanned but too urgent to wait for tasking via the day-long ATO cycle.  
Whether tasked via a preplanned or immediate request, there are typically CAS 
assets available or “on-call” to strike evolving targets.  The concept of “Push 
CAS,” where CAS aircraft are launched to an on-call mission in anticipation of an 
immediate CAS request, was used extensively in Operation Iraqi Freedom but its 
successful application is reliant on an abundance of CAS assets. 
                                                 
37 Department of Defense, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support 
(CAS), Joint Publication 3-09.3, Change 1, 2 September 2005, p. I-1. 
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In a typical immediate request for CAS, the ground commander will have 
to first decide to request CAS in lieu of or in addition to other fire support.  Upon 
making the decision to request CAS against a target, the commander instructs 
his TACP to send a request via the AFARN (Army request) or the TARN (Marine 
request).  The critical request information is compiled by the TACP onto Section I 
of the DD Form 1972, Joint Tactical Air Strike Request, and sent via voice over 
the AFARN to the ASOC, or over the TARN to the DASC.  The portion of the 
target and engagement data in block 8 of the DD Form 1972 is commonly 
referred to as the “9-line.”  Figure 15 shows a sample of the DD Form 1972.  
(Note:  There are actually 21 different versions of the 9-line.  Please see 
Appendix B for an explanation of data formats.) 
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Figure 15:  DD Form 1972, Joint Tactical Air Strike Request (From 38) 
                                                 
38 Department of Defense, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support 
(CAS), Joint Publication 3-09.3, 2 September 2005, pp. B-5. 
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When the request is received at the ASOC or DASC, it is aligned with one 
of the available CAS providers available.  The ASOC typically only has Air Force 
aircraft available for tasking and the DASC typically only has Navy and Marine 
aircraft available for tasking.  In practice, if either the ASOC or the DASC do not 
have enough CAS providers to fulfill their requests they contact the other to 
attempt to pass target requests. 
As the CAS request system exists today, there is very little, if any, 
consideration given to the synchronization of CAS providers and desired effects.  
The immediate CAS requests are sent to the ASOC or DASC and an available 
asset is assigned to fulfill each request.  These pairings are completed in a more 
or less “first come, first serve” manner with only some consideration given to 
urgency of the request (“troops in contact” requests are given priority). 
The target tasking orders that fulfill the requests are then passed to the 
CAS aircraft via a UHF/VHF voice transmission.  Once the aircraft arrive near the 
target area, they contact the JTAC directly via UHF/VHF radio.  The JTAC 
provides the CAS aircraft with a brief description of the ground situation, the 
known or suspected anti-aircraft threats, and describes any deconfliction 
measures in place to protect the fire support providers (separating the aircraft 
from other aircraft or ballistic fires like artillery).  The JTAC then verbally or 
digitally passes the target data to the CAS aircraft using the “9-line” format or 
derivative.  Once the CAS provider has the required information and a situational 
awareness of the engagement area, the JTAC will then typically send a verbal 
description of the target to the aircraft to aid in acquisition of the target during the 
attack.  Once the attack begins, the JTAC or FAC will give final weapons release 
approval to the CAS aircraft only when he is satisfied that the aircraft is attacking 
the intended target.  Because of the amount of coordination involved to execute a 
CAS engagement, it typically takes at least 10 minutes from first radio contact 
with the aircraft to weapons impact on the first target in the area.  Subsequent 
target attacks in the vicinity take less time.  A typical Army request for Air Force 
CAS support should follow the chains of command and communication as 
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Figure 16:  Army Request Routing for Artillery or AF CAS 
 A soldier alerts the company FIST of a target.  Again, a TLDHS is used to 
fix the target position and the data is routed up the chain of command via the 
AFATDS system and the radio networks.  At one of the command levels up 
through the BCD, based on the target characteristics, permission is given to a 
FO, FAC, TACP, or JTAC to contact the ASOC to request Air Force CAS 
support.  At this point, the AFATDS file is manually transcribed into the “9-line” 
request format and read to the ASOC.  The ASOC (within the AOC) considers 
the resources it has under its control and the C2 operational picture as presented 
by TBMCS (or GCCS).  It makes a decision to task one of its assets and makes a 
voice connection to that platform via one of many possible communications 
routes.  (The complexity of aircraft communications and data links is shown in 
Appendix A, JFIIT Interoperability assessment matrix.) 
 The ASOC may pass part or all of the “9-line” data to the tasked platform 
with instructions to contact the originating FAC, TACP, or JTAC.  The aircraft 
commander will confirm “9-line” data, coordinate with the FAC or JTAC, and 
complete the engagement. 
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 While it has been technically demonstrated that AFATDS data can be 
passed to specifically configured aircraft and presented in the cockpit via 
particular data links and special on-board systems, this capability is not high 
priority for the services as it could not be generally applied across an aircraft fleet 
with divergent communication link and on-board system baselines.  Continued 
translation to a verbal 9-line format is far more likely. 
2.2.4 Challenges of a Joint Fire Support Request 
 The examples above outline the basic chains of command and 
communication for fires support requests.  The environment becomes 
significantly more complicated when non-standard service pairings are 
considered.  The example in Figure 17 illustrates the coordination and decision 
making complexity within a Marine request for JFS from providers outside of 

































Figure 17:  Coordination and Decision Making Complexity of JFS 
The Project Team approached this analysis from the perspective of 
standard, published organizational constructs that preserve standard operational, 
tactical, and administrative lines of control.  This was done for two primary 
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reasons.  First, it allowed decision-making to be completed within the boundaries 
of fielded systems and current training methods.  It also allowed system failures 
to be traced back to the appropriate level of command within the owning service. 
The team concedes that there are probably an infinite number of ways to 
assemble an organizational structure if different assumptions are applied.  For 
example, a capabilities-based construct could be used to greatly simplify the 
overhead associated with chains of command.  However, that construct would 
assume perfect interoperability of all underlying systems.  The team deemed an 
approach like this one as more risky than the one chosen. 
 Coordination and decision making complexity examples are shown in 
Appendix C.  Networking and automated information system complexity is 
evaluated in Section 4.3.1.  Conclusions from these diagrams may be found in 
the metrics summary table in Section 2.6. 
2.3 FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
 The SEDP (as described in Section 1.3) transforms the stakeholders’ 
requirements and needs into a set of system functions and process descriptions 
that generate information for decision makers and provide input for the next level 
of functional development.  These system functions and process descriptions 
also form a “blueprint” of what the system needs to do and what performance 
criteria are used for assessment of alternative solutions.  This set of artifacts 
forms the functional architecture. 
 Many Systems Engineering experts refer to this process as a functional 
analysis.  According to Blanchard and Fabrycky, a function is “a specific or 
discrete action (or series of actions) that is necessary to achieve a given 
objective.”39  The objective of this analysis is to determine what the system must 
do but not constrain the solution space into how it must be done. 
 
2.3.1 Input-Output Modeling 
                                                 
39 B. S. Blanchard W. J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis, 4th ed., Pearson 
Prentice Hall, 2006, p. 62. 
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The JFS system and environment can be described on the basis of the 
inputs and the outputs of the system, and this Input-Output model serves as a 
key artifact of the overall functional architecture.  These system flows include 
Controllable and Uncontrollable Inputs and Intended and By-Product Outputs. 
The Input-Output (I-O) Model for a fire support request is critical to ensuring the 
end-product is flexible and responsive to any operating environment in which the 
end-product may be used.  The I-O Model was a tool used by the Project Team 
to help scope and bound the problem. 
The system being proposed consists of a process that accepts a valid 
target, generates and transmits a tasking order to the “best provider” based on 
the current rules of engagement, commander’s intent and COP.  The intended 
output of the system is secure tasking orders with an expectation of improved 
timeliness and reduced risk of fratricide.  Unintended results of the system were 
evaluated to include risk of transmission intercept; undetected errors in the fires 
request; and uncontrollable environmental interference preventing transmission 
of request or tasking.  The process used for determining the inputs and outputs is 
described in more detail in Appendix C.  Neither the input nor the output items 
were prioritized in this modeling step.  The resulting input and output model is 
described in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18:  Input-Output Model 
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2.3.2 Functional Decomposition of Joint Fires 
Due to the complexity of the existing Joint Fire Support system and the 
constructs chosen thus far, a time-flow approach was taken to perform the initial 
functional breakdown.  In a general request for fire support, the following steps 
are completed: 
• First, details on a potential target are collected by a fielded unit. 
• Second, when a unit decides it cannot prosecute the target with its 
resources, the target details are forwarded to higher organizational 
levels in some form of Joint Fire Support (JFS) request. 
• Third, at the higher organizational levels, a data collection and 
synthesis occurs.  There are organizational constraints on the 
range of data that can be collected so the data synthesis that 
results is a function of the data input.  Steps two and three can 
happen repeatedly until one of the organizational levels has the 
ability to act. 
• Fourth, a decision and a corresponding action plan are made. 
• Fifth, the decision and action plan are disseminated to affected 
organizational levels. 
• Sixth, the involved organizational levels execute the action plan. 
This functional flow is outlined in Figure 19.  The functional flow within the 
project design space aligns with the Track, Target, and Engage functions 
described by the F2T2EA model. 
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Tasking to 
Provider 










Figure 19:  Functional Flow Diagram of the System 
These system functions are multi-faceted and inter-related.  This system’s 
primary functions include: sending the JF request, processing the JF request 
(which includes making a decision based on collected information), sending the 
JF tasking to the provider, and receiving feedback from the provider that the 
tasking was either accepted or rejected (reclama).  Additionally, this system must 
have a sufficiently capable communications infrastructure to transmit and receive 
the necessary information.  The following are descriptions of what is involved in 
each one of these overarching, top-level functions (see Appendix D:  Functional 
Flow Analysis, for a more detailed analysis): 
 
Send JF Request:  This system function involves the process of 
gathering information about the target, the requester, and the desired effects on 
the target.  The output of this function is a majority of the actionable information 
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for the rest of the system.  (See Appendix B for more information about fire 
support request formats) 
Process JF Request:  This function involves gathering information from 
other sources to help decision makers develop a preferred course of action.  The 
ability to pull data from C2 systems regarding position of Blue/Red forces, as well 
as other on-going operations, and link this information with provider availability is 
a key component of this function.  This function will also prioritize each request 
within the context of the larger area of operations.  It will also provide a listing of 
necessary actions to deconflict a particular fires provider with the target area (i.e. 
avoid flying aircraft through artillery landing zones).  The output of this function is 
all available information to make a preferred requester/provider pairing.  This 
quality of the output is highly dependent on the source data. Based on the 
information available to the appropriate decision-maker, a preferred course of 
action will be selected. 
Send JF Tasking to Provider:  At this point, the request along with 
relevant additional information will be transmitted to the fires provider.  This may 
be the first time the fires provider has been contacted regarding a particular 
mission, so complete and accurate information transfer is important. 
Provider Accepts/Reclamas Tasking:  Based on the mission tasking 
and current provider status, there is an opportunity for a provider to opt out of a 
tasking.  Until the designated fires provider accepts a tasking and coordinates (as 
required) with the requesting unit, the management structure will continue to 
track the fires request. 
Communication:  Underlying these other system functions, this system 
requires communication.  Lack of adequate communications is a primary failure 
mode of this system so it will be tracked as a stand-alone function. 
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2.3.3 F2T2EA Functional Analysis 
 The “Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess” kill chain forms the basis 
of the Joint Fires chronological process.  The target type is an “unanticipated, 
immediate target” that was not planned to be struck and needs to be serviced 
outside of the normal air tasking order planning cycle.40  An analysis of the 
functional sequence and the chronological order of the functions provide 
additional insight into the design problem.  Additionally, the data that must be 
utilized by each of these functions must be identified.  The movement of essential 





















































































Figure 20:  Context Diagram of Functional and Data Flow 
2.3.4.1 Track Functional Analysis 
During the track phase, the requester has a valid target position 
and maintains contact throughout engagement.  The request message is sent to 
                                                 
40 Secretary of Defense, Commanders Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting, 
Department of Defense, 22 March 2002, p. I-2. 
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the appropriate authority for processing and approval.  Target updates may be 
made through the same process until ordnance is delivered. 
The request for fires process is subdivided into a series of 
sequential events.  First, a formatted request message is created (either voice or 
data message).  Regardless of the method used, the request message is sent 
and receipt is acknowledged by the receiving entity.  The request may be filtered 
through several levels of command based on organizational structure, rules of 
engagement, and commander’s intent.  Next, the target is approved as valid for 
prosecution and assigned a priority.  The following items would normally be 
considered prior to validating the request: proximity to friendly forces; presence 
of special operations or coalition forces without real-time blue force tracking; 
battle damage assessment from previous attempts against target; collateral 
damage estimates; military law or Intel pre-set no-fire zones; and request 
duplication.  The validated target is then forwarded to a target-provider pairing 
authority and/or an automated algorithm within the target system function. 
2.3.3.2 Target Functional Analysis 
 The targeting phase begins with a validated target.  To generate a 
provider tasking the system will assess desired effects, engagement options, 
assets available, location of available assets, and target environment.  The 
algorithms required to generate the pairings can be automated or manually 
processed within a system, organization, or staff. 
The request processing function and the assignment of a fire 
support provider are intertwined, but the methodology options to determine the 
pairings of the requests with the providers is a unique function with numerous 
options.  Regardless of the specific methodology involved, a method or process 
is needed to perform the function of matching or pairing a request with a  
weapon system. 
 The system should allow providers responding to a validated target 
to be re-tasked, if required.  If a higher priority target “pops up”, assets on the 
ATO with lower priority targets should be considered as available providers.  
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Depending on operational tempo, it may not be advantageous to change the 
ATO. However lessons learned from Desert Storm indicate that “flexibility of the 
ATO must be improved to account for changes, shifting priorities and real time 
target requirements as the campaign progresses.”41 
 When the provider-target pairing (and deconfliction functional 
process, if required) is completed, the authority to task the asset is obtained and 
tasking message is generated. 
2.3.3.3 Engage Functional Analysis 
 The engagement phase begins when the tasking order is 
transmitted to the designated fires provider and receipt is acknowledged. This 
tasking can be voice or a data message specific to the provider platform 
receiving the order (i.e., NFCS, AFATDS, ATWCS, Link 16, etc.).  The provider 
should have the capability to return the task to the tasking authority (reclama or 
cantco [can not comply] for authorized reasons such as low fuel state or lack of 
weapons).  Additionally, the requesting unit should be informed of the tasking 
and, at a minimum, be provided with a reply delineating who is providing the 
support and when it should be expected. 
 Concurrent with the provider tasking, an asset to provide battle 
damage assessment (BDA) should be identified. For the targets considered, time 
sensitive in direct contact, the requester is assumed to be capable of providing 
this BDA. 
 For some targets, it may be required to establish direct 
communications from the provider to the requester.  This may include “Danger 
Close” situations with artillery or naval guns, and most close air support missions 
rely on voice communications to prevent fratricide. 
 The proposed system does not consider the actual engagement.  
Once the provider is tasked and the requester is informed.  The engagement 
becomes a matter of the tactical operation of the weapon platform.  BDA is 
presumed to feed into the common operating picture so that destroyed targets 
                                                 
41 Department of the Navy, “U.S. Navy in Desert Storm and Desert Shield,” 
[http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/dstorm/ds6.htm], Sept 06. 
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are not re-attacked.  Similarly, requests for re-engagement are treated as a new 
request with an updated priority based on current operational situation. 
2.3.4 Functional Hierarchy 
The functions identified in the F2T2EA functional analysis were distilled 
and arranged into a hierarchy of functions.  The advantage of this construct is 
that it allows analysis of functions based on functional groupings instead of a 
chronological sequence. 
The Track phase of the F2T2EA process is simply the transmission of the 
fire support request data.  The next phase of the system can be sub-divided into 
four distinct functions: process request, match user to provider, task the provider, 
and send tasking feedback to the requester.  Once tasked, the provider 
acknowledges the receipt of the tasking by accepting or declining the tasking. 
This reply from the provider defines the end state boundary of this system 
design.  All of these functions are enabled by the communication of data, intent, 
and authority between the functions.  The hierarchy of functions for the proposed 






















Figure 21:  Functional Hierarchy 
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2.4 NEEDS ANALYSIS 
 In accordance with the SEDP, the stakeholder’s needs and desires were 
decomposed, assessed, and compiled in an Analysis of Needs. 
2.4.1 Stakeholder Analysis 
The primary purpose of stakeholder analysis is to identify the people or 
agencies that are relevant to the design problem and to determine their needs, 
wants and desires with respect to it.42  Due to the size and complexity of the 
design problem, and the broad scope of the JFS study area, determining the 
stakeholders was a difficult task.  Thanks to the joint nature of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s student body, the Project Team was able to speak with 
numerous groups of students intimately familiar with JFS procedures and 
challenges.  The service-diverse makeup of the team also improved the team’s 
ability to identify and contact stakeholders both on and off-campus.  Throughout 
the stakeholder analysis process, the stakeholders were asked to specifically 
identify and discuss their “needs, wants, concerns and desires” for a Joint Fire 
Support system of systems in the year 2020. 
During the interview process the team conducted several trips to visit 
stakeholders, arranged video teleconferences, and made numerous telephone 
interviews with stakeholders outside of the local area.  Group meetings were held 
periodically with the student and faculty stakeholders identified at NPS.  All of 
these interviews were vital to the process of extracting the specific and overall 
expectations of a proposed JFS system. 
Stakeholders for a JFS system are a diverse group with different 
perspectives and priorities.  Identifying the perspective of the stakeholder not 
only assisted with locating other stakeholders with a similar perspective, but it 
also helped the team to understand the motivations for the system needs and 
wants identified by the stakeholder.  The perspectives of the identified 
stakeholders run the gamut between decision makers and end users in the field.  
                                                 
42 B. S. Blanchard, and W. J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis, 4th ed., Pearson 
Prentice Hall, 2006, p. 323. 
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The stakeholders’ perspectives were considered when the team began fusing the 
numerous stakeholder needs and wants into a manageable and conclusive list. 
The decision making stakeholders have the authority to make impacting 
and final project decisions when multiple design choices are available.  For a 
Joint Fire Support system that may include tasking of joint military assets, one of 
the primary decision makers is Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).  Additionally, 
the Combatant Commander (COCOM) and the acquisition leadership of each 
service component were also identified.  JFCOM has established the Joint Fires 
Integration and Interoperability Team (JFIIT) at Eglin AFB, Florida to “act as the 
lead agent for USJFCOM to investigate, assess, and improve the operational 
effectiveness of joint fires.”43  The team contacted JFIIT and conducted several 
telephone interviews.  Additionally, the team traveled to JFIIT in  
June 2006 and met with them again at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, 
California in October 2006.  JFIIT’s insights were vital to the identification of  
JFS needs. 
 The organizational leadership entities of any proposed JFS system would 
certainly have a significant input into the decision maker category.  This includes 
leadership utilizing the system to lead, direct, and protect their forces.  At higher 
command levels further from the battlefield, the military leader’s needs and wants 
are not the same as the needs and wants of the battlefield commander.  For this 
reason, the team consulted with mid-level military leaders from all of the combat 
services.  Through trips to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, Fort Irwin, and Nellis AFB, 
Nevada the team was able to gather the wants and needs of a wide range of 
military leaders involved in JFS.  At Fort Sill, the team interviewed the USMC 
detachment responsible for training Marines to operate AFATDS and its 
associated systems and later the AFATDS program manager for software 
development.  At Fort Irwin, the team interviewed National Training Center 
exercise participants in the field during maneuvers and assisted JFIIT personnel 
with data collection efforts during the exercise.  At Nellis Air Force Base, the 
                                                 
43 Department of Defense, “Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Team (JFIIT),” 
[http://www.jfcom.mil/about/com_jfiit.htm ], May 06. 
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team consulted with the cadre of Air Warrior, the organization responsible for the 
CAS component of the National Training Center exercises.  Additionally, the 
team met with the Joint Test & Evaluation agency for Joint Fires Coordination 
Measures and the Joint Air to Ground Operations Group. 
 The team had the unique opportunity to attend the National Fire Control 
Symposium in Tucson, Arizona to discuss JFS with both defense contractors and 
academia.  The involved agencies that presented concepts for future JFS 
included Raytheon, NAVSEA, MIT Lincoln Labs, and Lockheed, among others. 
The most obvious group of stakeholders for a JFS system is the engaged 
troop requesting the JFS.  Discussions with numerous combat veterans on NPS, 
at Fort Sill, and at Fort Irwin provided the team with a very solid understanding of 
the desires for this group of stakeholders.  Additional information on the methods 
used to identify and specific comments made by the stakeholder can be found in 
Appendix D. 
After fusing the input from all of the stakeholders, the following list of 
“needs, wants, concerns and desires” that defines the characteristics of any 
proposed JFS system.  The list below is arranged in relative order of importance: 
• Efficient Turn-Around Time On Fire Support Requests 
• Reliable System 
• Very High Level Of Availability 
• Flexible Communication Methods 
• Ability To Manually Override Any Automation 
• Easy To Maintain And Setup 
• Simple Training 
• Scalable System 
• Interoperability With Current Platforms 
• Share A Common Awareness 
• Efficient And Accurate Decision Support 
• Reliable Archiving Of Historical Message & Tasking Data 
• Uncomplicated, Straightforward System Operation 
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2.4.2 Effective Need 
The Needs Analysis process allows for a summation of the stakeholder 
defined needs into a refined and summarized need statement.  Based on the 
current state of JFS, the anticipated future capabilities for JFS, and the needs 
and desires of the stakeholders involved, the effective need that will drive the 
proposed system design and define the functional, physical, and operational 
architectures of the solution is to: “Define an operationally feasible Joint Fires 
request, coordination, and tasking architecture that enables rapid battlefield 
effects for the Commander.”  Any system design alternatives will be measured by 
their ability to satisfy this effective need statement. 
2.4.3 Hierarchy of Objectives 
The individual needs identified through stakeholder analysis and review of 
source documents were consolidated and organized into the Objectives 
Hierarchy shown in Figure 22.  System objectives are composed of functions and 
attributes.  This Objectives Hierarchy allowed the Project Team to develop 
relevant metrics and measures of effectiveness used to evaluate the 
performance of design alternatives.  A detailed discussion of the system 

























Define an Operationally Feasible Joint Fires Request, Coordination, and Tasking 
Architecture that Enables Rapid Battlefield Effects for the Commander.
 
Figure 22:  Objectives Hierarchy 
2.5 NECESSARY SYSTEM OBJECTIVES 
The functions and attributes that the proposed system must possess can 
be traced to three sources: the intended environment of the system, essential 
stakeholder needs, and analysis of the source documents requesting the system.  
The Project Team sorted and evaluated these objectives according to the 
primary needs the proposed JFS system will support.  These objectives have 
been segmented according to the objectives hierarchy and are described below. 
The primary system objectives are:  Request, Process, and Task, 
Coordination, and Operational Feasibilities.  The sub-objectives that make up 
these top-level system objectives are described Figures 23 and 24.  Any 
proposed system must efficiently process a joint fires request and then select an 
appropriate provider.  The processing of the request must be accomplished in 











Figure 23:  Request, Process, and Task Objectives of the System 
The proposed system must provide efficient procedures for tasking of 
effects-based requests and must be able to pass those tasking orders to a 
variety of weapon systems in a format that is useable.  A variety of methods and 
procedures exist to request fire support depending on the service, type of 
delivery platform, and area of operations.  Any proposed JFS system must 
simplify the request process and standardize the information required to engage 
the target. 
The prioritization, pairing, and deconfliction algorithms used in this 
process must be flexible in order to support a variety of operational environments 
and changing ROE in support of the commander’s intent.  A single, fixed 
algorithm for pairing, prioritization or deconfliction is insufficient to support the 
broad spectrum of commander’s intent.  Dynamic algorithms, or a selection of 
algorithms that provide varying degrees of control, collateral damage 
considerations, and asset risk are appropriate and required to support a variety 
of operations and enable the process to be scaled and tailored to the current 
environment. The system must also possess key attributes related to the 










Figure 24:  Coordination Objectives of the System 
 The proposed system must integrate the individual service capabilities into 
a joint fires effort, standardize training, tactics and procedures, and consolidate 
and fuse a variety of C2 information.  It should provide greater horizontal and 
vertical integration.  The final top-level system objective is operational feasibility 










Figure 25:  Operational Feasibility Objectives of the System 
Feasibility encompasses the foundations required to actually produce and 
field the family of systems that enable joint fire support.  In short, the system 
must work in the way that it was intended to work.  Operational feasibility must be 
assessed in the fielded environment and it must meet or exceed accepted levels 
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of performance.  A JFS system, as the basis of its design, should be 
interoperable, usable, reliable, available, and sustainable over the duration of an 
operation  
or mission. 
In order to meet the need for interoperability, the system under 
consideration must be able to accept requests from all four service components, 
SOCOM, and potential allied or coalition forces and pass data and tasking orders 
along to a similar variety of providers.  Individual fielded systems, including 
request input devices, radios, data fusion tools, and C2 systems should meet 
specified usability, reliability, maintainability, and availability requirements 
developed in the detailed design.   
The usability of the system is an attribute that assesses or determines the 
ease-of-use of interfaces.  It should include system efficiency, errors, and 
satisfaction of the user.  Reliability of the system refers to the ability of the 
system to perform and maintain its designed function in routine, hostile, or 
unexpected situations or circumstances.  The standard for maintainability should 
be that the system will be maintained in or restored to the specified working 
condition within a set standard of time, provided the appropriate maintenance is 
performed in accordance with the designed maintenance procedures and 
available resources.  Availability standards refers to the degree to which a 
system or sub-system is available and operable.  In simple terms, it is the time a 
system is available to perform the function it was designed to perform. A true 
assessment of Operational feasibility can only be done on a more detailed, 
physical SoS design.  Reliability of the conceptual systems is qualitatively 
assessed in chapter 6, Risk and Reliability 
2.6 SYSTEM METRICS 
 The necessary system attributes and essential functions defined in the 
previous sections were assessed and divided into those objectives that could be 
directly measured (quantifiable metrics) and those that could only be subjectively 
assessed or validated (qualitative metrics).  The Objectives Hierarchy developed 
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in Section 2.4.3 was studied to determine how to assess satisfaction of those 
needs.  The results of that analysis were the metrics that should be evaluated.  
Several quantifiable metrics were identified for evaluation using modeling and/or 
simulation.  Those metrics are: 
1. Processing Time (for a Request to be Serviced) 
2. Pairing Effects Ratio 
3. Number of Systems Involved (in the Request-to-Tasking Process) 
4. Number of Decision Points (involved in the Request-to-Tasking 
Process) 
5. Number of Steps Involved in the Process 
6. Number of Process Gaps (in the Request-to-Tasking Process) 
7. Blue Force casualties.  
 
These metrics can each be traced to an identified need in the 
Objectives Hierarchy, as seen in Figure 26. 
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EFFECTIVE NEED:
Define an Operationally Feasible Joint Fires Request, Coordination, and Tasking 
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Figure 26:  Traceability of Quantifiable Metrics to Identified Needs 
Qualitative metrics were identified and assessed based on discussions 
with stakeholders and among team members.  Additionally, qualitative metrics 
were influenced or defined by the environment in which any JFS system will 
operate in and the capabilities of the current JFS system.  A summary listing of 
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Table 4:  Performance Metrics of System Objectives 
 These metrics will be used to compare proposed JFS system alternatives 
through modeling, simulation, risk assessments, and subjective evaluation by 
subject matter experts. 
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3.0 PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURES 
 Continuing with the deliberate SEDP and building on the functional 
architecture developed in Chapter 2, alternative physical architectures were 
developed.  By design, a physical architecture “should provide resources for 
every function identified in the functional architecture.”44  To do this, the physical 
alternative must be built in a way that meets the identified needs and fulfills the 
identified functions.  The physical architectures generated by the Project Team 
accomplished this because they were conceived in the context of the DOTMLPF 
construct and address the uncertainties of several scenario concepts.  This 
section will first describe the proposed system alternatives.  Then, scenarios will 
be used as the backdrop for evaluation of those alternatives presented.  The 
anticipated environment and the associated threats to a JFS system are also 
elaborated as part of the development of the physical architectures. 
3.1 GENERATION OF ALTERNATIVES 
The team began developing alternatives for the system with an 
understanding of the operational environment and the stakeholder needs.  Using 
concepts developed from the stakeholder discussions or linked to the user-
defined needs and wants, the team developed numerous distinct alternative 
concepts for the proposed system.  The methodology and concepts developed 
during the team’s generation of alternative architectures is discussed in more 
detail in Appendix E. 
 The alternative generation efforts produced five alternatives that were 
assessed for feasibility.  Three distinct alternatives were determined to be 
feasible architectures in the year 2020 and are described in the following 
sections.  It is important to note that the alternatives all assume a similar level of 
peripheral materiel acquisition.  For instance, current plans for improvement in 
communication abilities for FOs include some type of digital entry device that can 
send data (equivalent or follow-on to TLDHS).  Additionally, a continued 
                                                 
44 D.M. Buede, The Engineering Design of Systems, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000, p. 246. 
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improvement in networking infrastructure and the maturation of the Global 
Information Grid (GIG) is assumed for all three alternatives. The environment the 
alternatives will exist in is a factor in defining the feasibility of alternatives and 
therefore need to be included and addressed. 
3.1.1 Alternative 1:  Status Quo Plus 
 The JFS process will certainly evolve between now and 2020.  There are 
already programs under development that will attempt to meet the needs of JFS 
in 2020 and beyond.  The Status Quo Plus alternative is an expansion of the 
current “as is” system based on the growth path of existing programs of record.  
This system alternative is based on realistic improvements in both capabilities 
and materiel during this timeframe, but it also retains many of the current aspects 
of fires support organizations and processes. 
 With respect to doctrine, the relationships between the services are not 
projected to fundamentally change.  The Marine Corps remains closely linked to 
the Navy, and the Army to the Air Force.  Each service continues development of 
its own command and control systems, although information sharing between 
them is still considered a benefit to interoperability. 
 With respect to organization and leadership, technological advances 
permit faster transmission of battlefield data through the same hierarchical 
structures used today.  Where duplication of functionality exists between services 
(e.g. the FFCC (Marines), BCD (Army), and SACC (Navy)) a separate but equal 
relationship remains.  There is no effort to consolidate these organizations to a 
more comprehensive joint capability. 
 With respect to materiel, each service continues its essentially 
independent development efforts.  Systems which provide service to fielded 
troops and to delivery platforms continue to be thought of as mutually exclusive 
projects, stratified by service, development community, and prime contractor.  
Interoperability is thought of as a “connector” that links otherwise distinct 
development efforts.  Service experimentation is characterized by configuring 
very specialized data channels to complete a specific mission rather than viewing 
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data transmission as a utility that can be broadly applied for any and all missions.  
Artillery requests can be sent digitally to the requester’s parent service for 
processing and pairing.  For example, although the Army and Marines both use 
AFATDS, or an AFATDS derivative/follow-on, their databases and assets remain 
functionally separated and requests do not freely flow between these two 
services.  Continued development of the Marine version of AFATDS will allow 
communication directly to NFCS through a data converter resulting in some 
degree of shared targeting database. 
 The pairing of requests and providers for all other JFS requests is 
primarily completed using a blended methodology based on service component 
of the requesting party and a weapon system priority.  The Air Force and Navy 
are continuing the practice of “push CAS” to expedite servicing of tasking orders. 
 The command and control structure that forms the organizational 
framework for the sharing, processing, and tasking of JFS in the Status Quo Plus 
alternative is depicted in Figure 27. 
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Figure 27:  Status Quo Plus Alternative Architecture 
The requester is a forward element, such as a FO or JTAC, routing a 
request for fire support up the chain of command.  In this architecture, the call for 
fire request is sequentially sent to the next organizational level and the target is 
either engaged with assets available to that organization or the request is 
forwarded to the next echelon for tasking.  If the request is passed up to the 
Division or Corps Operations Center, that agency has the communications and 
coordination ability to send the request to a joint functional organization for 
support, such as the ASOC, DASC, or SACC.  The request is then vetted within 
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those organizations and a provider is selected and tasked for support of  
the request. 
3.1.2 Alternative 2:  Centralized Joint Fire Support Network 
 This alternative will enable a fire support request to be sent into a single 
decision making organization and then allocated and tasked to a provider.  Of 
these three alternatives, this alternative most closely resembles the “911 Call 
Center” concept discussed in Section 1.5.  The requesting unit would send a JFS 
request to one processing entity that is either a single organization at one 
physical location (like a JAOC), or geographically dispersed virtual organization.  
The function of this organization will be to receive, acknowledge, process, pair, 
and task the requests to a provider.  This organization maintains interfaces with 
and integrates portions of similar organizations such as the SACC, BCD, FFCC, 
and ASOC. 
With respect to doctrine, the roles and missions of the services do not 
fundamentally change, but both the Joint doctrine and the service doctrine 
change to reflect functional interoperability with respect to JFS.  The Marine 
Corps remains closely linked to the Navy, and the Army to the Air Force, but 
broader implementation of JFS procedures improves performance between the 
pairs.  Changes in doctrine have very little impact on the DoD acquisition process 
or acquisition planning. 
 With respect to organization and leadership, significant changes to the 
request routing procedures increase the availability of fire support providers.  
Headquarters level organizations that previously shared similar functions are 
consolidated and combined.  The organization of JFS-related entities is not as 
vertical as the current system, especially prior to selection of a provider.  The 
reduction in organizational complexity, the shift from voice to data messages, 
and technological advances in communication systems result in faster 
transmission of battlefield data through this JFS network.  Overall processing, 
pairing, and decision making is faster because the JFS resource owners are 
organizationally intertwined and combined. 
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With respect to materiel, the services teamed up to develop and field a 
common data entry device that allows transmission of requests back to the 
centralized processing agency. This common data entry device is interoperable 
with artillery systems but not other providers. Interoperability with the other 
providers is partially achieved through commonality of other installed equipment.  
Service specific organizations continue to use separate, weapon system-specific 
equipment to task providers. 
  
Training requirements are simplified for most personnel in the JFS 
network due to system commonality.  The reduction in specialized talents and 
training reduces manning problems for requesting unit types.  As a result of 
common training requirements, there is a greater diversity of service and 
functional experience mixed throughout the JFS network.  This amalgamation of 
fire support expertise improves the common knowledge base of personnel within 
the JFS entities. 
 
This process and the framework for the organization and coordination 


































Figure 28:  Centralized Joint Fire Support Network Architecture 
The Centralized JFS Network functions as follows:  the requests for fire 
would be sent primarily as a digital data packet through RF or IP-based 
communications, but units would also have a backup ability to send requests 
using RF voice.  A reply acknowledging receipt of the request, and the 
notification of provider tasking and impending fire support, would be sent back to 
the requesting unit (via the same method).  The effects-based pairing of requests 
with providers would be accomplished by the Joint Fires Coordination Cell.  
Weapon system tasking orders would then be formatted to the provider’s needs 
and sent to the tasked weapon system using established or legacy tasking 
mechanisms.  Of course, as with the existing system, if the provider is unable to 
perform the requested tasking then there will be an option for them to “reclama” 
the tasking or reply with a “CANTCO” (can not comply) message.  The need for 
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this denial of tasking option will be reduced by improving the accuracy of the 
central processing facility’s “available for tasking” list. 
3.1.3 Alternative 3:  Distributed Joint Fire Support Network 
 A fully networked force that is able to search and share information 
globally would have great potential for a JFS request and tasking system.  This 
alternative requires fully internetworked capabilities for all JFS participants, from 
the ground combatant to the providers.  This alternative is conceptually similar to 
the Distributed Weapons Capability work performed by the John Hopkins Applied 
Physics Laboratory dealing with Theater Ballistic Missile Defense.45  To exploit 
that capability, requesting units send their requests to a fire support database via 
the Global Information Grid (GIG).  A decision algorithm assesses the available 
providers that are in the database at the time the request was received, 
processed, and posted.  A common algorithm is used to determine the best 
tasking with regard to weapon effects, deconfliction, and availability and a 
preferred shooter is selected.  Based on the request origin and the proposed 
provider, a dynamic chain of command is constructed.  The pairing is 
immediately approved by the responsible commander and the fire support 
provider answers the tasking.  In cases where a legacy weapon system is 
technologically incapable of connecting to the JFS database via the GIG, the 
functional agency responsible will perform surrogate duties related to the 
evaluation and algorithm calculation and will task the weapon as appropriate. 
With respect to doctrine, in this alternative both the Joint doctrine and 
each service’s doctrine will change significantly to reflect extensive 
interoperability, especially with respect to JFS.  Improvements in Joint doctrine 
and tactics will effectively eliminate the service pairings of the past—each 
component is confident and comfortable working with the other.  Acquisition 
planning and procedures evolve to reflect the shift in doctrine. 
 With respect to organization and leadership, the fluid process of 
distributed JFS spawns organizations similarly flexible in this alternative 
                                                 
45 Shafer, Phillippi, Moskowitz, and Allen, “Distributed Weapons Coordination Conceptual 
Framework,” Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, Vol. 23, Nos. 2 and 3, 2002, pp. 223-236. 
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architecture.  Dynamic chains of command link requesters with fire support 
providers and permit oversight based on weapon functionality, not service.  All 
JFS organizations are networked and collaborative.  The reduction in tasking 
complexity, the shift from voice to data messages, and technological advances in 
communication systems result in faster transmission of battlefield data through 
this JFS network.  Legacy organizations like the SACC, BCD, and FFCC remain 
only as a back-up capability and are completely integrated. 
With respect to the materiel envisioned for this alternative, the services 
widely field a common data entry device that effectively extends advanced 
communications capabilities to the “edge” of the battlefield.  Not only does it send 
requests for JFS, but it can also relay information directly to and from the 
responding fire support providers.  Legacy weapon systems continue to rely on 
voice coordination for engagement.  Service-specific legacy C2 systems are 
either consolidated or eliminated and are maintained and operated jointly based 
on function. 
Training for JFS is “Joint” in nearly all respects in this framework.  
Because of system interoperability and materiel commonality, there are limited 
specialization requirements.  Common joint training is standard and adequate for 
any position within the JFS network.  Tactics are improved through synergy in 
JFS execution and planning. 
The framework for the organization and data processing of the Distributed 
JFS Network architecture as well as the flow of the request and tasking is 
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Figure 29:  Distributed Joint Fire Support Network Architecture 
 Within this alternative, there is a potential to “over-communicate” and jam 
or bog down the network.  This alternative assumes a fully networked decision 
process at the O-5 level command and above.  Ships, Brigade Operation 
Centers, GIG-enabled aircraft (controlling units or CAS) participate in the 
decision process for themselves and their assigned assets.  As the technology 
becomes realized in the field, the distributed decision process can be pushed 
further down to the individual units eventually resulting in a fully networked force. 
  85
3.1.4 Summary of Alternative Architectures 
 The three alternative architectures are distinctly different in both structure 
and approach.  A comparative summary elaborates the differences for the 
reader.  Table 5 provides that summary of materiel and non-materiel 
characteristics for all three alternatives. 
Alternative 
Characteristics
DOCTRINE ORGANIZATION & LEADERSHIP




-No Consolidation of 
Existing JFS-related 
Organizations.
-No Significant Changes 
to JFS Training 
Procedures.
-Faster Comms due to 
More Efficient Networks 
(Only between Upper 
Echelons).
-Incremental 
Improvements in Legacy 
C2 Systems.
-Data Input Devices are 
Fielded (Functional or 
Service-Specific).
-Faster Comms due to 
More Efficient Networks 







Improvements in Legacy 
C2 Systems.
-Common Data Input 
Device is Widely Fielded.
-All significant JFS 
organizations are 
networked at all levels.
-Common Joint Training 
is Standard and 
Adequate.
-Faster Comms due to 
More Efficient Networks 
(All Organizational 
Levels).
-Dynamic Chains of 
Command based on 
Pairings.
-Commonality Resulting 
from Elimination of 
Service/ Functional 
Specific Equipment  
-Comms at the "Edge" of 
JFS
- Specialization NOT a 
Premium Skill.
-Consolidation or 
Elimination of some 
Legacy Systems.
-Common Data Input 
Device is Widely Fielded.






-No Change to 
Existing Service or 
Joint Doctrine.
-Fully Joint Doctrine 
with Corresponding 
Shift in Acquisition 
Planning.
-Joint and Service 
Doctrine 
Improvements, but 




not Transferred to 
Acquisition Planning.
-Consolidation of HQ-
level Organizations with 
Same Roles.
-De-facto Improvements   
to Training.
-Improvements are due 
to Bringing Different 
People & Experiences to 
Work Together            












-Training Changes are 
Limited to Service-
specific Training Needed 
to Meet Legacy System 
Improvements.
-May be Virtual 
Based on Comm 
Capabilities
-Functional duplication 





Table 5:  Summary of Materiel and Non-Materiel Architectures 
3.2 THREATS AND FUTURE ENVIRONMENT ASSUMPTIONS 
 The Project Team initially developed numerous scenarios to highlight 
difficulties in requesting fire support with the as-is system.  These scenarios 
challenged the depth and breadth of the system to illustrate potential calls for fire 
that required support from another service.  The threats examined in these 
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scenarios were similar to current threats.  These types were expected to remain 
the most likely opposing force faced by deployed units through the 2020 
timeframe.  The proposed system should be capable of supporting a combatant 
commander during a major theater war, but the more likely future was expected 
to be comprised of significantly lower intensity conflicts. 
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review states that a “greater emphasis on 
the need to address the war on terror and irregular warfare activities including the 
long duration unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, counter insurgency, and 
military support for stabilization and reconstructions efforts” is required.46 
The expected threat included irregular forces operating in a relatively 
permissive environment.  U.S. forces will likely be operating in concert with the 
host nation supporting counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism operations.  
Popular support for the insurgent forces could be high in locations.  Proliferation 
of modern military hardware to these forces has continued, resulting in irregular 
forces equipped comparably to today’s light infantry.  Conventional engagements 
are rare and short lived, but engagements of squad-sized and smaller elements 
are frequent. 
3.3 SCENARIOS 
 The baseline conceptual scenario consists of a small US ground force 
element engaged by an equivalent or larger insurgent force.  The engaged unit 
places an effects-based call-for-fire with sufficient precision and timeliness to 
allow for a variety of fire providers to be considered.  The basic scenario is 
service independent because the challenges facing a JFS request and tasking 
are not different whether it is a soldier, sailor, Airman, or Marine requesting fire 
support.  Commander’s intent and Rules of Engagement allow clearance of fires 
and tasking orders to be accomplished by the echelon with control over the 
providing asset.  For example, a company has authority to clear and task mortars 
under its control, and a brigade authorizes and tasks artillery or helicopters under 
                                                 
46 Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, Department of Defense,  
February 2006, p. 4. 
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its control.  A more detailed description of the forces within each simulation or 
model is described in Chapter 4. 
 From this generic scenario and expected threat environment, four specific 
and detailed scenarios were chosen to highlight the depth and breadth of the 
challenges to the current operations and illustrate the need for improved fire 
support processing and coordination.  These scenario snapshots describe a wide 
spectrum of potential future operations in order to provide analysis results that 
are not specific to a particular circumstance.  The DoD’s recent move to a 
“capabilities-based” acquisition strategy includes an emphasis on evaluation of 
alternatives in the context of scenario uncertainty.  This is done in order to 
develop a system that performs well across a wide range of possible situations. 
The Rear-Area Ambush scenario describes a situation where an Army unit 
can not be supported by their own service assets.  The Riverine scenario 
describes a Navy unit that is unable to get support from naval assets.   The 
Urban scenario describes a Marine unit whose own fire support is unavailable. 
The High-Value Target scenario describes a Special Operations team operating 
outside the theater of operation and the weapon’s range of associated tactical 
level fire support assets.  Each of these instantiations of the common scenario is 
briefly discussed below. 
3.3.1 Rear-Area Ambush 
The Rear-Area Ambush scenario was designed to examine the challenges 
of an Army unit operating outside of the Army’s established ground based fire 
support assets.  An Army convoy transiting a coastal road behind the fire support 
zone is ambushed by irregular forces.  The convoy is lightly armed, consisting of 
several High Mobility, Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) escorting 
several re-supply trucks.  An Expeditionary Strike Group, including a Navy 
destroyer, equipped with extended range guided munitions and tactical missiles, 
and Marine aviation strike aircraft are operating off the coast.  These fixed and 
rotary wing attack aircraft, along with naval surface fires are available to the 
combatant commander as potential providers.  The geography of this scenario is 
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shown in Figure 30. 
 
Figure 30:  Army Call for Fire 
3.3.2 Riverine 
This scenario was designed to explore the challenges of the newly formed 
Navy Riverine Force operating without direct support from Navy-Marine Corps 
aircraft based on a Carrier or Expeditionary Strike Group.  A four-boat naval 
riverine unit conducting patrols along an isolated section of the river comes under 
fire from hostile forces along the river.  Assumed forces include the 4 small boats 
with .50 caliber and smaller weapons, while joint fires providers available are  
Air Force CAS assets, Army artillery, and Army attack helicopters. 
The current concept of operations would place these naval riverine forces 
under the operational control of the maritime component commander, and a 
request for fires support within the context presented would necessitate 
coordination within the joint forces commander’s staff.  Horizontal communication 
directly to the Army Battalion operating adjacent to the river would only be 
available if pre-arranged as an ad-hoc set up.  The geography of this scenario is 
illustrated in Figure 31. 
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Figure 31:  Navy Request 
3.3.3 Urban 
This Urban scenario is designed to explore the fire support options of a 
Marine patrol in joint fires environment.  The geography and rules of engagement 
in this scenario limit indirect fires to a counter-battery nature only.  This limits the 
options of fire support responders to precision guided munitions, preferably 
aircraft delivered. 
There is no direct link from the engaged element directly to the proposed 
Air Force CAS assets.  The connection to Air Force assets would require 
coordination between the DASC and ASOC through the JOC.  Understandably, 
an ROE restrictive environment may demand higher authority for an engagement 
order, but the current system for routing the request through the various parallel 
command structures places increased risk on the operating forces.  The 
geography of this scenario is shown in Figure 32. 
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Figure 32:  USMC Request 
3.3.4 High-Value Target 
The High-Value Target scenario was designed to explore the depth of 
command to approve engagement of a High-Value Target discovered outside the 
established area of operations of regular forces.  Special Operations Forces, 
remote from the combat zone, locate a target of national interest.  Due to target 
location, the request for fire will require approval from National Command 
Authority and strategic assets will be considered as possible firepower providers. 
Irrespective of the requester and provider, the proposed system must 
allow communication to the appropriate level of command for authorization and 
tasking shown above.  This highlights the depth of the command structure 
compared to the others which examine joint information and control across the 




Figure 33:  SOF Request for High Value Target 
 These scenarios represent instantiations of a common scenario: a call for 
fire from an engaged element that requires tasking of an asset outside of his 
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4.0 OPERATIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
The functional and physical alternatives were used to develop the system 
operational architecture.  According to Buede, “the process of developing the 
operational architecture….is the only activity in the design process that contains 
the material needed to model the system’s performance and enable trade-off 
decisions.”47 
Because the physical design of a JFS system in the year 2020 is a 
necessarily abstract system, the operational architecture is analyzed from a 
similar abstract perspective.  Very little, if any, of the physical systems or 
software identified in the physical architectures exist today.  The operational 
architecture therefore focuses on the comparisons of doctrinal, organizational, 
and tactical structures at a high level of abstraction. 
4.1 MODELING ALTERNATIVES 
The modeling techniques selected are grouped into two broad categories: 
qualitative modeling and quantitative modeling.  Qualitative modeling is used to 
compare aspects of the alternatives that could not be physically measured, such 
as degrees of interoperability and usability of a system.  Qualitative assessments 
of the material system utility and system design risks are addressed separately.  
Quantitative modeling enabled more traditional analysis of performance between 
architectures based on the Project Team’s identified metrics. 
 The tools used in the team’s modeling efforts included discrete event 
simulations, agent-based simulations, and simple numerical and statistical 
simulations.  The software programs used to create these simulations and 
analyze the results included the Microsoft EXCELTM, Imagine That Inc. 
EXTENDTM, New Zealand Defense Technology Agency MANA, US Army DAFS, 
and Minitab Inc. MINITABTM.  The metrics identified during earlier phases of the 
study are assessed and appropriate methods of analyzing and measuring them 
                                                 
47 D.M. Buede, The Engineering Design of Systems, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000, p. 246. 
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Table 6:  Models and Simulations Used (by Metric) 
4.2 QUALITATIVE SPREADSHEET MODELING OF JFS PROCESS 
ALTERNATIVES 
Each of the proposed alternatives requires different message processing 
and coordination steps.  A descriptive model of each proposed JFS alternative 
was constructed and the processes, organizations and systems involved with a 
variety of joint fire support requests (based on the scenarios in Section 3.3) were 
studied.  This analysis produced three conclusions: 
1) CJSFN had the fewest number of decision steps and process delays  
2) DJSFN & CJFSN had the fewest systems and process gaps 
3) The Status Quo Plus had the most steps for all categories 
The models used to arrive at these conclusions are described below. 
4.2.1 Spreadsheet Model Description 
This static model traces the process delays and value added steps in the 
fire support request process.  This includes steps when the data is reformatted 
and transferred from system to system (i.e., an AFATDS data file is manually 
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reformatted into a voice radio transmission to an airborne platform) and the 
updates or changes to the common operating picture command and control data 
that are necessary for decision making. 
The metrics specifically assessed in this model include: the number of 
different systems/equipment items needed, the number of decision points 
(actions taken), the number of steps needed to complete a joint fire support 
request, and the “process gaps” between those systems.  A process gap is 
defined as a process step where data has to be transformed from one type to 
another (i.e. a data file is manually converted to voice or different data format) or 
where a new system input must be compared to the previously developed target 
information.  For example, an Army call for fire to Marine Corps artillery is 
coordinated using the CPOF C2 system.  When this request is sent to the Marine 
Corps, the target information may be re-validated through C2PC, GCCS-M, 
and/or TBMCS before organization approval may be obtained. 
In order to explore the depth and breadth of the expected JFS 
environment, this analysis was performed for each of the four scenarios concepts 
and the results were averaged for comparison. 
4.2.2 Spreadsheet Model Assumptions 
 A number of assumptions were made in this system analysis.  First, the 
communication backbone was assumed to exist.  This backbone is currently 
being referred to as the Global Information Grid (GIG).  Counting the system 
permutations possible within the GIG is well beyond the scope of the project.  
Second, for both the CJFSN and DJFSN alternatives several fully interoperable 
(or common) systems are available.  The system functions for AFATDS, NFCS, 
and any other future battlefield aid are assumed to be fully interoperable (or 
common).  Facilitating this and enhancing interoperability with other radio 
systems, all fielded tactical radio systems conform to the roadmap of the JTRS 
program.  Airborne radios are all assumed to be interoperable with a JTIDS or a 
JTIDS-like standard.  This infers complete interoperability with JTRS.  Finally, in 
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accordance with the JBMC2 Roadmap recommendations, all C2 systems will be 
interoperable (or common) in this model. 
4.2.3 Spreadsheet Model Results 
 Tables which fully outline the modeling results for each scenario may be 
found in Appendix I.  A summary table of the model metrics is shown in Table 7. 
Status Quo + Centralized JFSN Distributed JFSN
Average # of Steps 10.2 6.8 7.8
Average # of Process Gaps 5.0 1.4 1.2
Average # of Process Delays 6.8 4.8 5.7
Average # of Systems Needed 9.0 3.0 3.0
Average # of Steps 10.0 8.2 8.8
Average # of Process Gaps 4.2 1.7 1.7
Average # of Process Delays 8.0 6.6 7.2
Average # of Systems Needed 9.8 3.0 3.0
Average # of Steps 8.6 7.2 8.2
Average # of Process Gaps 4.8 2.2 2.0
Average # of Process Delays 7.2 4.5 6.8
Average # of Systems Needed 9.6 3.8 4.0
Average # of Steps 19.0 14.5 15.0
Average # of Process Gaps 8.5 3.0 3.0
Average # of Process Delays 16.0 11.5 12.0





















Table 7:  Summary Table of Model Metrics for All Alternatives. 
Lower values generally equate to a more preferred process (i.e., the fewer 
the processing delays the better the system will perform) and these lower values 
are individually highlighted in the table rows. 
 The average number of steps and the number of potential process delays 
in the alternatives are highly correlated and may be used interchangeably to 
describe the general behavior of the other.  The organizational designs of the 
CJFSN and DJFSN alternatives have fewer steps than Status Quo Plus.  
Interestingly, DJFSN, which is the most automated alternative, has about one 
more step on average than CJFSN.  This is due to the addition of the decision 
algorithm while maintaining a coordination step with the organization formerly 
responsible for the decision. 
 The average number of systems used is most highly sensitive to the 
number of C2 systems of record in use.  The Status Quo Plus alternative retains 
the portfolio of C2 systems in use today whereas the other alternatives assume 
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only one fully interoperable C2 system for all the services.  For CJFSN and 
DJFSN, the average number of systems used approached the bottom limit of the 
model; one system for the data transfer, one system for the weapon control 
system, and one C2 system of record. 
 Finally, the average number of process gaps declined in step with the 
decrease in number of systems used.  Based on our counting methods (see 
Appendix I), the ratio of process gaps to number of systems needed stayed 
relatively constant (2 process gaps: 3 involved systems).  The averages of all of 
these metrics across all four scenarios are summarized in Table 8. 
For All Scenarios:
Status Quo Plus Centralized JFS Network
Distributed JFS 
Network
Average # of Steps 12.0 9.2 10.0
Average # of Process Gaps 5.6 2.1 2.0
Average # of Process Delays 9.5 6.9 7.9
Average # of Systems Needed 10.5 3.7 3.8
 
Table 8:  Relative System Preferences. 
This model reveals a preference of either CJFSN or DJFSN over Status 
Quo Plus.  CJFSN may have slightly better performance than DJFSN. 
4.3 QUANTITATIVE MODELING 
The nature of the proposed system and the timeframe that it will exist 
within posed challenges to the overall modeling approach.  The physical 
components that are proposed to make up the physical alternatives do not fit the 
standard agent-based modeling tools directly and networking analysis can rapidly 
become too complex to complete with team resources.  To cope with this 
challenge, the Project Team developed several smaller models from a functional 
perspective (e.g., basic system transactions). 
The modeling and analysis efforts were separated into three areas: 
analysis of organizational alternatives (including overall communication system 
disconnects and process delays), simulation of the pairing and decision making 
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processes, and estimation of communication impacts on JFS performance in an 
agent-based simulation. 
4.3.1 Modeling and Simulation of Organizational Alternatives 
A discrete event simulation was used to analyze the proposed JFS 
network communication and coordination pathways in the organizational 
alternatives.  This model represented the flow of valid requests from engaged 
ground elements through appropriate command elements to the provider and 
was built in EXTEND6TM.  This simulation was designed to evaluate the average 
time to process a call for fire from request to tasking for each of the three 
alternatives. 
The simulation generates requests for tasking, and routes them through a 
series of modeling blocks representing message processing entities, 
transmission delays, and decision makers. To gain insight into expected 
performance, consistent assumptions and components were used to model the 
processes in each alternative.  These models and subsequent analysis produced 
two conclusions: 
1) DJFSN results in the overall fastest time to task fire support providers 
2) The CJFSN process was quicker than the Status Quo Plus alternative 
The following section focuses on a discussion of the modeling constructs 
that represent the decision flow through each alternative command and control 
organization.  Assumed values for system parameters that represent capabilities 
for each alternative are presented, as well as the other parameters that remained 
constant for each alternative.  A more detailed description of how these models 
were built is contained in Appendix J. 
4.3.1.1 Organizational Model Descriptions 
 The Status Quo Plus model, simplified in Figure 34, represents a 
baseline case for a notional forward observer generating a call for fire and 
sending that request to its commanding unit, in this case the responsible 
company.  This company-level unit evaluates its capability to engage the target 
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with organic assets.  The company then engages the target or forwards the 
request to the battalion.  The battalion then either engages with assets under its 
control, or forwards the request to the brigade.  Similarly, the brigade then 
engages or forwards the request for the joint force commander to provide air or 
naval strike assets. 
 
Figure 34:  Status Quo Plus Organization Model. 
The Centralized Joint Fire Support Network model is depicted in  
Figure 35.  A call for fire is generated by a notional forward element as in the 
Status Quo Plus model, but now it is sent directly to the Joint Fires Cell (JFC).  
The JFC then processes the request, provides a target-provider pairing, 
deconflicts the air space, and authorizes the tasking.  The tasking order is then 
sent to the applicable fire support provider asset. 
Figure 35:  Centralized Joint Fire Support Network Organization Model. 
The Distributed Joint Fire Support Network model is depicted in  
Figure 36. The same call for fire is generated by the notional forward element but 
it is now submitted to a target database via the Global Information Grid.  This 
automated provider-based decision process results in a tasking order to the 
“best” provider based on a common decision algorithm and operational picture 
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held at each command.  This process includes all O-5 and higher commands 
(brigade and above ground units, ships, and aircraft) that control fire support 
assets collectively evaluate their capability to engage the target.  The 
EXTEND6TM block diagram flow and parameters for each of these alternatives 
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Figure 36:  Distributed Joint Fire Support Network Organization Model. 
4.3.1.2 Organizational Model Assumptions 
There are several key assumptions in this abstract model.  The first 
of these is distribution of target types and the weapons that are used against 
those target types.  The notional opposing force presented 50% targets that were 
Type 0 and are able to be directly engaged by company level assets.  Target 
Types 1 to 4 required sequentially higher echelon assets to be tasked against 
them.  The probabilities listed in Table 9 were used to generate requests with 
these generic target types. 
Generic 
Target Type Probability Provider Assets 
0 50% Company 60 
1 20% Battalion 120 
2 15% Brigade 96 
3 7% Naval Fires 30 
4 8% Close Air Support 2 / 40 minutes 
 
Table 9:  Organization Model Target Probability Distribution Function Inputs. 
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Weapon-target pairing was not specifically modeled in this 
simulation.  The target type abstractly represents the target characteristics, 
weapon pairing, and deconfliction of the “best” provider.  The number of provider 
assets available was made sufficiently large enough that all of the targets 
presented could be appropriately prosecuted.  A summary of the model input 
data is presented in Table 9. 
 Communications connectivity was assumed to be perfect and all of 
the targets presented were valid.  All CFFs resulted in tasking orders, and were 
tasked to the notional “best” provider.  Delays for processing, pairing, 
deconfliction, and authorization in each alternative were applied from statistical 
distributions.  These average processing delay times were based on the 
judgment of the Project Team and other Subject Matter Experts.  The average 
engagement times were based on a summary of response time data from 
Raytheon48 and RAND49 reports, stakeholder input, and team observations of the 
CFF request process at the National Training Center and AIR WARRIOR. Table 
10 summarizes these delays by alternative.  
 
                                                 
48 U. S. Marine Corps Marine Corps Combat Development Command, “Marine Corps Fire 
Mission Profiling Through Experimentation with Real and Simulated Systems,” Raytheon, 2006, 
pp. 1-16. 
49 Pirnie, Vick, Grissom, Mueller, Orletsky, “Beyond Close Air Support,” RAND, 2005, pp. 78-
161. 
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Status Quo + CJFSN DJFSN
Initial Call for fire request 0.5 0.5 0.5
Engagement Times
Company Asset 3 3 3
Battalion Asset 3 3 3
Brigade Asset 3 3 3
Close Air Support 10 10 10
Naval Fires 10 10 10
Process and Tasking Times
Company Asset 3 5 3
Battalion Asset 5 5 3
Brigade Asset 5 5 3
Close Air Support 3 5 3
Naval Fires 3 5 3
ASOC/DASC/JOC 5
Joint Fires Cell decision 5
GIG collaborative decision 3  
Table 10:  Summary of Simulation Delays (Minutes). 
4.3.1.3 Organizational Model Results 
 The model results were output to a spreadsheet for analysis in 
MINITABTM to evaluate the average processing time for each alternative.  A more 
detailed description of the analytical results is discussed in Appendix J. The null 
hypothesis for all considerations is that there is no processing time difference 
caused by target type or alternative system.  Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
conducted to reject or accept this hypothesis based on the simulation data.  
Because the assumed statistical distributions for processing time were not 
symmetrical, the assumption of normally distributed data required for ANOVA 
was suspect and a non-parametric (Kruskal-Wallis) analysis was conducted to 
confirm the results. 
 The ANOVA results rejected the null hypothesis for the full target 
set.  The choice of Alternative System (F statistic=391, p=0.0000) had a 
statistically significant difference in response time, indicating at least one system 
is different from the others.  Non-parametric results showed statistically 
significant differences and ranked system performance as DJFSN, CJFSN, then 
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Boxplot of task delay vs System
 
Figure 37:  Boxplot of Organizational Delay Times. 
In order to examine the effects of the various distribution means 
(the input simulation delays described in Table 10) on the performance of each 
system, a sensitivity analysis was conducted.  Each parameter was individually 
varied and the overall mean tasking times were calculated for 30 runs.  Of all 
parameters altered, only the target type distribution demonstrated an interaction 
with system response time.  As more targets requiring a tasking above the 
company level (target types 1 to 4) were generated, Status Quo Plus system 
performance degraded while DJFSN and CJFSN alternatives remained about the 
same.  Further detail of the statistical analysis and results is contained in 
Appendix J. 
Overall, the DJFSN system required the least amount of time to 
processing a call for fire, followed by the CJFSN then Status Quo Plus. 
4.3.2 Modeling and Simulation of Pairing Effectiveness 
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The effectiveness of request-provider taskings is a key factor in the 
analysis of alternative architectures.  The applicable portion of the Effective Need 
described a requirement to “maximize rapid battlefield effects through efficient 
target-provider pairings.” The pairings of targets and providers was simulated by 
interlaced models that ran simultaneously within EXTEND6TM and EXCELTM.  
The models that represented the three alternative architectures were distinct 
variations of a common model.  These models were designed to evaluate the 
differences in overall pairing effectiveness achieved when considering either all 
available providers (in the CJFSN and DJFSN alternatives) or engagement with 
first available asset (Status Quo Plus).   
These models and subsequent analysis produced two conclusions and an 
interesting observation:  
1) An effects-based pairing algorithm improves engagement effectiveness 
over a service-based pairing methodology. 
2) Pairing effectiveness was not sensitive to the differences in processing 
delay times between the CJFSN and DJFSN.. 
Observation: A pairing algorithm capable of rapidly producing thousands 
of engagement recommendations can be built to support future JFS 
systems. 
The following section describes the steps taken to arrive at these 
conclusions.  The model describes the processing and decision actions as the 
data flows through each alternative weapon-target pairing simulation.  Although 
all of the simulation scenario structures describe an Army requester, the joint 
relationships are what determine the results and the requester can just as easily 
be modeled as a different entity if the names in the rest of the model are changed 
appropriately.  A summary of the analytical results of the simulation data is 
presented as a basis for comparison of each alternative. 
4.3.2.1 Pairing Model Descriptions 
 The simulation models each process and task an identical 
sequence of calls for fire that include target type, target location and desired 
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effects.  Within each model, these requests are routed through the alternative 
pairing processes and a notional effectiveness is then applied to the target (an 
estimated “probability” of achieving the “requested effect”) based on the resulting 
weapon-target pairing.  The notional effectiveness applied to the requested target 
was then compared to the best possible effectiveness for that target type, 
location, and requested effects.  A more detailed description of the models, 
assumptions, and results are contained in Appendix K. 
The Status Quo Plus model, represented by the flow shown in  
Figure 38, represents a baseline case for a notional forward observer generating 
a call for fire that is sent to the responsible company.  Each level in the 
hierarchical command structure (company, battalion, and brigade assets) 
evaluates its capability to engage the target.  If they cannot service the target due 
to a lack of available providers/weapons, then they forward the request up the 
chain.  Eventually, the target is engaged by the Army or forwarded to Air Force 
CAS.  If AF CAS assets are available, then the target is engaged by AF CAS, 
otherwise the request is forwarded to the JOC for tasking of naval surface fires, 
Marine artillery, or Navy-Marine Corps CAS assets. 
 
 
Figure 38:  Status Quo Plus Pairing Model. 
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An effects-based pairing model representing the CJFSN alternative 
is depicted in Figure 39.  A call for fire was generated and sent to the Joint Fires 
Cell.  A list of prioritized providers was generated by the JFC based on target 
type and desired effects using a weapon effectiveness table described in the 
assumptions below.  A target location filter then removes providers that are 
infeasible (out of range) from the prioritized provider listing.  The process then 
sequentially evaluates the availability of the remaining prioritized provider assets 
and tasks the best one available, regardless of service.  
Figure 39:  Effects Based Pairing Model. 
 The same effects-based pairing process was used by the DJFSN 
model, but the processing and coordination delays were different, representing 
that model’s communications and coordination capabilities.  
4.3.2.2 Pairing Model Assumptions 
 The engagement and decision delays developed in the 
Organizational Alternatives Models (Section 4.3.1) were used as the input for the 
average time delays within the pairing models.  An additional engagement delay 
time of 3 minutes was added to these process delay times to estimate the total 
time from arrival of the requests and engagement of the target.  The quantity and 
effectiveness of providers were kept constant between all three alternative 


















Status Quo Plus Mean: 14 min   SD: 4 min
Mean: 17 min   
SD: 5 min
Mean: 19 min   
SD: 4 min
Mean: 20 min   
SD: 5 min
Mean: 24 min   
SD: 5 min 3 Minutes
Centralized            
JFS Network
Mean: 10 min   
SD: 5 min
Mean: 10 min   
SD: 5 min
Mean: 10 min   
SD: 5 min
Mean: 10 min   
SD: 5 min
Mean: 10 min   
SD: 5 min 3 Minutes
Distributed            
JFS Network
Mean: 7 min    
SD: 4 min
Mean: 7 min    
SD: 4 min
Mean: 7 min    
SD: 4 min
Mean: 7 min    
SD: 4 min
Mean: 7 min    





Table 11:  Pairing Model Processing and Engagement Delay Assumptions 
 An identical target list of 1000 targets was generated for all of the 
simulation models.  This list of target types, desired effects, locations, and 
request arrival times was randomly determined beforehand and then fixed for all 
of the simulation runs.  The Target type probability was evenly distributed among 
the 10 options, and the targets were generated in locations that were evenly 
distributed across a notional battlefield.  The assumption was made that Army 
Artillery, Marine Artillery, and Naval Fires would have similarly sized, overlapping 
areas of fire support capability that would permit them to collectively service 85% 
of the target locations.  The statistics for the 1000 calls for fire are given in Table 
12. 
Target Types %
Troops in the Open 10%
Effects Type Requested % Entrenched Troops 11%
Harass 5% Trucks 9%
Suppress 15% Armored Personnel Carriers 12%
Neutralize 48% Armor/Tanks 11%
Destroy 33% Bunker/Hardened Structure 8%
Targets within Range of: % Logistics/Assembly Site 10%
Artillery Battery 9%
C2 Site 10%
CAS (AF, Navy, USMC) 100% SAMs/SCUDs 10%
Artillery (Army, Marine 
Corps) or Naval Fires 86%
1000 Requests, Arrival Intervals 
Randomly Distributed 0-3 min
 
Table 12:  Pairing Model CFF Inputs 
The requested effects type categories, and the distribution of those requested 
types, were derived from stakeholder input and Army Field Manual 6-30.  To 
meet the request for “Harass” effects, the enemy simply needs to be concerned 
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about the presence of enemy fires.  Suppression effects on a target “limits the 
ability of the enemy personnel in the target area to perform their jobs.” 50  To 
achieve the desire effect of Neutralizing a target, it must be “knocked out of 
action temporarily… Neutralization does not require an extensive expenditure of 
ammunition and is the most practical type of mission.”51  Destroy was the most 
severe requested effect and according to the Army, “Destruction puts a target out 
of action permanently.” 52  Interviews with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) 
determined that roughly 50% of CFFs request “Neutralize” effects, 30% request 
“Destroy” effects, and the remainder request primarily “Suppression” effects.  The 
distribution of requested effects was outlined in Table 12. 
The predicted effectiveness of each weapon assumed in the model 
is based on requested effects and target type.  These weapon-target pairing 
effectiveness percentages are listed in Table 13 and are roughly based on Joint 
Munitions Effectiveness Manual (JMEM) and stakeholder/SME estimates.   
                                                 
50 Department of the Army, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire, Field 
















Troops in the Open 98% 25% 98% 96% 25%
Entrenched Troops 60% 20% 60% 50% 20%
Trucks 75% 40% 75% 73% 40%
APCs 60% 45% 60% 53% 45%
Armor 50% 45% 50% 48% 50%
Bunker/Hardened Structure 50% 20% 50% 47% 20%
Logistics/Assembly Site 98% 33% 98% 96% 33%
Artillery Battery 25% 40% 25% 33% 40%
C2 Site 94% 28% 94% 93% 28%
SAMs/SCUDs 87% 7% 87% 85% 7%
Troops in the Open 82% 47% 82% 35% 47%
Entrenched Troops 41% 32% 41% 40% 32%
Trucks 62% 47% 62% 60% 47%
APCs 51% 49% 51% 49% 49%
Armor 39% 48% 39% 36% 48%
Bunker/Hardened Structure 30% 51% 30% 29% 51%
Logistics/Assembly Site 79% 36% 79% 75% 36%
Artillery Battery 19% 44% 19% 26% 44%
C2 Site 77% 36% 77% 74% 36%
SAMs/SCUDs 72% 6% 72% 71% 6%
Troops in the Open 73% 69% 73% 71% 69%
Entrenched Troops 32% 41% 32% 31% 41%
Trucks 49% 62% 49% 48% 62%
APCs 40% 54% 40% 38% 54%
Armor 26% 57% 26% 25% 57%
Bunker/Hardened Structure 13% 63% 13% 13% 63%
Logistics/Assembly Site 54% 52% 54% 52% 52%
Artillery Battery 12% 58% 12% 14% 58%
C2 Site 61% 52% 61% 59% 52%
SAMs/SCUDs 59% 5% 59% 63% 5%
Troops in the Open 51% 63% 51% 50% 63%
Entrenched Troops 23% 49% 23% 22% 49%
Trucks 37% 77% 37% 35% 77%
APCs 21% 81% 21% 20% 81%
Armor 9% 74% 9% 5% 74%
Bunker/Hardened Structure 7% 72% 7% 26% 72%
Logistics/Assembly Site 28% 58% 28% 27% 58%
Artillery Battery 8% 72% 8% 15% 72%
C2 Site 36% 63% 36% 49% 63%




















Table 13:  Weapon-Target Pairing Effectiveness Model Input Matrix 
The metric used to evaluate system performance was called the 
Effects Ratio.  This ratio is calculated by dividing the Applied Effects (the 
percentage that was actually applied by the model as the target was paired with 
a provider) by the maximum effect possible for that target-effects pair (the largest 
percentage in the same row of the table defined by the target type and desired 
  110
effects).  For example, a “Troops in the Open” target type with a requested effect 
type of “Harass” that was engaged by artillery had an effects ratio of 1 (.98/.98).  
Engaging the same request with CAS had an effects ratio of .26 (.25/.98). 
4.3.2.3 Pairing Model Results 
The model results were output to a spreadsheet for analysis in 
MINITABTM to evaluate the pairing effectiveness for each alternative architecture.  
A more detailed description of the analytical results is discussed in Appendix K.  
The null hypothesis for all models is that there is no processing time difference 
caused by differences in pairing methodology or alternative systems.  Analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was conducted to reject or accept this hypothesis based on 
the simulation data.   
The ANOVA results reject the null hypothesis (F=13.35, p=0.000), 
and indicated that at least one alternative is different from the others.  Median 
effects ratio of the Status Quo Plus is lower than both DJFSN and CJFSN.  While 
the middle 50% (interquartile) of observations almost completely overlap in the 
boxplot of the effects ratio (Figure 40), there is a difference between the 
















Boxplot of Effect ratio vs Alternative
 
Figure 40:  Statistical Means of Effects Ratios by Alternative 
  This overlap is primarily due to the weapons effects table used.  
Ground based fires, artillery and naval gun fire, were equivalent and no 
differentiation in the capability of air assets were made.  By examining the 
utilization of provider assets show in Figure 41, the effect-based pairing method 
achieved a better median Effects Ratio by tasking more aircraft; Navy-Marine 
Corps CAS assets were available providers.  The benefit of this pairing method is 
the potential for reducing the logistical requirements to support the volume of 
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Figure 41:  Provider Asset Utilization by Pairing Methodology 
 
 Considering the assumed distributions for processing and 
engagement times, along with the weapon effects chart, the assumption of 
normally distributed data was suspect.  A non-parametric analysis (Kruskal-
Wallis) was conducted to confirm the ANOVA results.  This analysis determined 
that there is no difference between the CJFSN and DJFSN alternatives, but the 
Status Quo Plus alternative is statistically worse than the other two. 
 The results from this model indicate that an effects-based pairing 
algorithm may improve overall engagement success.  With the given fixed target 
set and arrival rate, the differences in processing delay times between distributed 
and centralized processing did not adversely affect the effectiveness of the 
pairing process. 
 An additional model observation is that this relatively primitive 
discrete event simulation, with spreadsheet lookups, generated pairings of 1000 
targets in under three minutes.  This aligns with the processing delay 
assumptions used in the organizational alternatives model.  It also indicates that 
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a dedicated software package, using a GIG enabled database for targets and 
providers, could be developed with comparable results both in effects and 
processing time.   
4.3.3 Agent-Based Performance Simulation 
The Project Team consulted with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 
Analysis Command, Training and Analysis Center-Monterey (TRAC-Monterey) to 
assess appropriate methods to model JFS and was introduced to several 
modeling and simulation tools.  The two best modeling alternatives were the 
Dynamic Allocation of Fires and Sensors (DAFS) simulation and the Map Aware 
Non-uniform Automata (MANA) simulation.  The team chose MANA for the 
agent-based modeling based on its communications modeling architecture.  The 
same scenario was tested among the team’s three alternatives, with the full 
MANA output gathered for each alternative. 
The simulation was designed to evaluate performance of the alternative 
system in providing operational support to a patrol in an Urban scenario.   The 
Urban scenario was chosen as the most difficult among the available scenarios 
to demonstrate each alternative’s effectiveness.  Additional scenarios were 
assumed to yield similar results, and were not modeled due to time and resource 
constraints. Number of blue force casualties sustained was determined to 
indicate relative effectiveness of the fire support system. 
These models and subsequent analysis produced the following 
conclusion: Distributed JFSN resulted in the fewest friendly force casualties.  The 
models and analysis used to arrive at this conclusion are described in the 
following sections. 
4.3.3.1 Agent-Based Model Description 
 MANA is an agent-based simulation.  Entities (agents) are given 
sensor ranges, weapon performance parameters, and behavioral guidelines, and 
are then released in the simulation to react to conditions based on those 
behaviors.  The user is able to shape outcomes based on an agent’s propensity 
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to engage or run from the enemy, cluster with like-minded agents, or seek cover 
and concealment.  Macroscopic interaction and outcomes can then be analyzed 
based on the individual agent behaviors. 
The MANA model was not intended to test pairing or deconfliction 
methodology, but rather to test communication schema to determine 
effectiveness of Joint Fire Support in a scenario.  The Status Quo Plus MANA 
model required a fires request to route through several separate steps (based on 
analysis of command structure from Sections 2.2 and 3.1), while the CJFSN and 
DJFSN required fewer steps or communications.  Aside from the communication 
and decision delays, the time for targets to be accurately located and ordnance 
to arrive on target are consistent throughout each alternative.  This modeling tool 
does not permit best-provider pairing.  This aspect was not measurable within 
MANA and any fire support provider which had ammunition and was within range 
of the target fired as soon as it was aware of a valid (hostile) target. 
An urban scenario was built using downtown Baghdad as the 
notional geography.  A company of Marines patrolled the city with an Army 
Battalion to the east with supporting artillery that was not previously coordinated.  
Marine requests for Army artillery support were routed, depending on the 
alternative simulated, through either the Joint Operations Center (Status Quo 
Plus), Joint Fires Cell (CJFSN) or directly to the artillery battery (DJFSN). 
 Each alternative was evaluated in the urban simulation with 44 blue 
(friendly) entities representing the C2, indirect fires providers, or front line troop 
categories.  The scenario layout is shown in Figure 42.  There were two Joint 
Fire Support providers, in the form of two Army artillery batteries of six guns 
each, which were able to support Marine patrols within the city.  Red forces were 
held constant at 38 entities and consisted of unconventional forces with enemy 
inferior weapons, as well as 3 sniper agents with increased (superior) detection 
and weapons capability.  The blue patrol elements required, by design, 
assistance outside their level of capability (i.e., Joint Fire Support) in order to 
neutralize the red threats and allow the unit to complete its mission (a complete 
patrol of the area).  A detailed description of the MANA model along with 
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information on the exact location and capability of each agent, and settings for 






Figure 42:  MANA Urban Scenario Initial Layout 
4.3.3.2 Agent-Based Model Assumptions 
 MANA is an implicit model, not an explicit, physics-based model.  
Sensor ranges, weapon performance, and probabilities are input by the user 
based on scenario assumptions.  These assumptions were based on stakeholder 
input and the combined military experience of the team.  General assumptions 
include friendly weapon and sensor superiority (range, probability of 
detection/kill) with few exceptions, enemy insurgent behaviors (propensity to 
avoid blue forces until able to mass fire in an ambush-style attack), and 95% 
reliable communications.  Communications were assumed to be accurate with 
the exception of a sensitivity analysis performed to analyze the effect of 
communications problems on system performance. 
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 The Status Quo Plus model was built with a serial call for fire 
format.  Requests are generated at the lowest engaged forward element (a 
squad), and passed serially through the chain of command until it can be 
appropriately serviced.  The CJFSN model sends all calls to the Joint Fires Cell, 
which then notifies providers of targets to be serviced.  The DJFSN model uses a 
fully connected communications matrix so that all elements in the simulation are 
able to communicate with each other (engaged elements can talk directly with 
Joint Fires providers). 
 The Fire Support weapons used for this simulation are based on a 
generic, battalion- or brigade-level fire support weapon.  Currently this weapon is 
155mm artillery, but for the purposes of the simulation, the artillery represents a 
joint fires provider under direction of the brigade.  This weapon is assumed to 
have sufficient range, accuracy and payload, with the required precision targeting 
and collateral damage requirements for use in an urban environment. 
4.3.3.3 Agent-Based Model Results 
 MANA results for blue force casualties are depicted in Figure 43.  
These results are based on 50 runs of each alternative within the specified 


















Blue Casualties Boxplot of SQ+, CJFSN, DJFSN
 
 
Figure 43:  Blue Force Casualty Results from the MANA Simulation 
  
 Analysis of blue casualties revealed no statistically significant 
difference between the Status Quo Plus and the CJFSN alternatives, but a 
significant difference between Status Quo Plus and DJFSN alternatives.  CJFSN 
was expected to perform better than the Status Quo Plus based on the 
assumptions that improved communications resulted in more rapid Joint Fire 
Support response, and thus fewer friendly casualties.  While investigating the 
lack of improvement, it was discovered that the CJFSN communications 
simulated in the MANA model resulted in less communication between friendly 
elements on a direct basis.  Elements communicated with the Joint Fires Cell for 
fire support missions, but did not communicate with each other (inter-squad) for 
those missions that did not require outside fire support.  Thus when the battlefield 
environment called for fewer inorganic fire support missions the CJFSN 
alternative resulted in fewer communications overall, and a decrease in 
situational awareness.  In those cases where calls for fire were frequent and 
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necessary, blue casualties decreased and there were no differences between the 
DJFSN and CJFSN models. 
 The DJFSN alternative resulted in the fewest blue casualties.  
Based on the conclusions above, in a low calls-for-fire environment (organic 
target prosecution), situational awareness outside the squad is critical to make 
the most use of organic assets.  In this environment it is not necessarily the Joint 
Fire Support process or format that facilitates fewer blue casualties, but rather 
the increase in communications and the resulting increase in situational 
awareness. 
 The MANA model was based on 100% communications accuracy.  
As a side note, sensitivity analysis was conducted within each alternative to 
determine the effects of degraded communications accuracy.  Accuracy was 
decreased linearly from 100% to 98% in .2% increments.  Casualties increased 
exponentially as communications accuracy decreased below 99% for the Status 
Quo Plus alternative, as shown in Figure 44.  This was important to effective fire 
support in all alternatives, but critical to Status Quo Plus.  Even a small 
decrement in communications accuracy resulted in extremely harmful results.  
Model behavior included elements reporting themselves or their position as 
hostile or fire support elements firing on non-existent or stale targets (targets that 
were either already dead or that had moved position).  On the other hand, 
fratricide due to communication inaccuracies for both the CJFSN and DJFSN 
alternatives appears linear, which is a logical result of a shift from serial to 
parallel communications.  The decrease in fratricide from distributed to 
centralized control can be attributed to the “check and balance” of multiple users 
using different communications links to get the same information from one point 
to another, as well as the assumed crosscheck of multiple receivers. 
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Figure 44:  Communications Accuracy vs. Blue Casualties 
 In conclusion, the DJFSN alternative, with its associated web of 
communications, resulted in the fewest blue casualties (including fratricide) and 
best increase in situational awareness.  This conclusion is valid in either a high 
volume call for fires environment, or an environment in which most targets are 
processed organically. 
4.4 MODELING AND SIMULATION SUMMARY 
The three proposed alternatives were evaluated based on the metrics 
developed to support the effective need.  Table 14 summarizes the results from 




SQ+ CJFSN DJFSN 
1.  Avg. Processing Time for a Request to be Serviced (minutes) 
                                                                                           (↓=better) 
16.7 10.1 6.6 
2.  Avg. Pairing Efficiency of the Target-Weapon Pairings (percent) 
                                                                                           (↑=better) 
78% 90% 90% 
3.  Avg. Number of Systems Involved in the Request-to-Tasking 
Process                                                                        (↓=better) 
10.5 3.7 3.8 
4.  Avg. Number of Decision Points Involved in the Request-to-
Tasking Process                                                          (↓=better) 
9.5 6.9 7.9 
5.  Avg. Number of Steps Involved in the Request-to-Tasking 
Process                                                                        (↓=better) 
12.0 9.2 10.0 
6.  Avg. Number of Gaps in the Request-to-Tasking Process 
                                                                                           (↓=better) 
5.6 2.1 2.0 
7.  Avg. Number of Blue Force Casualties 
                                                                                           (↓=better) 
4.9 5.1 3.5 
Table 14:  Summary of Modeling and Simulation Results. 
The following comparative analysis outlines the results among all 
alternatives with regard to each criterion previously identified: 
1. Time to process a CFF request in simulation was a surrogate for 
proposed system processing time.  Average processing time for a 
CFF request to be serviced was evaluated by simulation.  The 
results rate the DJFSN as the best, followed by the CJFSN 
alternative, then the Status Quo Plus system. 
2. Pairing efficiency with notional weapons effects in simulation was a 
substitute for an effects-based pairing algorithm.  Pairing efficiency 
was evaluated by simulation.  The average pairing efficiency of the 
Target-Weapon pairings rated CJFSN and DJFSN as the same, 
with the Status Quo Plus performance significantly lower. 
3. A count of the systems involved is a proxy measure to count 
interface translation systems required, and opportunities for errors 
to be introduced in the tasking process.  The number of systems 
involved in the process was evaluated with static models.  The 
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average number of systems involved to generate a tasking rated 
the DJFSN as slightly better than CJFSN and both outperforming 
the Status Quo Plus. 
4. A count of the decision points (human intervention) is a surrogate 
measure to evaluate operator oversight, opportunity to introduce 
errors, and process delays during conversion.  The number of 
decision points involved in the process was evaluated with static 
models.  The average decision steps involved to generate a tasking 
rated the DJFSN best, followed by CJFSN then Status Quo Plus. 
5. A count of processing steps is a substitute for the volume of 
information exchanged to support tasking a provider.  The number 
of processing steps (human or machine) involved in the process 
was evaluated with static models.  This resulted in CJFSN as 
fewest steps, followed closely by DJFSN and significantly higher 
processing steps in the Status Quo Plus. 
6. A count of the process gaps represents the number of missing 
digital interfaces between systems in each alternative. Process 
gaps were evaluated with static models.  The CJFSN required the 
fewest followed closely by DJFSN with Status Quo Plus with a gap 
at nearly every decision and processing point. 
7. The organizational and communications structures modeled in the 
MANA models assessed the number of friendly (blue) force 
casualties as a result of the timeliness of the response to a CFF.  
The DJFSN communications structure resulted in the fewest 
casualties, and both the CJFSN and Status Quo Plus alternatives 
presented a similar larger number of casualties. 
Based on the modeling and simulation results alone, the DJFSN 
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5.0 COST ESTIMATE 
A cost estimate for a system with few physical specifications is difficult, if 
not impossible.  Regardless of the JFS alternative chosen, the physical portions 
of the system would include: user input devices (such as TLDHS or “Strikelink” 
systems), the communications equipment and architecture necessary to transmit 
JFS request data to higher command (RF spectrum, TCP/IP, SATCOM), the 
computer systems and software necessary to process, pair, display, and transmit 
target tasking data, and the associated systems resident on the provider 
platforms. 
5.1 COST ESTIMATE ASSUMPTIONS 
 The basic assumption was that joint procurement can be more economical 
and effective than service-specific acquisition.  The overall cost of a joint 
command and control system is expected to be comparable to the existing 
service specific C2 systems.  Table 15 summarizes current C2 systems and 
illustrates the limited degree to which the services share systems.  Shifting to a 
single system has potential to reduce expenditures to significantly less than the 
current total expended on all of these separate systems. 
Table 15:  A Selection of Service Specific Command and Control Systems 
 The other costs associated with continuing to operate with disparate C2 
systems is the lack of interoperability.  Four separate prime contractors maintain 
Service C2 system Contractor






Air Force TBMCS Lockheed
GCCS-AF DISA
Integrated Space Command and Control Lockheed
Marine Corps C2PC Northrop Grumman
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these systems, with numerous subcontractor support facilities and teams.  The 
three separate GCCS systems are not currently interoperable, although the 
NECC transition plan does propose a path for future integration.53 
 This lack of interoperability leads to potential operational costs based on 
mission risk.  For example, if time sensitive information, delayed due to 
translation from one services’ system to another, is used to dynamically 
deconflict assets it could result in a higher risk of fratricide.  Similarly, delays in 
prosecution while awaiting accurate data for deconfliction or pairing could result 
in lost opportunities to prosecute valid targets.  The additional risk placed on 
ground elements when they are engaged with a hostile enemy force is 
unacceptable when the source of the delay is a manual translation delay from 
CPOF to TBMCS (for example). 
5.2 COST ESTIMATE CONCLUSIONS 
 The materiel cost of implementing each alternative is similar.  All involved 
elements of: computer hardware, software, data input and display devices, and 
radios/networking equipment.  C2 software requirements for a common system 
(CJFSN and DJFSN) are expected to be less than continuing separate 
development with incremental improvements in interoperability (Status Quo 
Plus).  The potential operational costs associated with independent systems do 
not support future operational concepts or a more responsive joint fire support 
system. 
 In the end, the cost of developing a common interoperable system is at 
least comparable to continuing the development of existing systems.  The 
additional operational benefits of reduced fratricide risk and improved 
engagement opportunity provides a high return for a relatively low cost and 
supports development of a common command and control system. 
                                                 
53 Defense Information Systems Agency, The NECC Provisional Technical Transition 
Architecture Specification, Version 0.5.7, 12 April 2006, pp. 1-2. 
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6.0 RISK AND RELIABILITY 
6.1 RISK ESTIMATE 
The magnitude of risk was estimated by viewing all three of the proposed 
alternatives from the perspective of changes to DoD’s current Doctrine, 
Organization, Training and Education, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and 
Facilities (DOTMLPF).  Because some risk areas crossed DOTMLPF categories 
the Project Team combined certain categories for ease of discussion.  The risks 
for the DOTMLPF categories, with respect to all three alternatives, are 
qualitatively evaluated below. 
6.1.1 Doctrinal Risks 
This category considers the interaction between the service component 
capabilities, the services’ roles and missions, and Title 10.  Because they are 
interrelated, especially when it comes to the individual service budgets, the 
proposed JFS alternatives pose challenges to the existing balance within these 
three areas. 
The Status Quo Plus alternative was assessed to have a low risk to 
implementation because it does not require a significant change to existing 
service or joint doctrine to implement. 
However, the CJSFN and DJSFN alternatives require that service 
capabilities, especially those outside its historical roles, are considered.  This 
could lead to the expansion of a particular service’s roles and missions and a 
possible redistribution of budget.  As an illustration, the CJSFN and DJSFN 
alternatives support a functional consolidation of the ASOC and the DASC.  This 
consolidation would put all fixed wing CAS assets under centralized control.  
However, Air Force doctrine for Countersea Support it is extremely limited (it is a 
single paragraph)54.  So, while Air Force assets have the capability to provide 
Countersea Support (which could include CAS support to amphibious forces), it 
                                                 
54 Department of the Air Force, Air Force Basic Doctrine, AFDD-1, 17 November 2003, pp.45-46. 
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is easily argued from a funding basis that the Air Force is not resourced to fill that 
role and should not perform it.  This dichotomy exists across most of the mission 
areas and affects all services in meaningful ways. 
Additionally, the CJSFN and DJSFN alternatives blur the distinctions 
between the supporting and supported roles.  The concepts of OPCON, TACON, 
and ADCON must become very dynamic to permit these alternatives. 
Since the CJSFN and DJFSN alternatives will undergo continual 
rebalancing of capabilities, roles and missions, and statutory requirements, they 
were assessed to have high levels of risk to implementation with respect to 
doctrine as shown in Figure 45. 
 
 
Figure 45:  Doctrine Risk Chart 
6.1.2 Organizational and Leadership Risks 
This risk is much more complex than simply drawing a solid or dotted line 
on an organizational chart.  This risk category considers the challenges of 
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maintaining dynamic chains of command, even across services, and the degree 
of business process reengineering necessary to consolidate cross service 
functions.  System and personnel risks are addressed separately. 
The current movement within DoD is towards streamlining and 
consolidating military organizations away from service-based roles and towards 
capability-based roles and missions.  While this move is in line with the effects-
based joint fire support concept, it challenges established military organizational 
conventions. 
The Status Quo Plus alternative has low risk to implementation because it 
does not require a significant change to current fire support organizations. 
Because this alternative preserves existing and duplicate functional 
organizations, the level of effort required to execute this strategy is low. 
The CJSFN architecture was assessed to have a medium risk level due 
because it requires the consolidation of HQ-level organizations with similar roles.  
Combining the functionally similar organizations with different cultures and 
procedures will require extensive process engineering efforts.  It does not 
fundamentally change the organizational construct of JFS to the same degree 
that the DJFSN alternative does. 
The DJSFN alternative was assessed to have a high level of risk due to 
the significance and scope of the organizational changes required to implement 
it.  Because Distributed JFS organizations are networked at all levels, from the 
field to the JOC, the dynamic chains of command and shifting levels of authority 
will challenge conventional leadership concepts.  A transition to a Distributed 
JFSN organizational construct would be difficult to implement incrementally and 
the initial performance of the Distributed architecture will probably be less than 
projected until leadership style adjustments are assimilated throughout.  The 





Figure 46:  Organization and Leadership Risk Chart 
6.1.3 Tactics and Training Risks 
This category highlights the risk involved with creation and implementation 
of completely joint tactics and training procedures with respect to JFS.  These 
risks include implementation at the forward observer level and at the upper-
echelon levels.  The Status Quo Plus alternative was assessed to have a low risk 
to implementation due to the limited changes from current and projected tactics 
and training.  The service-specific improvements to JFS associated systems and 
procedures will incur a minimal training burden on the service components 
without any significant changes to tactics and only slight improvements in tactical 
flexibility.  There will continue to be a burden for cross-service training of liaison 
elements in the disparate C2 systems of each service.  There are no 
requirements to further standardize call for fire formats or data standards in the 
Status Quo Plus alternative, therefore those training requirements change very 
little. 
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The CJFSN alternative was assessed to have a medium risk to 
implementation with respect to tactics and training.  The movement towards a 
common JFS data entry and request device and C2 system will enable 
standardization of warfighter training requirements across all of the services.  
This commonality of equipment should enable significant improvements in 
training quality and tactical flexibility, and the risk will be mitigated by maintaining 
the option to use legacy voice procedures for requesting support.  One of the 
most significant risks to this alternative with respect to training is the 
development, acceptance, and implementation of a common joint call for fire 
format to replace the numerous service and function-specific formats used today.  
The changes in the routing of this request are anticipated to produce noticeable 
improvements in upper-echelon functions as a result of organizational 
consolidation moves such as the Joint Fires Cell.  The simple act of consolidating 
cross-functional expertise should realize efficiency gains in both coordination and 
processing times, but also in the tactical efficiency of the request-to-provider 
pairings.  The training risks of consolidation at this level are mitigated by virtue of 
the breadth of experience available for on-the-job training and learning, although 
there may be some tactical challenges with initial implementation and use of a 
common format for request for fire data. 
The DJFSN alternative was assessed to incur a high level of training risk 
due to shifts in authority and responsibility.  The ability to request and receive fire 
support without direct oversight and approval requires a high degree of individual 
proficiency.  The movement towards a common JFS data entry and request 
device and C2 system will enable standardization of warfighter training 
requirements across all of the services.  The training burden for tactical expertise 
and aptitude is shifted from a relatively small cadre of upper-echelon leaders to a 
very large group in the field and in combat.  The responsiveness of this 
architecture will challenge the ability of supervisory entities to maintain tactical 
synergy and deconfliction of fires.  A risk reduction factor of this alternative could 
be that the elimination of service or function specific equipment will remove the 
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premium currently placed on training for those specialized systems.  The tactics 
and training risks of each alternative are shown in Figure 47.  
 
 
Figure 47:  Tactics and Training Risk Chart 
6.1.4 Materiel Risks 
The main risk drivers in this area are system interoperability and the 
expanded vulnerability of a fully networked force.  Interestingly, technical 
readiness levels were not determined to be a driver.  The core technologies to 
develop fully interoperable JFS systems exist today.  Interoperability challenges 
reside primarily with programmatic choices. 
 System interoperability includes the equipment which processes the call 
for fire directly (fielded land, sea, and air systems), the C2 systems which provide 
decision inputs, and the communications structure (GIG) which serves as the 
information conduit.  
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There is a continuum of interoperability that will define the materiel risks of 
the three alternatives.  The highest level of interoperability occurs when there is 
complete commonality of equipment or the systems have been purposefully 
developed to be interoperable.  On the other end of the spectrum, the lowest 
level of interoperability occurs when the interface between separate systems or 
functions is filled by a person that must combine or move data from one system 
to another.  The interoperability required of the systems and material needed to 
implement the alternatives drives the risk for each.  
Expanded system vulnerabilities stem from the assumption of network 
connectivity.  All networked nodes in these joint fire support request networks 
can be assumed to be predictably radiating within the electromagnetic spectrum.  
Radiating nodes lose the advantage of concealment.  Additionally, attacks 
against radiating nodes would likely result in a “no transmit” policy, rendering all 
of the proposed alternatives ineffective.   This risk will have to be mitigated 
through technology (low power signals) and countermeasures.  Since a net-
enabled force was an assumed condition across all alternatives, this risk was 
assessed to be equal for all alternatives.     
The Status Quo Plus alternative incurred low materiel risk because it 
accepts a low level of interoperability.  Projected improvements to the separate 
C2 systems at upper command levels will enhance the performance of these 
alternatives, but the repercussions of failures in interoperability at these levels 
will be absorbed by personnel.  While its fire support networks will require 
relatively faster and more efficient communications, most of the communications 
strain in this alternative will be across the upper organizational echelons.  
Incremental improvements in legacy C2 systems and currently fielded data input 
devices (service and function specific) will reduce this alternative’s risk.   
  Both the CJFSN and DJFSN alternatives were assessed to have medium 
levels of risk. Both of these alternatives require significant interoperability in order 
to function.  Both alternatives require fully interoperable C2 systems, the 
development and DoD-wide fielding of a joint, common input data device, and a 
common transmission network that eliminates specialized data links, particularly 
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across the aircraft fleets.  These alternatives demand improvements in 
communications and networking although the requirements for the Centralized 
alternative are primarily on the back side of the request (in the processing and 
tasking areas).  The network requirements for the DJFSN are riskier because 
connectivity must span all organizational levels and out to the “edge” with the 
forward observer.  The materiel risks of each alternative are shown in Figure 48.  
 
 
Figure 48:  Materiel Risk Chart 
6.1.5 Personnel and Facility Risks 
The risks to implementation of these alternatives due to personnel and 
facility changes vary significantly.  The Status Quo Plus alternative is assessed 
to have very little risk because the qualified personnel and appropriate facilities 
needed to implement this option already exist.  Although there may be some 
challenges caused by incremental improvements of legacy systems, the risk 
remains small in this category. 
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The CJFSN concept will make significant demands on physical facilities 
due to the consolidation of fire support functions and personnel.  This was 
assessed as a medium level of risk and can be mitigated by simply mixing the 
personnel and expertise currently segregated by function and service without 
combining them into one large organization. 
The DJFSN alternative will incur high risk to implementation due to the 
fundamental personnel changes involved.  The ability to transition the tactical 
knowledge and experience in JFS into a virtual and distributed organization at 
the level of proficiency required is not currently feasible.  Although the relaxation 
of physical facility requirements helps reduce the implementation risk, the 
personnel productivity of virtual organizations must also meet or exceed the 
capability of a co-located organization.  This will be very risky if a large portion of 
that virtual organization is on the battlefield under fire.   The personnel and 
facilities risks of each alternative are shown in Figure 49.  
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Figure 49:  Personnel and Facilities Risk Chart 
A summary comparison of the qualitative risk estimates of these 
alternatives is provided in Figure 50 and Table 16. 
  135
 
Figure 50:  Summary Risk Chart 
 
 
  Status Quo Plus Centralized JFSN  Distributed JFSN  
Doctrine   No Significant Changes  
Transition from Service 
Doctrine to Joint  
Integrated and Altered 
Joint Doctrine  
Organization 
& 
Leadership   
No Significant 
Changes  
Consolidation of Orgs.   
with Similar Roles  
Dynamic, Virtual 





Common Joint Tactics 
and Training  




Authority, Taskings  
No Significant 
Changes  
Core C2 System 
Interoperability  
Total C2 Interoperability 
to the “Edge”  
No Significant 
Changes  Cross-functional Orgs.  
Virtual Orgs. and 
Disconnected Personel  
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Table 16:  Risk Across Alternatives with Respect to DOTMLPF 
6.2 RELIABILITY ESTIMATE 
Each alternative’s performance of F2T2EA functions forms a basis for 
future reliability analysis.  The proposed joint fires system fits the process 
between acquiring targets (find, fix, and track) and prosecuting them (engage 
and assess).  Evaluating potential failure modes and mission impact of each step 
in the process provided insight into what failures significantly degrade overall 
system operation. The Project Team examined specific failure modes and 
assessed severity and likelihood for each alternative.  These failure modes were 
evaluated relative to the severity of the mission and were independent of the 
system alternative. The likelihood of occurrence based on the alternative 
implemented was then evaluated.  A relative risk assessment code was then 
assigned and color code ratings listed for each failure mode (as seen on Tables 
17, 18, and 19).  The list is not all inclusive and the severity is will be mission 
(scenario) dependent. 
The definition of what constitutes a failure is necessary to evaluate the 
overall system.  Failure to deliver available ordnance on a valid target is 
considered a failure of the overall fires system.  Figure 51 summarizes the overall 
system, with potential failures listed. 
 
Figure 51:  Overall Fires System Potential Failures 
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The acquire and prosecute processes are outside the scope of the system 
being developed, but potential failures at those interfaces are important to the 
overall reliability of the system.  Reliability risks, failure modes and potential for 
mitigation are discussed below. 
6.2.1 Request Process Failures 
The request input from the forward observer or other engaged unit was 
assumed to be perfect within the team’s modeling and simulation.  The main 
causes of errors being introduced to the system by the request are equipment 
failure, environmental effects, and training. 
Table 17 summarizes some potential failures and proposes actions to 
mitigate the risk of invalid or missed requests.  Equipment failures, such as the 
primary radio, typically result in delays in placing the CFF.  Additional radios are 
typically available within the unit, the request can be sent to another unit for 
forwarding, or messengers can be sent. 
Environmental effects, including radio interference, or electronic attack 
may prevent a call from being sent or merely delayed while an alternative 
communications path is found. 
The final factor, human error is typically a result of insufficient training or 
proficiency.  Correctly identifying a target while under fire can be difficult.  There 
is a tendency to request destruction of every target.  This typically is not the 
commander’s intent because excessive ordnance and providers could be tasked 
potentially missing other valid targets. 
Additionally, blind reliance on targeting equipment without the experience 
to verify the data can lead to precision errors.  Unqualified observers calling for 
fire on their position, not recognizing range or bearing errors, and calling from the 
wrong reference point will have severe implications.  Tasking a qualified fire 
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Table 17:  Potential Failures in the Acquire Process 
6.2.2 Targeting Process Failures 
 The targeting process for each alternative is the primary system under 
consideration.  A summary of the potential failures in this system are presented 
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Table 18:  Potential Failures in the Joint Fires System Targeting Process 
 Communications system failures may prevent requests from being 
forwarded to the appropriate decision cell or tasking orders being sent to 
providers.  In either case, a delay in engagement or loss of target will result.  
Failures in communication with the common operational database, or within the 
database itself will complicate the pairing and deconfliction algorithms.  
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Assignments to less than optimal providers or an increase in “CANTCO” 
responses will result.  Delays in prosecution due to manual deconfliction of 
airspace, or increased risk of fratricide will also result.  The algorithms used for 
pairing and deconfliction should account for the possibility of time delayed 
position data and the application of appropriate separation for assets and 
ordnance trajectories. 
 These pairing and deconfliction algorithms also require flexibility to meet 
changing Commander’s Intent and Rules Of Engagement.  The correct pairing in 
an open desert permissive environment is not necessarily the same as a 
constrained urban setting even when the same assets are available.  The JFC 
staff should periodically review the algorithm in use and promulgate changes to 
subordinate commands. 
 The message format and data structure used to share the information 
between the various entities should be robust enough to be virtually error free.  
Inadvertent bit errors that go undetected will adversely impact the engagement 
process.  Increased risk of fratricide, collateral damage, and lost opportunities to 
engage targets will result. 
 Errors in the operational picture will increase the risk to blue and neutral 
forces or may negate a valid CFF.  Sharing this data with coalition forces 
presents a significant security risk that should be addressed separately. 
 Unavailability of assets or an estimated engagement beyond requested 
response time needs to be communicated to the operational commander and the 
requesting unit.  A decision will then be made to engage the target when an 
asset becomes available, cancel the request, or re-task an asset assigned to a 
lower priority target.  The Project Team’s modeling and simulations did not 




6.2.3 Prosecution Process Failures 
Table 19 summarizes potential failures during the prosecution process.  
Project Team simulation and modeling did not take into account potential failures 
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Table 19:  Potential Failures in the Prosecution Process 
 Environmental interference or jamming preventing receipt of tasking can 
be mitigated by tasking the “second best asset” or providing anti-jam or electronic 
attack assets to engage the jammer.  A delay in engagement or loss of 
opportunity to engage the target may result. 
 Equipment failure of the provider will result in a non-engagement, and 
require the target to be re-assigned.  Removal of the asset as a potential provider 
from the operational database should make this a single event with minimal 
overall system impact.  Inherent inaccuracies in the targeting systems (position 
error, circular error probable, average miss distance, etc.) will impact the actual 
effectiveness and coupled with effective assessment may require re-nomination 
of the target for prosecution. 
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 System errors that require human intervention will typically delay time until 
the target is engaged.  If the CAS provider is required to deconflict airspace via 
voice en route to the target, the overall timeliness of response will suffer.  For 
“Danger Close” targets, it will be required to employ tactics and procedures that 
are inherently more difficult and slower than a less restrictive CFF. 
The overall expected risk of the above failures can be used to rank the 
alternatives based on relative reliability of mission success.  The Acquire process 
rated the Status Quo Plus more likely to fail than the centralized and distributed 
joint fire support networks.  The Target process rated the DJFSN alternative as 
the best, followed by the CJFSN and Status Quo Plus.  The Prosecution process 
rated the Status Quo Plus and CJFSN as moderate to high risk, with the DJFSN 
even higher. 
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7.0 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this study was to determine a better way to perform Joint 
Fire Support.  Specifically, the Project Team attempted to “define an 
operationally feasible Joint Fire Support request, coordination, and tasking 
architecture that maximizes rapid battlefield effects for the Commander.”  By 
taking an objective look at the concept of JFS and applying a systematic design 
process to the problem, the project team has identified challenges, proposed 
solutions, and insights for a truly “joint” fire support system in the future. 
7.1 PREFERRED SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
The Distributed alternative offers the best possible range of benefits but 
also comes with the highest implementation risks and challenges.  Before the 
project team could arrive at an overall alternative recommendation, a 
consideration that military forces will have to continue day-to-day operations 
during the transition period.  This constrained the risk that operational 
commanders would wish to take and imposed a “tipping point” for 
implementation.  Having considered all these factors, the team chose to 
recommend the distributed joint fires support network as the recommended 
alternative.  However, the project team recommended against efforts to get to 
that objective in one step.  The Centralized alternative is a natural evolutionary 
step to get to a distributed system.  Moving to the centralized alternative and, 
after that alternative is fully realized, moving to the distributed architecture is a 
preferred method to mitigate implementation risk. 
The doctrine, organization, and materiel requirements for the DJFSN 
system drive the main sources of operational risk.  The dynamic chains of 
command, a fully interoperable and common command and control system, and 
trusted decision making algorithms are high risk to implement; the DJFSN 
system fails without them.  However, even though these objectives will be difficult 
to implement, they should remain the ultimate goals. 
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The Centralized Joint Fire Support Network (CJFSN) represents a 
stepping stone on the path to DJFSN.  While CJFSN also streamlines chains of 
command and requires an interoperable command and control system, it remains 
less efficient than DJFSN because it keeps the personnel associated with 
decision-making at the various functional levels.  These people are the key to 
operational risk mitigation; they can absorb the shortfalls associated with areas 
that do not yet meet the larger goals.   
The path to implementing a fully distributed joint fire support network can 
be achieved by transitioning first to a centralized joint fire support network 
(CJFSN) and then building on that success.  Development of the required 
doctrine, organization, and tactics changes will then allow a “top-down” 
implementation of the DJFSN.  This “build a little, test a little” approach will 
mitigate the risks involved with transition from Status Quo (Plus) to a fully 
distributed process while also improving overall Joint Fires system performance. 
The magnitude of DOTMLPF changes required to implement the DJFSN 
































Figure 52:  Potential Benefits and Risks of the Proposed Alternatives 
7.2 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 There are numerous obstacles that must be overcome if any integrated 
JFS system is to be deployed.  Based on the team’s study of the challenges of 
joint fire support and the recommended implementation path from a centralized 
to a distributed joint fire support network, numerous recommendations were 
identified to enable this change.  These conclusions and recommendations have 
been organized in the construct of the DOTMLPF model and are highlighted 
below. 
7.2.1 Doctrinal Conclusions and Recommendations 
 The implementation of the DJFSN requires that service doctrine continues 
to evolve towards capability-based operations.  Progress in this area has been 
significant and is likely to continue.  The establishment of the JFC structure has 
brought an unprecedented level of flexibility to operations.  And commands like 
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SOCOM continue to push out “the edges of the envelope” through their day-to-
day operations. 
The Joint Fires Support mission area crosses the boundaries of the 
four Services, each bringing unique capabilities to the battle.  The 
synergism of the mission area that has universal Tactics, 
Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), recognized and employed by 
all users, will be a force multiplier for joint operations in the future.55 
  
 Doctrine should also permit the services to carry more supporting roles 
and missions that are consistent with their capabilities and Title 10 
responsibilities.  In particular, doctrine should establish more developed ground 
and air combat support relationships among the services.   
 
7.2.2 Organizational/Leadership Conclusions and Recommendations 
 Functionally equivalent organizations should be consolidated, physically or 
virtually, with formal organizational linkage under the JFC construct.  From the 
perspective of the team, there are a significant number of organizations 
performing comparable functions.  For example, the DASC and ASOC complete 
many of the same tasks for CAS operations.  Defined organizational links will 
maintain clear chains of command and allow any calls-for-fire to move between 
the services’ decision nodes without having to transit the staffs, thereby 
shortening the timeline for truly effects-based decision making.  
 This organizational consolidation should be used as the catalyst for 
functional collaboration.  Personnel working in these organizations will expose 
the interoperability issues of duplicative systems, help develop common training 
syllabi, and be a primary source of cross-cutting improvements.  Acting on these 
areas is key to the “build a little, test a little” approach and overall implementation 
success. 
 
                                                 
55 U.S. Marine Corps Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Mission Area Initial 
Capabilities Document for Close Air Support, JROCM 095-04, 14 June 2004, p. 2. 
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7.2.3 Tactics and Training Conclusions and Recommendations 
 Develop a core syllabus of standardized, joint training for calls-for fire 
which is included in every service’s basic combat skills list.  Where it is 
necessary, specialized training for fire support teams, forward observers, forward 
air controllers, or riverine combat teams may be developed.  The expected result 
is a reduction of training differentiation between the services and consistent 
procedures between theaters.   Develop a common joint tactical publication set to 
reinforce this core syllabus. 
 Develop prioritization, pairing, and deconfliction algorithms for a variety of 
scenarios.  These automated algorithms will be used as tactical aides by the 
Joint Fires Cell to support rapid effects-based pairing.  A robust set of algorithms 
that can be tailored to support the JFC intentions and operational requirements is 
necessary to move to the DJFSN architecture. 
7.2.4 Materiel Conclusions and Recommendations 
 The DoD must realign to permit the development of interoperable 
systems.   With respect to joint fires, this realignment must focus on the portfolios 
of programs that comprise the Command and Control systems, fielded ground, 
air, and ship systems, and the communications equipment which comprises the 
Global Information Grid.  Despite the significant efforts from a roster of program 
executive officers, functional boards, and oversight councils, separate command 
and control systems still exist within a fractured community.  Each service 
maintains multiple approaches to address common issues.  This diversity 
extends across the entire joint fire support spectrum and is increasing each day.  
For example, as the “ground gets taller” with fielded combat troops operating 
UAVs in the battlespace, integration into the Theater Battle Management Core 
System (TBMCS) is not a requirement for the UAV C2 systems.  
 The DoD should realign the requirements, authority, and funding of the 
programs into a single track.  One construct to do this is to use a Joint Program 
Executive Officer as the instrument of that change.  For C2, this would be 
particularly difficult since the acquisition community is divided between the 
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Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I and each of the services.  With fully 
interoperable systems as the goal, all systems which process calls-for-fire should 
share common data standards; many of which already exist.  As an example, the 
Joint C3 Information Exchange Data Model (JC3IEDM) developed by the 
Multilateral Interoperability Program (MIP) at NAVSEA is a mature standard but it 
has not yet been widely used outside experimental settings. 
 The DoD should continue investments in communications with an 
emphasis on providing more bandwidth to the fielded troops, ships, and aircraft.  
Much like the C2 discussion above, the Global Information Grid (a program 
managed by DISA under ASD/C3I) needs to move in step with the services’ own 
planned networks.  The Navy’s ForceNet, Air Force’s C2 Constellation, and 
Army’s LandWarNet systems are attempting to capture, process, interface, and 
secure the ever-increasing amount of networked tactical data in the form of text, 
VoIP, recorded data, sensor targeting, fire control data, text command 
instructions, and images.56 The command and control efficiency needed to 
effectively communicate the JTF commander’s intent and priorities will be 
impossible to achieve without a robust and interoperable system. 
The DoD should designate a “Center of Excellence” for the development 
of the family of decision algorithms necessary to support automated command 
and control.  Throughout this thesis, the Project Team reviewed several decision 
algorithms that conducted various actions including prioritization, pairing, and 
resource deconfliction.  The team concluded that no universal decision making 
algorithm will satisfy the full range of operational requirements.  However, the 
majority of these algorithms will share common processes and data 
requirements.  A centralized repository of methods and expertise should prevent 
needless duplication in this area. 
7.2.5 Personnel and Facility Conclusions and Recommendations 
The continued development of the Global Information Grid (GIG) should 
allow the expansion of the joint fire support concept within the US military and 
                                                 
56 Department of Defense, Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2) 
Roadmap, Draft Version 2.0, 22 February 2005, pp. 1-181.  
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allow participation of allied and coalition partners. The primary challenge to this 
expansion is the complexity and sensitivity of allowing allied/coalition entry into 
the U.S. joint “infosphere.”  The GIG should deliver, as advertised, a “plug and 
fight” interoperability, that enables allied and coalition partners to connect on an 
as needed basis. 57  
A coherent and unambiguous common operational picture requires that 
sensors reliably and clearly identify and track targets within the complex 
battlespace.  Future C4ISR systems will have to support a rapid detection and 
precise location of blue forces and red targets for a shared common view linked 
to the operational command decision maker, who determines the joint fire of 
choice in an integrated, dynamic fire support plan.58  As technology integrates 
more information into the user’s hands, data analysis/discrimination will be 
slowed by necessary human intervention.  Information overload will occur.  Battle 
management aids will have to be developed to avoid inefficiency of the human in 
the loop stymied with information overload. 59 
The reliance on voice communications permeates current JFS practices, 
affecting Fire Support Coordination Agencies (FSCAs) and related elements. As 
the military develops advances in joint fires capabilities the reliance on 
automated data may bring with it overcrowding of some RF spectrums as well as 
new requirements for increased information security that result in longer data 
transfer times.60 
The DJFSN requires a real time operational picture of targets and 
providers.  Additionally, blue, gray and white positions should be known with 
sufficient accuracy to prevent fratricide and collateral damage.  Effective IPB 
communicated to all fire providers is needed to set no-fire or restricted zones 
where higher authority permission is required to engage (due to presence of 
SOF, coalition forces, critical infrastructure, political targets etc.). 
                                                 
57 US JFCOM, Global Information Grid, 15 August 2001, p. 7. 
58 U.S. Marine Corps Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Mission Area Initial 
Capabilities Document for Close Air Support, JROCM 095-04, 14 June 2004, p. 34. 
59 Ibid 
60 U.S. Marine Corps Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Mission Area Initial 
Capabilities Document for Close Air Support, JROCM 095-04, 14 June 2004, p. 34. 
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7.3 AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
 During the course of this study, the Project Team identified several areas 
for further study. 
7.3.1 Doctrine 
Title 10 US Code mandated separation of some service functions was 
cited as a reason for lack of interoperability between services during several 
stakeholder interviews.   
An operator’s review of 10USC revealed flaws in the arguments and 
apparent support for several of the team’s recommendations.  According to 
10USC, the Secretary of Defense shall take action to eliminate duplication in the 
Department of Defense61.  Additionally, matters of joint concern shall be 
coordinated between the Army, Air Force, and Navy62. In joint operations, 
airspace management and deconfliction of manned aircraft, unmanned vehicles, 
and ordnance are matters of joint concern.  Coordination between USMC, Army, 
and Air Force for tactics and equipment used by landing forces is also required.63  
With regard to the acquisition of systems, the JROC has a responsibility to assist 
CJCS in assessing joint military requirements.64  The team proposes that a 
common command and control system should be a “joint military requirement”.  
Title 10 also states the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I “shall have as his 
principal duty the overall supervision of command, control, communications, and 
intelligence affairs of the Department of Defense.” 65  Establishing a Joint PEO 
under ASD/C3I may be the catalyst to develop a common joint command and 
control system. 
                                                 
 61 House of Representatives, “10USC125(a)”, 
[http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/index.html], Nov06 
62 House of Representatives, “10USC5062(c)”, 
[http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/index.html], Nov06 
63 House of Representatives, “10USC5063(b)”, 
[http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/index.html], Nov06 
64 House of Representatives, “10USC181”, [http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/index.html], 
Nov06 
65 House of Representatives, “10USC138(3A)”, 
[http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/index.html], Nov06 
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The requirement for separately developed and managed systems within 
the component services appears to be more a matter of “the way we’ve always 
done it” than public law.  A more detailed review of the legal requirements to 
enable more efficient, effective, and economical operation stated in 10USC125 
which we believe is needed. These doctrine changes will also affect the 
distribution of budget between the services and how they organize, train, and 
equip the force. 
7.3.2 Organization and Leadership 
 The requirement for dynamic allocation of assets to prevent fratricide 
presents significant challenges to the decision makers.  The complication of a 
manned weapon occupying the same volume of space as unguided weapons 
and the expected proliferation of small unmanned aerial vehicles necessitates 
additional coordination measures.  The various methods of deconfliction and 
development of a model to overcome the organizational challenges of 
implementing ‘joint engagement zones’ for fires support requires further analysis. 
7.3.3 Tactics and Training 
  The priority of the targets, and the desired effects against those 
targets, determines the fire support assets that should be tasked against them.  
On a dynamic battlefield with rapidly moving targets, exceptionally mobile blue 
forces, and quickly shifting objectives, this aspect of fire support integration 
becomes extremely difficult to manually accomplish.  The final DJFSN system 
should have a pairing algorithm that can be tailored to the commander’s intent.  
Development of a variety of these pairing algorithms to support a range of 
operating environments, an assortment of ROE environments will be required.  
Parallel development of these algorithms for testing and use at the joint fires 
support cell will improve the processing time and help build the confidence during 





 As the services move towards more restrictive ROE and precision guided 
munitions, the capability to accurately locate the target is critical.  Otherwise 
precise misses result from PGM on errant targeting information.  An alternative 
method of tasking a targeting sensor (a remote UAV for instance) that operates 
in conjunction with a ground based fires asset may replace or enhance the active 
range finder carried by each ground unit.  BDA assets should also be tasked as 
part of the joint fire support system.  The assumption that the requester was in 
position to conduct BDA may not always hold true.  Consideration to employ 
manned aircraft as weapons delivery and BDA, or tasking a sensor asset to 
accomplish the assessment should be part of the decision process. 
 Continued development of the Global Information Grid was an initial 
assumption for all three alternatives considered.  The information data structures, 
exchange formats, and interfaces with existing and developing systems require 
oversight and evaluation.  The common operational picture assumed to exist is 
predicated on systematic integrated development of various command and 
control systems. 
7.3.5 Personnel and Facilities 
 The consolidation of the various service specific functional entities under 
the centralized system requires further analysis.  Physical and functional layout 
and organization of this new functional component should be designed and 
networked based on a human resources based analysis. 
 Commonality of training syllabus, collocation of facilities or cross-service 
exchange of instructors should be evaluated.   
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APPENDIX A. JFIIT SYSTEMS INTEROPERABILITY  
 Joint Forces Interoperability and Integration Team Systems Matrix shown 
in Table 20 identify capabilities, limitations, and interoperability of various 
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APPENDIX B. JOINT FIRE SUPPORT REQUEST DATA FORMATS 
 The Project Team asserted that the call-for-fire data requirements are 
constant across the services.  The team has reviewed the primary methods to 
complete a call for fire for various types of providers to ensure the data contained 
in these different requests is essentially static. 
 For artillery calls for fire, a normal call for fire consists of six elements:  
Observer identification, Warning Order (which includes the type of mission, the 
size of the element to fire for effect, and the method of target location), Target 
Location, Target Description, Method of engagement, and Method of fire and 
control.  These elements are transmitted by voice communication in three parts, 
with each part being read back to the originator to ensure accurate transmission. 
 If an artillery call for fire is completed within AFATDS, the basic data entry 
screen requires the input of the observer identification, unit composition, 
ammunition type requested, target location, target type guidance, and map 
version used in the handheld terminal.  By design, these data elements 
correspond directly to the items required for a verbal call for fire. 
 Requests for CAS are completed via a DD Form 1972 Air Strike Request 
and a “9-line” engagement message.  (Due to widely varying equipment 
baselines in the aircraft fleet, there is no parallel to an AFATDS-like system.)  
While there at least 21 different versions of the 9-line, the data contained in the 
different versions are basically static and compare very closely with the data 
elements needed for artillery requests.  From Table 21, the core data elements 
(contained in >50% of the formats) are evident  
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JFIRE Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Total
Target location / coordinates x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 16
Callsign: Observer ID / aircraft / JTAC x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 14
Target description x x x x x x x x x x x x x 13
Method of engagement / type of ordnance x x x x x x x x x x x 11
Heading to target / direction x x x x x x x x x x 10
Clearance / method or type of control x x x x x x x x x x 10
Friendly position x x x x x x x 7
Distance to target x x x x x x 6
Authentication x x x x x x 6
Abort code x x x x x x 6
Time-on-target / Time-to-target x x x  x x 5
Number and type of aircraft x x x x x 5
Mission Number x x x x x 5
Mark type x x x x x 5
Target Elevation x x x x x 5
Weather / hazards x x x x 4
Threats in the target area x x x x 4
Remarks x x x x 4
Position of aircraft x x x x 4
Play time x x x x 4
Initial Point x x x x 4
Egress direction / instructions x x x 3
Restrictions x x 2
Artillery (max ordnanace / gun-to-target line) x x 2
Target area description x 1
Intelligence / situation update x 1
Ground commanders initials 0
Call for Fire Formats
 
Table 21:  Close Air Support Call for Fire Format (From66)  
 As a result of this analysis, the team felt confident in assuming the data 
required to engage a target was not significantly different based on the mode of 
engagement. 
Simplicity under combat conditions is a characteristic of the above 
formats.  However, these simple data structures aren’t sufficient to describe the 
battlespace for C2 Automated Information Systems. 
The Joint Consultation Command and Control Information Exchange Data 
Model (JC3IEDM) was developed by the Multilateral Interoperability Program 
(MIP) at NAVSEA, Dahlgren, VA.  The JC3IEDM is essentially a pre-negotiated 
data structure to share Command, Control, and Communications (C3) data 
between 28 participating nations.  This robust data structure of over 2000 
elements would permit a very high degree of data interoperability between 
participating nations.  If fully implemented, the JC3IEDM would require extensive 
changes to or replacement of existing equipment and software.  JC3IEDM 
implements an eXtensible Mark-up Language (XML) format and would require 
much more bandwidth than current ASCII text-based equipment.  While the 
                                                 
66  D. C. Clayton, Air Combat Command USAF Weapons Review, Winter 2005, “Close Air 
Support Briefings for the Future: Alterations to the 9-line”, p. 40 
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JC3IEDM construct is on the interoperability path of many of the major C2 
systems, the hardware at the edges, such as the data links onboard aircraft or in 
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APPENDIX C. CURRENT JFS COORDINATION AND DECISION-
MAKING COMPLEXITY 
  
Figures 53 through 55 are additional examples of the challenges in 




























































































At least 18 steps
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Figure 55:  TLAM Request Processing 
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APPENDIX D. INPUT-OUTPUT MODELING PROCESS 
 The first consideration when attempting to characterize any system with 
an Input-Output (I-O) Model is to determine the intended outputs.  The systems 
engineering process inputs combine the customer’s requirements and the project 
constraints.  The controllable inputs determine what is needed to start the 
process in order for the outputs to be achieved.  The controllable inputs must be 
able to shorten the fire support tasking cycle by having the capability to task a 
request expeditiously. Controllable inputs apply to areas that can be controlled by 
the human interface with the system.  These include, but are not limited to: 
training, C2, and the type, number, placement, and grouping of targeting sensors 
for a specific operation, in addition to tactics and logistics. 
 Uncontrollable inputs are those mostly environmental characteristics that 
influence the performance of the system.  They are inevitable factors such as 
geography, climate, and topography.  The uncontrollable inputs of our system 
often detract from the intended outputs.  The proposed fire support system 
solution must be able to operate a range of dynamic environments from force-on-
force, to rear area support and urban combat. 
 By-products of the systems process are unintentional or incidental outputs 
that have a positive or negative effect on achieving the overall goal of the 
system.  Some of the by-products that have been identified by the Project Team 
include such things as sensor failure and enemy responses.  The I-O Model 
helps provide information on the performance characteristics of the system and 
relates to how well the system will work in its intended environment.  Once the 
outputs have been generated and bounded, the analysts can begin to make a 
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APPENDIX E. FUNCTIONAL FLOW ANALYSIS 
The functional flow of items through the proposed system was deliberately 
decomposed into smaller steps as outlined in Figures 56 through 61. 
 
Figure 56:  Proposed System Decomposition 
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Figure 57:  Send JF Request Sub-functions 
 
 
Figure 58:  Process JF Request Sub-functions 
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Figure 59:  Send JF Tasking Sub-functions 
 
 




Figure 61:  Request-Provider Pairing Sub-functions 
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APPENDIX F. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS AND SUPPORTING DATA 
Stakeholder analysis enables the designer to identify the system's 
effective need as well as critical assumptions and constraints of the defined 
problem.  These may come from a variety of sources and might include 
assumptions ranging from strategic to tactical.  While time and money are the 
most typical constraints, there are also physical, legal, environmental, social and 
technological constraints that may be relevant and must be considered. 
 The Project Team began identifying stakeholders who would determine 
the system requirements, scope and bound the problem, and be involved in the 
entire process of definition, development, and deployment of the solution.  
Stakeholder analysis has several sub steps that include:  (1) identifying 
stakeholders; (2) conducting interviews with stakeholders; (3) identifying 
stakeholders’ needs, wants, and desires for the proposed system;  
(4) consolidating information. 
Stakeholders can be separated into five major categories.  Each category 
identifies a unique function and perspective that the specific stakeholders in that 
category provided the team.  These five categories are: 





For the proposed Joint Fires in 2020 system, the following stakeholders 
were identified with respect to these five categories: 
Decision makers have the authority to make impacting and final project 
decisions when multiple design choices are available.  Because the purpose of 
the proposed future systems includes the weapon effectiveness of Joint military 
assets, the practical primary decision maker is:  the Joint Fires Integration and 
Interoperability Team (JFIIT). 
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Clients are agencies or groups of people that will have substantial input 
as to the development of the solution set.  They include Combatant Commanders 
(COCOMs) and each of the armed services. 
Sponsors are offices or groups of people that provide financial support, 
which may include technical support or support in the form of special studies or 
specialized information, and include the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). 
Users are agencies or groups of people that will actually use the system 
that is developed.  Practical users include Operators (all U.S. military) and 
defense contractors. 
Finally, the project team analysts will evaluate the effective need and 
assist in determining the projected performance of various system alternatives.  
These include the SEA-10 Joint Fires Project Team and NPS faculty, staff  
and students. 
Based on efforts to identify the stakeholders, the team traveled to visit and 
discuss JFS with the organizations described below.  The following excerpts are 
trip report e-mails sent by members of the team immediately after each 
stakeholder visit.  Each trip report describes the significant events and 
knowledge gained on each trip. 
 
Stakeholders:  US Marine Corps AFATDS Training Center 
AFATDS Software Development Project Manager 
Location:   Fort Sill, Oklahoma, May 2006 
Audience:    Joint Fire Support in 2020 Team & Advisors 
Author:   Maj Tyler Gabriel 
 
Overall, the short visit to Fort Sill, OK was incredibly helpful 
in all respects and I honestly believe that we have saved weeks or 
months of project effort by making this short trip.  The amount of 
information we received was enormous and the insight into 
customer needs and stakeholder inputs we gained during our 
tabletop discussions with the Marines there gave us a whole new 
perspective on our Joint Fires project concept. 
On Thursday morning, we met with the USMC contingent on 
Fort Sill responsible for training Marines on the AFATDS system.  
Officers and Senior Marine NCOs spent about 1½  hours just 
describing and demonstrating AFATDS, EMT (Effects Management 
Tool), PSSSOF (Precision Strike System, SOF), C2PC, JTCW, and 
the MRT/TLDHS (AKA Strikelink), a new piece of 
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hardware/software that has recently joined the AFATDS system of 
systems.  After a thorough review of how a Marine (or Army GI, or 
possible Riverine sailor) actually makes a call for fire using the 
AFATDS family of equipment, and how that request gets sent, 
processed, approved, prioritized, allocated, tasked, serviced, and 
assessed, they spent the next 2 ½ hours answering our questions 
about stakeholder needs and helping us to understand where the 
current systems are not meeting those needs.  All of these Marines 
have recently returned from OIF and had actual experience 
interfacing the AFATDS and NFCS systems aboard a ship in the 
Persian Gulf.  We also talked briefly about one recent application of 
the AFATDS technology, a rapid anti-mortar counter-fire capability, 
which has direct tie-in to the efficiency/timeliness of the technology 
in place and the advantages of the rapid responsiveness.  This was 
a very productive meeting, and we learned a lot about the current 
system architecture and interaction, as well as programs that are in 
development and/or in limited fielding. 
Thursday afternoon, we met with the program requirements 
manager for the AFATDS software for 4 hours.  After seeing the 
operation of the current equipment with the USMC, we were able to 
pepper him with informed questions about the Joint Fires process 
and the requirements process that generated, and continues to 
refine, the AFATDS system.  Of note, the AFATDS system, as a 
‘System of Record’ designation, is by mandate projected to be THE 
primary mechanism for fire support in both the USA and USMC 
until around 2016.  The next block software cycle, due out later this 
year, will move to a Windows OS (instead of the Unix OS it is on 
now), will include XML capability in addition to its current 
VMF/USMTF (Variable Message Format/US Message Text Format) 
messaging capability, and it will also be able to provide a specific 
deconfliction ‘tunnel’ for planned shells/rockets/missiles to aid in 
better deconfliction with airborne aircraft (and civil air as in the case 
of Iraq).  The first version of AFATDS was fielded in 1996, so it has 
been in refinement and development for 10 years, making it an 
established and refined program that has incorporated 10 years of 
customer inputs to get to the functionality that it has today.  One 
important aspect of AFATDS that we learned from both the Marines 
and the software program manager is the 2 different functions, 
tactical and technical, in the same software/hardware package. 
 The technical function is the side of the software that computes 
exactly where to point the tubes/MRLS (essentially a weapon 
system component), and the tactical function is the side of the 
software that prioritizes, allocates, and tasks based on 
commander’s guidance.  An important part of the AFATDS software 
that we discussed with the software program manager in detail was 
the compatibility issues with other existing systems.  AFATDS is 
  172
currently able to communicate directly to over 60 other systems 
using its VMF/USMTF message format.  Several other systems, 
including JADOCS (Joint Advanced Deep Operations Coordinated 
System…simply renamed from ADOCS to generate funding) which 
should soon be supplanted by WEEMC (Web-Enabled Execution 
Management Capability), and the upcoming Net-Enabled 
Command Capability (NECC) were discussed.  We had a great 
discussion of the shortcomings of AFATDS and all of the other Joint 
Fires-related software and the TTP/doctrinal disconnects.  
Interestingly, it appears the AFATDS systems wasn’t originally 
developed using a systems engineering process.  Only after 10 
years of customer feedback have they managed to provide a 
system that meets the customer’s (ground unit) effective 
needs…mostly. 
 
“Take Aways”-  The AFATDS system seems to be already doing 
exactly what the Army and Marines want it to do for organic indirect 
fires (mortar, arty, rockets, etc), but the Joint Fire Support request 
system starts breaking apart once it tries to leave the ground 
commander’s purview (i.e. CAS, Naval Fires).  This is where all of 
the advantages of this digital request format are lost by human-in-
the-loop hurdles, which means that there has been little or no 
quantifiable improvement in CAS/NSF during the decade between 
Desert Storm and OIF/now.  This is where Shawn and I think we 
should focus our analysis…there is an effective need here for 
customers across all of the services.   
 
Stakeholder:  Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Team 
Location:   Eglin AFB, Florida, June 2006 
Audience:    Joint Fire Support in 2020 Team & Advisors 
Author:   LCDR Matt Bartel 
  
The trip to JFIIT went well. 
 
As for the briefs and the briefers:  overall impression is that 
these guys are the single joint source.  Nobody else is working on a 
joint picture that they could think of.  There are a slew of civilians 
and contractors on staff, and only a few military (the CO, LCOL 
Ringler, and a few enlisted folks).  The contractors are almost 
exclusively folks involved in joint fires (Marine FACs, former A-10 
driver, Naval Aviators, and Intel).  They (JFIIT) are the result of 
combining the CID (Combat Identification, think BlueForce Tracker, 
etc), and the Joint Fires folks commissioned by JFCOM.  About 140 
total personnel.  They've done some research, with a lot of it at the 
National Training Center.  We are invited to the next NTC event, 
August 12-15.  The data they've collected, however, doesn't seem 
very useful from a modeling perspective...they monitor 
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communications and layer each units SA to a ground truth (reality) 
to see how well the picture is being relayed up and down the chain.  
Here’s a rundown of the briefs: 
Intro from LCOL Ringler:  Welcomed us and offered all his 
resources...really looking to help us in any way he can.  Changing 
command in a month or two, but guaranteed his replacement would 
have the same attitude.  Asked about other organizations, he said:  
CNA (Center for Naval Analysis)...should have lots of data/info, 
JFCOM (POC pending), JAGO offices (Joint Air Ground 
Operations)...never heard of them, and look at the Marine Corps 
lessons learned on Joint Fires (I'm looking into this...it should be 
unclas).  As far as data for the models, they have anecdotal info 
(interviews and surveys, with a big one finishing next month), but 
not much we can directly plug into our model, and no model of their 
own to simulate joint fires...their "model" is collecting data at live fire 
and exercise events to give performance feedback.  Steve Mechum 
(Intel guy who coordinated for us) said he'd look at finding what 
we're looking for. 
Ron Spock - Laser Rangefinder Quicklook method:  At first I 
thought this brief wouldn’t be useful, but it turned out to be 
insightful.  There are 5 laser rangefinders currently in use...they 
didn't recognize my weak attempt at describing the Strikelink 
LRF/tablet system.  The five are:  LLDR (Northrop Grumman 
product with Thermal and Video), the Mk 7 (most widely used), the 
Viper 2 (no longer manufactured), the Vector 21 (replacement unit 
for Viper 2), and the LH-40/41 (limited manufacture).  All of these 
produced a mean error of 6-175 meters due primarily to the 
magnetic compass.  JFIIT devised a method to improve to 5-40 
meters mean error using the "Quicklook" method (using a known 
fixed point to determine declination and improve the coordinates 
passed).  When I asked about digitized/automated systems, they 
said "bad data fast is still bad data".  We eventually got around to 
the point that nearly every transmission of coordinate data is 
transmitted by voice.  This brief also raised the point of joint fires 
also being joint ISR (in other words joint target location…USAF unit 
finds target for Army unit to be engaged by Army MLRS).  Their 
biggest emphasis for future trends was CDA/CDE (collateral 
damage analysis/estimate); smaller and smaller warheads to attack 
a target due to political correctness. 
Mike Higgins/Tim Finn (Tim Finn wrote quite a bit of the Joint 
Fires pubs) - JBMC2 (they used this acronym quite a bit at JFIIT).  
Like almost all the briefers, the emphasis is on JCAS...little 
integration of artillery/indirect fires, and no integration of NSFS. 
They had only a limited knowledge of current and planned Naval 
weapons like ERGM and the Rail Gun. This brief brought forward 
one of the biggest lessons learned (from my perspective):  a major 
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part of our analysis should go into the politics of the current 
problem (the major reason the military is not "joint")...and that is 
Title 10.  I'll be honest and say I don't know a whole lot about it, but 
every brief mentioned that service parochialism and Title 10 are the 
major roadblocks to truly joint fires.  It doesn't allow for the 
interoperability necessary for close coordination.  It took them a 
year to do the analysis of JCAS problems, but the data is 
summarized in two excel spreadsheets that have more data than 
we could process in the time there...all the holes between aircraft 
and systems (who can't talk to whom, etc).  Great data.  Also 
mentioned talking to the Military Operational Research Society 
(MORS) for more data.  They also spoke of a CJTFEX (Combined 
Joint Task Force Exercise) 04-02.  They spent millions of dollars 
putting SA-6's and Scuds in the North Carolina countryside for 
"Joint Fires"...the targets were found by national assets, but the 
information never made it to the trigger pullers (they mostly faulted 
the Navy, who was in overall command, for not processing and 
relaying the info).  Again, a great ISR tie-in.  They recommended 
analyzing Joint Vision 2010 and 2020 for the discrepancy between 
what's been mandated and what's possible, especially in the realm 
of the F-35 JSF (hard joint requirements that conflict with service 
requirements).  Tim also took the time to explain exactly how you 
go from user to provider (in a generic sense):  Ideally you have a 
TACP (Tactical Air Control Party) who is a JTAC (Joint Terminal Air 
Controller)...could be officer (FAC qualified) or could be enlisted.  
They submit a voice request to the USAF Air Request Net, 
proposed to become the Joint Request Net.  This request is then 
sometimes transferred to a form DD 1972 to go through Army 
channels for indirect fires.  The coordination happens at the DASC 
(Direct Air Support Center, USMC) or ASOC (Air Support 
Operations Center, USA).  The question of allocation or 
prioritization seemed very fuzzy, and I wasn't convinced of a 
standard approach aside from commander's prerogative.  The joint 
coordination seems missing entirely once you leave the CAS 
arena...they mentioned AFATDS use by both the Army and the 
Marines. 
Scot Chiasson (A-10 Driver) - Joint Fires Model.  The Joint 
Fires "Model" is actually a UML representation of the kill chain.  He 
presented the F2T2EA kill chain, and the presentation does an 
outstanding job of dissecting it.  He also showed us another kill 
chain, D3A (Decide, Detect, Deliver and Assess).  I obviously like 
the way we're going better (F2T2EA).  His presentation explains 
target selection within this kill chain, including the allocation of 
assets for TST and on-call fires.  Good explanation, but not a model 
in the sense of what we're going to need to do.  Brought up the 
urgent need for MOE's and MOP's, and he referred me to "Annex 
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A"...lots of time/Pk/etc metrics that'll be on SharePoint shortly.  
When pressed for an allocation scheme, he referenced AFATDS 
and the way it handles calls for fire.  He said there was an 
automated process for allocation that the commander can tailor 
with intent...maybe Tyler and Shawn know more on this. 
On the technology side of things, they mentioned Link 16 is 
not currently compatible for CAS (you have to enter an air target at 
0 altitude to point out a ground target).  A neat system they 
mentioned was Rover 3, a system that allows the JTAC to see 
exactly where the aircraft's sensors are pointing (a video display of 
what the pilot is looking at in his FLIR/etc). 
Col Andy Balding (USMC, Ret) gave a brief on training and 
the plan for future JTAC...doesn't look good.  The capacity is barely 
there to maintain the requirements as it is, and the plan is to double 
output.  Major roadblock is aircraft sorties for live fire training.  
Again mentioned Title 10 roadblocks to integration.  Extensive brief 
on the T part of DOTMLPF.   
 Overall the trip was beneficial and provided good insight to 
the communications and breakdown of Joint Fires between the 
services. 
 
Stakeholders:  Various Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps 
personnel and Professors 
Location:   Naval Post Graduate School Monterey, California,  
           July 2006. 
Audience:    Joint Fire Support in 2020 Advisors & Team 
Author:   LT Spencer Nordgran 
 
 The Joint Fire Support in 2020 held its interim Project 
review in July, 2006.  This meeting was held to get expert faculty 
and student input from experienced personnel in the area of Joint 
Fires, Fires, and Systems Engineering.  Numerous personnel from 
the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy, as well as several professors 
and retired flag rank military personnel were in attendance.  The 
meeting was very successful and allowed the opportunity to meet 
subject matter experts in several joint fire areas to assist in the 
scoping and bounding of the project.  The following questions and 
comments were addressed: 
 
1.  Maj Che’ Bolden 
-Are you using kinetic or non-kinetic fires? 
-Organic/non-organic? 
-Request is it from a human or will you include UAV’s etc. 
-Who’s doing tracking? 
   -electronic 
   -human 
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-May want to start at lowest level.  USMC uses battalion 
level.  
2.  MAJ Tony Knight 
-Guy on the ground already knows what he wants. 
-Multi Asset (possible thesis topic). 
-How are you going to positively identify a 1500 yard target 
(UAC, UCAV, etc.)? 
3.  MAJ Tom Stoner 
-How are you going to encompass TST stuff? 
-Caution separating request from process. 
-What will JTF’s role be? 
4.  Admiral Mike Jones 
-What type of C4I is being proposed? 
5.  Tom Pugsley 
-Is someone waving the flag and making the big push for 
what the priorities should be? 
6.  MAJ Ty Neuman 
-2015 and on doesn’t matter the ordnance/platform, all 
electronic, link/architecture should be able to drop on target and be 
adaptable for new technology.  
7.  MAJ Mike Shewfelt 
-Direct/indirect support, everything initially falls into general 
support or general category then it will be prioritized, ordered, etc. 
(intended plan for the 2015 time frame). 
8.  Phil Acquaro 
-Collateral damage estimates, are you looking at it? 
-JCA, what is the effect, do you use regional, multi-regional, 
etc? 
9. Prof. Langford 
-Problem, increased vulnerability to mission completeness, 
quicker response & effective use of weapons? 
 
All of these personnel were experienced in Joint Fires or 
Systems Engineering.  A lecture was given on the scope and 
current direction (at the time) of the Joint Fire Support in 2020.  
Although some of the questions were outside the bounds of the 
Joint Fire support in 2020 project, the input was vital and the 
information was very helpful in considering issues in these specific 
areas.  
 
Stakeholder:  National Fire Control Symposium 
Location:   Tucson, Arizona, July 2006 
Audience:    Joint Fire Support in 2020 Team & Advisors 




Overall:  We all should have gone to this symposium.  Not only 
would we all be on the same page for what we learned, we could 
have worked with a few more of the technical people at the 
conference at a deeper level.  Aspects of our project are being 
completed by many other organizations within the services.  All of 
them really seem “to get” the issue at hand, even if there doesn’t 
seem to be any overarching leadership to focus the effort. 
Leo and I were puzzled at the lack of military representation 
at the symposium.  Besides the two of us, there were maybe 5 
other military in a crowd of 200+ contractors, government civilians, 
etc.  If there were any government “decision makers” in the crowd 
(military Program Managers, PEOs, HQ staffers), they were 
keeping a low profile. 
This forum yielded very valuable information and contacts for 
our project.  We’ll break down some of the key contacts/projects so 
you can all get an idea where we can leverage their efforts to fill 
some of our gaps.  While we signed up to get a copy of all the 
briefings/papers (in a few weeks), we’ll have to follow up with most 




The sessions started with overviews from the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force.  Interesting that all these visions shared the idea that 
munitions will be controlled all the way to impact, not just release.   
The Navy perspective was given by Edmund Anderson 
(PEO for Navy Strike Weapons). edmund.anderson@navy.mil   He 
related a vision for using networked fires to launch (and control) an 
SM-6 / Harpoon-3 to the limit of its range, not just to the limit of the 
ship’s control (effectively doubling the range).  The scenarios he 
described match the components of ours.  His office has demos 
planned for ’09 and ’10 … too late to be of real value for us.  
However, he does have a program office that is interested in our 
conclusions. 
 The Air Force perspective included a laydown of AFRL’s 
priorities  
The Army perspective was very adamant to maintain the 
person-in-the-loop.  Army requirements documents will continue to 
force decisions made by humans over automation.  We should 
keep that in mind for our efforts.  TLDHS, AFATDS, etc will remain 
a centerpiece of the Army effort.  (The Marine Corps briefs later 
reinforce this link). 
 
Advanced Technologies for Fire Control 
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Most of the briefings in this section of the symposium were 
guided-sensor, small-munition combinations.  Many of the weapons 
have been tested on some scale so data about data link rates etc. 
can be collected although we probably aren’t going to do any big 
models of the bandwidth required.   
The most useful project information from this section is from:  
 Dr. Piali De (Piali_De@raytheon.com)… she has real world 
experiment data for CAS and artillery support.  She recently 
completed an exercise with the Marine Corps where all fires 
requests/support were analyzed.   I’ll get a copy of their experiment 
results and her briefing slides.  These are something we should all 
talk about.  (file: PDENFCS06 paper.pdf) 
Michelle Adams (Michelle.L.Adams@navy.mil) … She has a 
number of very valuable pieces of information.  1) The LANCE-
NFCS 2005 demonstration results.  This is an AFATDS/NFCS 
multi-national exercise.  In particular, they used a common XML 
message to do all the targeting information –much like we have 
talked about.  2) New acronym: JC3IEDM – The Joint Consultation 
Command and Control Information Exchange Data Model.  It’s 
common, XML-based and part of a very large data standardization 
effort.  This is the “9-line streamlining” effort we talked about.  (file: 
FileControlSymposium_Brief.ppt) 
James Matts / James Cech (cechjv@navsea.navy.mil) -  
Naval Integrated Fire Control System.  More NFCS exercises … 
 Useful source documents for how the Navy intends to migrate 
NFCS.  Mr. Cech (an NPS grad) also made a pitch to ask him to 
come out to be a guest speaker.  I’ll forward his information to Prof. 
Solitario. 
Chris Shoaf  (Chris.shoaf@navy.mil) NFCS Joint Test 
Threads and Architecture documents.    
 
Combat Identification Session  
 
This session contained multiple briefings regarding various 
LADAR/LIDAR sensor programs. 
 
Joint Air and Missile Defense Session 
 
Two interesting items from this session.   
One, a Lockheed presentation took a different tack at the 
coordination problem (a different way to look at networking).   
Two, three engineers from Raytheon developed an 
EXCELLENT construct to move from the requirements views to the 
data flows.  We’ll have to show you on slides, it would take too long 




Network Enhanced Fire Control Session 
 
While all the briefers at this symposium had the big “Network Ring” 
in the sky, only a few briefers talked about what made it up. 
Three briefers from MIT Lincoln Labs headed by Dr. Steven 
Davidson have some excellent source material for the topic.  Mr. 
Roop Ganguly and Jeff McLamb gave briefings on what would be 
the beginnings of a requirements analysis for the network.  (files: 
Ganguly – AND – with notes.pdf , McLamb – Early Operator – with 
notes.pdf) 
We spoke at length with Dr. Davidson.  He would like to be 
involved in our work as we progress.  He certainly seemed willing to 
help us out. 
Also, the Marine Corps Roadmap was laid out by Thomas 
Irwin.  We’ll get his briefing in the next few days and review it with 
our group.  Bottom line:  more connectivity with AFATDS, 
abandoning all competing programs.  God Bless the Marine Corps 




Stakeholders:  Various Army/Marine Corps personnel 
Location:   Naval Post Graduate School Monterey, California,  
          August 2006 
Audience:    Joint Fire Support in 2020 Advisors & Team 
Author:   LT Spencer Nordgran 
 
The Project Team held a stakeholder input session in Bullard 
Hall in August of 2006.  The purpose of the meeting was to collect 
stakeholder needs and requirements, as well as receive feedback 
on the group’s work.  Some of the relevant questions/comments 
from the meeting were: 
1.  How are you defining deconfliction? The deconfliction 
between both air assets and ground assets was addressed.  In 
addition, the deconfliction between field artillery, CAS, and other 
munitions with special forces was addressed. 
(Earl Richardson, USMC/Capt/Infantry) 
2.  Recommend Modeling using CBS or JCATS. These 
systems were discussed but with the close proximity of TRAC 
Monterey it was decided that MANA or DAFS would be the best for 
the project based on modeling support.  
(MAJ Chris Wade, BCTC, FT Leavenworth) 
Iraq and Afghanistan is a slow process on the watch floor for 
Joint Fires, recommend automation of process as much as 
possible.  Discussion on the need to automate the majority of the 
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process was held.  However, the need for the man in the loop was 
discussed, as well.  The concern was that top level military 
personnel would want a person to give final authority to give the 
feeling of human control of release authority. 
(MAJ Tom Stoner, Army Special Forces) 
On the watch floor if there is nothing on the grid, watch floor 
personnel want to bomb it.  This is unacceptable to special forces 
because they are there, but they will not show up on grid.  
Therefore, requires a Special Forces authorization before release 
authority is granted for Joint Fires. The discussion was that even 
though we have a good idea where personnel are at all times the 
special forces are in areas that are only understood by special 
forces personnel.  Therefore, they must be present and must give 
authority prior to any release of weapons.  In addition, the JAG 
usually has a cut on the release authorization. 
(MAJ Tom Stoner, Army Special Forces) 
Will the system of systems be compatible with emerging 
Doctrine? The discussion was about what doctrine is provided and 
how it compares between joint doctrine and each service doctrine.  
It was determined that there may need to be new doctrine written to 
address the new system or systems. 
(MAJ Tom Stoner, Army Special Forces) 
Recommend a Joint Fires Operating Center(s) with all 
services in control of launch authority in a central location.  The 
discussion was that all fires should go to one location.  This would 
allow for all service authority to be able to determine the need or 
ability to provide fires.  This would also allow for optimization of 
weapons and limit fratricide because all necessary personnel would 
be available for consultation, if necessary.  This includes a special 
forces contingent. 
(MAJ Tom Stoner, Army Special Forces) 
Battalion Commander won’t want the company commander 
making the decision to fire in case a new company is approaching 
the area.  The discussion was about the ability of the lowest man to 
have authority to call for fires and the ability for the company 
commander to support.  This led to the ability of the company 
commander to hold the big picture.  If he can see the same 
operating picture as the battalion commander and he is trained this 
may or may not be an issue. 
(Earl Richardson, USMC/CPT/infantry) 
All of these personnel were experienced in either the Iraq 
and/or Afghanistan theaters.  Discussion was brought forward in 
each of these areas and considered in the approach to solving the 




Stakeholders: National Training Center 
   Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Team 
Air Warrior Operations 
Joint Fires Coordination Measures JT&E 
Joint Air to Ground Operations Group 
Location:  Fort Irwin, California, October 2006 
   Nellis AFB, Nevada, October 2006 
Audience:  Joint Fire Support in 2020 Advisors & Team 
Author:  Maj Tyler Gabriel 
 
     The SEA-10 Joint Fires trip to Fort Irwin and Nellis AFB was 
informative and provided us with a perspective of the fires request 
process that we hadn’t seen before.  The coordination process, 
especially the process for artillery fires as it exists now, was 
significantly different, operationally, than we had researched.  The 
coordination and insight that we gleaned from our interaction with 
the JFIIT team was very useful determining the users, providers, 
and C2 stakeholders in our proposed system. 
FORT IRWIN, CA – National Training Center (NTC) 
     We observed the JFIIT team was involved in data collection in 
the field and through the use of the instrumented range equipment.  
The JFIIT team had between 20-30 folks there who were involved 
monitoring every part of the exercise.  They paired each of us up 
with a JFIIT Observer and took us out into the field each day.  Our 
team took turns going out into the field or monitoring the exercise 
from the instrumentation rooms on post so that every one of us got 
to see the exercise from both perspectives.  The scenario at NTC 
has changed dramatically from when I was there as a participant 
however, and the pace of the ‘action’ was slow.  The scenario was 
a ‘spin-up’ for future operations in Iraq (SRO) and although there 
was opportunity for fire support requests (almost exclusively 
counter-fire), they were few and the coordination process was not 
necessarily doctrinal.  Additionally, there were much fewer trained 
requesters in the current system (about six per brigade) compared 
to the fully netted force we were considering. 
    The units in the field suffered from pretty severe training and 
manning issues that hampered both their actual connectivity and 
their organizational responsibilities.  In conversations/interviews 
with the exercise players, the biggest issues that prevent timely fire 
support are the coordination process/oversight and deconfliction 
issues.  Hampering their ability to do either was a pretty broad 
range of technical competence…some of the units (Battalions) had 
most of their C2 systems operating (CPOF, AFATDS, etc) but many 
of the units had only partial connectivity.  It appeared that the 
problems were mostly training issues, but the systems were so 
diverse that there was a high training requirement for each of 
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them.  The process that was used by the NTC participants to 
request CAS was ad hoc and didn’t utilize their available 
resources…they were finally able to find a surrogate DD Form 1972 
request within the AFATDS system and use that to request 
support.  However, there was no feedback from “higher” that told 
the requesting unit the status of their request.  In conversations with 
the Air Force TACP (JTACs) in the field, they are plagued by a lack 
of SA on the status of requests.  Their problem wasn’t in making 
contact with higher, but with getting any sort of feedback on what 
happened to their request after it was sent.  As a result, they 
adopted a ‘shotgun’ approach to requests for CAS…they’d request 
through several avenues and with repetition and hope that one of 
the requests would get through.  From our perspective back at the 
Division TOC and notional ASOC, only some of the requests were 
making it up to the ASOC, and the feedback on the status of the 
requests was going back to the Brigade…the info/SA was stuck 
there. 
     Although AFATDS was designed to be a system of record, it has 
MAJOR loopholes in it which allow users to bypass the automation 
features that are designed specifically to assist them.  This led to 
ad hoc and non-doctrinal usage of all aspects of the current 
system.  I especially noticed that there were no example templates 
in the HELP section of the software. 
    An interesting observation was that, with very few exceptions, 
the communication of fire support requests and coordination was 
almost exclusively done via voice (radio or VoIP phones).  Although 
systems like CPOF are built to maintain a COP that makes the 
coordination process easier and faster, the technical problems 
experienced by these units prevented this enabling technology from 
working. 
    We gathered data on the requests for CAS and the timelines 
involved with each request.  We observed the equipment currently 
in use and the portions of each of the systems that are actually 
being used and the portions that are not (either due to difficulty, 
training, or connectivity).  We also had a discussion with LtCol Ell 
(JFIIT leader at NTC) about the fire support process and he offered 
his insight from the exercise and suggestions for our project.  ASR 
(air support request) data for NTC is posted on SharePoint. 
NELLIS AFB, NV – Air Warrior, Joint T&E, Red Flag 
     The Project Team visited the AF unit that supports the NTC 
exercises with CAS assets and is the keeper of the lessons learned 
from NTC’s ground-air interactions.  We were able to observe 
another days worth of air support via the instrumented system.  We 
were able to hear the conversations between the JTAC on the 
ground and pilots overhead and follow their discussions of targeting 
using the force tracker and imagery overlay.  In team meetings with 
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the Air Warrior staff (LtCol Barks ad Maj Spechler) we discussed 
our proposed system and its compatibility with the CAS process 
and future trends in CAS.  They pointed out the dangers of 
coordinate specific weapons (JDAM, JSOW, etc) in the CAS role 
and said that at least 90% of NTC’s fratricide incidents (blue air 
dropping on blue forces) are due to these types of weapons being 
used in CAS.  They also told us that the responses for calls for CAS 
are dependent on the quality of the request and the information in 
it.  We attended a post-flight debrief of a CAS engagement and 
garnered lessons learned from the coordination and deconfliction of 
fires.  There seemed to be some concern about overall tasking 
authority, especially as it related to the ASOC’s ability to task.  The 
concern wasn’t whether the ASOC had the authority to task CAS 
assets, but instead centered on the quality of the decisions made 
by this tasking authority.  As it applies to our project, the take-away 
is in the quality of the tasking and whether the tasking reflects the 
ground truth about what is really going on in the AO.  In our 
proposed system, there seems to be a significant need for a man-
in-the-loop who will be able to QC the tasking orders against the 
latest AO update.  The concern for us is to design a system that is 
reliable, or more to the point, a system that the providers trust to 
give them the best tasking.   
We visited the Joint Test and Evaluation program for Joint 
Fires Coordination Measures as well and discussed the Joint Fires 
Area concept that is soon to be released.  The JFAs are 3-D areas 
that are intended to replace “kill boxes” and include coordination 
and authorization for fires.  The T&E program is about 2/3 complete 
and they discussed and provided us with a draft version of their 
TTP product.  They had some interesting insights on the processing 
piece of the coordination that we can take into our conceptual 
model.  One of the most unique points for me was a discussion of 
the processing of requests…should the processing be focused on 
the “who chooses” or on the “how to choose” the target-provider 
pairings? 
     We also visited the Joint Air to Ground Operations Group 
(JAGOG) and the 6th Combat Training Squadron to discuss the 
processing of requests and the training of Joint Tactical Air 
Controllers (JTACs) and Joint Forward Observers (JFOs).  We met 
with LtCol Ehmig and Maj Oberdieck, who was working in the 
ASOC during the high-intensity conflict phase of OIF and he shared 
some really interesting insights on CAS based on that experience.  
In collaboration with several other agencies, they are developing 
JAGC2 (Joint Air-Ground Coordination Cell) concept to try to move 
towards collaboration instead of deconfliction.  This concept has 
some interesting implications for our project…if we can refine our 
proposed system to integrate fires smartly, then we won’t have to 
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deconflict the fire supporters from each other.  We discussed in 
detail the current systems for tracking and coordinating fire support 
requests, especially JADOCS, and we now have a working 
knowledge of how JADOCS is used in theater (and Red Flag 
exercises) to coordinate/deconflict fires from targets. 
Overall, this multi-stop trip was very informative and, despite 
the lower-than-expected level of activity at NTC, allowed us the 
opportunity to gather some valuable data and discuss aspects of 

























APPENDIX G. GENERATION OF ALTERNATIVE ARCHITECTURES 
The initial steps taken to generate alternatives were built upon both the functional 
analysis and the needs analysis.  The functional analysis was analyzed and 
several areas were identified for assessment.  Among these functions were: send 
request, process request, task request, and send tasking. 
Based on feedback from the stakeholders and continuing advances in 
communications capabilities, three possibilities arose for sending requests and 
sending tasking orders: they could continue to be sent via voice, they could be 
sent as a digital data packet via a point-to-point transmission, or they could be 
sent as a digital data packet via a network broadcast transmission.  Each of 
these possibilities has advantages and disadvantages.  The primary advantage 
of continuing to use voice requests and tasking orders is in the simplicity and 
ease of use.  Our stakeholders, especially the stakeholders that send the 
requests, identified numerous tactical situations that would favor the use of voice 
transmissions over data.  A time-critical situation involving friendly troops 
engaged with the enemy in close proximity, what is called a “Troops In Contact” 
(TIC) situation, would tend to favor a simple voice transmission over a data entry 
task, regardless of the simplicity of the data/request entry device.  The added 
benefit of a voice transmission is the ability to discern contextual messages in the 
voices of the parties involved.  The strain, panic, or stress in an individual’s voice 
can relay tremendous non-verbal information to another human, but those subtle 
messages would be lost by any sort of automated translation of voice to data. 
The digital data packet method holds tremendous promise due to its 
relative speed, accuracy, and flexibility.  Unlike a voice transmission, a data 
transmission will be able to send all of the available target information in less 
than a second.  Additionally, a data transmission can be used to send graphical 
data, such as imagery, as well as text data. 
The transmission method of these data packets defines the other two 
options for sending requests.  A digital point-to-point, similar to a fax transmission 
or an e-mail, has the advantage of being targeted to a particular recipient.  The 
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communication procedure for this type of transmission dictates that positive 
feedback is required from the recipient that a transmission was received.  This 
trait would be vital to a system where “lost” requests have life or death 
consequences.  Additionally, a point-to-point transfer system would not suffer 
from the “information overload” of a system where numerous broadcast-style 
messages are being sent to everyone. 
On the other hand, a network broadcast transmission would allow for 
better information fusion into a COP if the system was able to organize the vast 
amounts of information being sent at any one time.  A broadcast transmission 
may provide advantages in provider pairing however because of the 
transparency of the target information to all interested entities. 
The processing of a request for fire was conceived in several different 
ways.  The traditional processing method, where the request is acknowledged as 
“received” and then tracked throughout the remainder of the pairing and tasking 
process, was one alternative for this function.  Another option was to “post” the 
request to an electronic database like a virtual “bulletin board.” The request 
processing function and the assignment of a fire support provider are intertwined, 
but the methodology options to determine the pairings of the requests with the 
providers is a unique function with numerous options.  Several alternative 
concepts were conceived for the pairing motivations:  pairings based on target 
type and predicted effectiveness, pairings based on predicted response time, 
pairings based on resource efficiency, pairings based on organizations, and 
pairings based on a combination of these measures.  Any determination of the 
“quality” of the request and provider pairings would have to be made in the 
context of the priority scheme applied to the tasking.  Also, the pairings should 
obviously be selected between possible providers, not simply the available 
providers.   If the target is spatially out of range of the weapon, then that weapon 
is effectively not available.  Any pairing of available providers would also need to 
maintain an accurate, up-to-date database or list of providers and their current 
status. 
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A pairing of requests with providers based on the effectiveness of 
provider’s weapons was one of the most obvious methods.  A fire support 
request, regardless of format, would specify to some degree the type of target 
and the effects desired on the target.  Based on that target information and 
historical weapons effects data, such as the Joint Munitions Effectiveness 
Manual (JMEM), the expected effectiveness of each potential provider could be 
assessed.  The available provider with the greatest potential to meet the 
requested target effects is selected and tasked to service that request.  It is 
important to note that the selection is made only between the providers that are 
available at the time the request is received and processed. 
Another possible pairing doctrine was to choose the provider that can 
service the request the soonest.  A selection in this method would have to 
account for the variations in tactics across the diverse weapon system 
possibilities.  For instance, the engagement time for an artillery unit ready for 
tasking is on the order of a few minutes from tasking to weapon impact but would 
be substantially longer if there were JFA deconfliction delays.  On the other hand, 
CAS aircraft may arrive in the target area very quickly, but the pre-engagement 
coordination and deconfliction would surely add several additional minutes before 
weapons impact.  Assumptions would have to be made concerning the 
responsiveness of a potential fire support provider based on their range to the 
target and their reported status.  These assumptions would be used to select the 
most responsive fire support provider. 
From the perspective of the JFC, one of the key stakeholders in any 
proposed JFS system, a viable pairing methodology would be one that optimized 
the available resources.  If given the choice between using provider A’s 2 bombs 
or provider B’s 24 artillery shells to produce similar desired effects, the most 
efficient provider to pair with that request would be A.  Each weapon system’s 
expendable ordnance could be assessed for availability and difficulty to re-
supply, and that data would be used to select between available providers. 
A pairing technique that aligned requests with providers based on 
weapons system organization or type is in widespread use today by those that 
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request the fire support.  One of the two possible options for this pairing scheme 
involves the service component of the requesting entity.  If the requester is Army, 
the preferred provider might be Army, followed by Air Force, the Marines, and the 
Navy.  Another possible prioritization option could be based entirely on the target 
and provider weapon system type, i.e., CAS is preferred for vehicle targets and 
artillery is preferred for troop targets.  A combination of these two priority 
schemes is another option.  For example, if the requester is a Marine Corps 
TACP, then the preferred pairing priority might be: Marine artillery, Marine CAS, 
Navy CAS, naval surface fires, Air Force CAS, Army Artillery.  The asset paired 
to that request would be selected based on weapon system preference, which 
may or may not be a surrogate for expected weapon performance against a 
particular target. 
These pairing prioritizations could also be combined in various fashions to 
create a pairing methodology that fuses these options.  This appears to be the 
method preferred by the existing target and provider decision aides. 
Based on these options for the functions of our proposed system, the 
Project Team combined them in such a way to create many distinct options for 
the conceptual JFS system, five of which were considered at length.  Two of the 
five alternatives that were considered were determined to be infeasible: the 
“Status Quo” alternative and the “Net-centric, Man-portable Joint Fires” 
alternative. 
 
STATUS QUO ALTERNATIVE 
One viable alternative is to do nothing and keep JFS in the state that it is 
in now (2006).  In this alternative, the predominant method of sending requests 
and receiving tasking orders is via voice, not data.  The selection of the best 
provider for the target is completed by the requester with little to no knowledge of 
what is available beyond the resources at their control.  The pairing, if the 
request is routed to higher headquarters, is made without a complete 
understanding of which assets are truly available and not just on the ATO or the 
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map. The stakeholders have expressed a need to improve the system for JFS, 
therefore maintaining the current state of affairs in not a feasible option. 
 
NET-CENTRIC, MAN-PORTABLE JOINT FIRES ALTERNATIVE 
 In this alternative, each soldier is equipped with a man portable weapon 
system that fulfills his fire support needs and minimizes the likelihood that he will 
ever have to request external fire support for any reason. 
Each troop carries with them a multi-purpose, guided, variable yield 
weapon system that obviates the need for traditional heavy fire support weapon 
systems.  Each element of this future force is also linked wirelessly to all of the 
other elements in the theater of operations and/or in the battle area.  These links 
allow for remote targeting of these future weapons so that one soldier/sensor can 
call on the weapons of many other troops after expending his weapon. 
A key enabler to this concept is the total situational awareness of the 
spatial relationships between blue forces, non-combatants, observed red forces, 
and blue weapons and their associated effects.  Pairing of joint fire support 
requests would be accomplished by the requester using a simple selection based 
on shortest service time. 
 The Project Team’s research determined that the technology risks to 
overcome would make this alternative infeasible.  Even the most optimistic 
predictions of weapon technology in 2020 do not meet the technical requirements 
of this proposed alternative. 
 The three alternatives that were analyzed and compared were the Status 
Quo Plus, the Centralized Joint Fire Support Network, and the Distributed Joint 































APPENDIX H. GENERATION OF NEEDED JFS SYSTEM ATTRIBUTES 
A functional breakdown of a Joint Fires system was accomplished using a 
dendritic approach.  This branching led to the development of system metrics 
based on needs defined by the stakeholders as seen below. 
 
1. Function:  Coordination 
1.1. How many organizations are involved in a decision? 
1.1.1. Improved horizontal and vertical integration 
1.1.1.1. Metric:  Count process gaps 
1.1.1.2. Metric:  Count organizations involved 
1.2. Does the system provide effective decision support? 
1.2.1. Deconfliction and Pairing  
1.2.1.1. Metric:  Subjective assessment 
1.3. Does the system provide clear SA to the decision maker? 
1.3.1. Improved Situational Awareness 
1.3.1.1. Metric:  Subjective assessment 
1.4. Is there a human in the loop at the right place? 
1.4.1. Reduce risk of fratricide 
1.4.1.1. Metric:  Count decision points 
1.5. Do all component commanders have access to the same information? 
1.5.1. Reduce C2 duplication 
1.5.1.1. Metric:  Count of systems involved 
1.6. Does the system streamline operations? 
1.6.1. Standardized process  
1.6.1.1. Metric:  Subjective assessment 
 
2. Function:  Processing 
2.1. Are pairings based on JFC assets or service specific assets? 
2.1.1. Effects based  
2.1.1.1. Metric:  Pairing efficiency (model) 
2.1.1.2. Metric: Number of pairing algorithms available to CJTF 
2.2. Does the system reduce overall time to task providers? 
2.2.1. Improve processing rate and response time  
2.2.1.1. Metric:  Average processing time (model) 
2.3. Does the system provide robust communications architecture to the 
ground element? 
2.3.1. Request methods 
2.3.1.1. Metric:  Count of number of communications paths from FO 
to HQ unit 
2.3.1.2. Metric:  Average availability of each communications system 
2.4. How many CFF requests types are required? 
2.4.1. Common training, tactics, procedures 
2.4.1.1. Metric:  Subjective assessment 
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2.5. Does the system provide correct information for engagement by the 
tasked weapon system/provider? 
2.5.1. Tasking methods 
2.5.1.1. Metric:  Number of compatible weapon control system 
tasking formats 
2.6. Does the system evaluate target priorities according to commander’s 
intent? 
2.6.1. Prioritization methods 
2.6.1.1. Metric:  Tailored prioritization algorithms available to CJTF 
2.7. Does the system provide air and ground space deconfliction according to 
commander’s intent and current operational guidance? 
2.7.1. Deconfliction methods 
2.7.1.1. Metric:  Tailored deconfliction algorithms available to CJTF 
 
3. Function:  Operationally Feasible 
3.1. Is the system scalable through a wide variety of future scenarios? 
3.1.1. Shift from organic to joint support 
3.1.1.1. Metric: Subjective assessment 
3.2. Does the system provide adequate backup? 
3.2.1. Redundancy  
3.2.1.1. Metric:  Count number systems involved 
3.2.1.2. Metric:  Count number of communication paths available 
3.3. Is the joint fire support system compatible with current and future 
(weapon/targeting/communication) systems? 
3.3.1. Interoperable 
3.3.1.1. Metric:  Subjective assessment 
3.3.1.2. Metric:  Number of open architecture interface standards 
3.4. Does the joint fire support system meet the operational availability 
required by the ground forces commander? 
3.4.1. Availability 
3.4.1.1. Metric:  Assessment of availability of physical sub-systems 
3.5. Are the human to machine interfaces user friendly? 
3.5.1. Usability 
3.5.1.1. Metric:  Human Factors usability study of physical sub-
systems 
3.6. What level of logistics support is required to operate the joint fire support 
system during expected operations?  
3.6.1. Sustainable 
3.6.1.1. Metric:  Logistics analysis of physical sub-systems 
3.7. Does the joint fire support system provide support to the ground forces 
commander throughout the duration of the operation/mission? 
3.7.1. Reliable 
3.7.1.1. Metric:  Reliability analysis of physical sub-systems 
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APPENDIX I. MODELING OF JFS PROCESS AND COMMUNICATIONS 
The following pages that include Tables 22 through 25 fully outline the modeling 
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APPENDIX J. EXTEND MODELING ORGANIZATIONAL ALTERNATIVES 
Connectivity 
Perfect connectivity between communication systems was assumed. All 
transmissions were received but delayed by a random distribution with the 
average delay based on historical data and Project Team concurrence. 
 
Weapons 
Each organization had some fires capability.  This organic capability could 
be mortars, artillery, missiles, or assigned aircraft (fixed or rotary).  Differentiation 
of weapons would not provide additional insight at this level of abstraction.  
Therefore, a target designated for brigade engagement was engaged by the 
brigade, without distinguishing between an artillery battery and attack helicopters. 
 
Target Sets 
Targets were generated to arrive randomly and assigned to the correct 
provider.  A limit of two hundred targets, with a Poisson arrival process (2 
minutes average) was used to ensure that overall processing delays were not 
due to the available fire provider assets.  Targets were assigned a target type 
based on a notional pairing process.  The system, at some point depending on 
the alternative, would match a provider to each target.  Table 26 summarizes the 
target–provider pairing ratios and the provider resource limits used in each 
simulation. 
Delays for pairing and deconfliction are based on alternative systems, and 
are addressed individually.  The same assets are available and transmission time 
from requester to next organization is the same in all three alternatives.  Total 
number of targets was limited to prevent running out of assets, but aircraft were 
made available at a rate of 2 per every 40 minutes to simulate close air support 
on the ATO.  Targets assigned to aircraft would wait “in the queue” until an asset 
arrived to service them. 
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Target type Probability Provider Assets 
0 50% Company 60 
1 20% Battalion 120 
2 15% Brigade 96 
3 7% Naval Fires 30 
4 8% Close Air Support 2 / 40 minutes 
Table 26:  Target Probability Distribution 
COMMON COMPONENTS 
Fire Support Unit 
The fire support unit represented an asset with weapons that could 
provide fires.  Each unit consisted of a time delay to process the request and task 
the weapon system; and an engagement delay.  Simultaneous engagements 
were allowed based on multiple units or provider assets at this level.  Figure 62 
shows the layout of the fires support unit process. 
Tasking delay (XDelayIn) and engagement delay (EngDelayIn) were 
alternative dependent numbers which set the center peak of the distributions in 
the random generator blocks.  TaskingOut was used to capture the tasking order 
generation time in the model so that weapon engagements were not included in 
the overall system performance comparisons. 






























Figure 62:  EXTEND6TM Fires Support Unit Flow 
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Targets were generated with a Poisson process with a mean of 2 minutes 
as shown in Figure 63.  Target type was randomly assigned using a fixed 
distribution, and time stamped with time generated.  The system then processed 
the requests depending on the organization of each alternative and forwards 
tasking to the “catch block”.  Total time delay through each system by target type 




























Figure 63:  EXTEND6TM Request Input – Tasking Output Flow 
 
STATUS QUO PLUS 
The Status Quo Plus processing structure was a linear process based on 
current command structure and was connected as shown in Figure 64.  Requests 
are received at the company, processed to determine if company assets can 
provide support and were either tasked or forwarded to battalion for support.  The 
battalion and brigade were similar, with a longer delay time for processing the 
request.  Targets not engaged by the brigade were forwarded for Air or Naval 
Fires to the DASC, ASOC, or Joint Fires Cell for final tasking.  These final tasking 
processes were combined in the simulation by assuming similar delays and 













































































Figure 64:  Status Quo Plus Flow Diagram 
CENTRALIZED JOINT FIRE SUPPORT NETWORK 
The centralized processing alternative was modeled by two sequential 
delays and a prioritization queue as shown in Figure 65.  The requests were 
generated and placed in the queue on the left until they were transmitted to the 
Joint Fires Coordination Cell.  The reporting delay was consistent for all requests. 
At the Joint Fires Coordination Cell, requests were prioritized, paired, 
deconflicted and authorized for tasking.  The tasking was then set to the 
appropriate unit for engagement.  This tasking delay time was estimated at 5 
minutes to complete with 12 simultaneous requests allowed.  Tasking from the 
headquarters unit to the provider included conversion of the tasking into the 
appropriate format (NFCS, AFATDS, 9-line, etc.) and transmission to the fires 


























tasking delay  
Figure 65:  Centralized Process 
DISTRIBUTED JOINT FIRE SUPPORT NETWORK 
The distributed processing alternative was modeled by two sequential 
delays and a prioritization queue as shown in Figure 66.  The requests were 
generated and placed in the queue on the left until they were transmitted to the 
GIG.  The reporting delay remained the same for all requests. 
At the GIG, requests were prioritized, in this case sorted by target type, 
highest number first.  Concur 2 Shoot represented the composite delay for all 
potential providers to receive the data, bid on the data, concur on bids and finally 
task the applicable unit.  The tasking was then set to the appropriate unit for 
engagement tasking, conversion delays for headquarters to provider contained in 
the fires support unit block separately. 
The pairing delay time was highly dependent on quantity of participants 
and bandwidth availability to pass the various messages between stations.  The 
Project Team agreed on a 3 minute delay by assuming that brigade and senior 
headquarters units (or equivalent) were nominating their assets (including 
subordinate commands) to reach a recommended pairing. To push to fully 
decentralized processing, with “every soldier a sensor” would rapidly increase the 
quantity of messages.  It was deemed ‘not likely’ by the team to meet a three 

























Figure 66:  EXTEND6TM DJFSN Processing 
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SUMMARY OF PROCESS DELAYS 
 Table 27 summarizes the average delays for each process.  The listed 
distributions were used and the specifics are discussed in the Process Delay 
Distributions section. 
 Status Quo + CJFSN DJFSN Distribution  
Initial Call for fire request 0.5 0.5 0.5 weibull  
Engagement Times          
Company Asset 3 3 3 lognormal  
Battalion Asset 3 3 3 lognormal  
Brigade Asset 3 3 3 lognormal  
Close Air Support 10 10 10 lognormal  
Naval Fires 10 10 10 lognormal  
Process and Tasking Times          
Company Asset 3 5 3 weibull  
Battalion Asset 5 5 3 weibull  
Brigade Asset 5 5 3 weibull  
Close Air Support 3 5 3 weibull  
Naval Fires 3 5 3 weibull  
ASOC/DASC/JOC 5     weibull  
Joint Fires Cell decision   5   weibull  
GIG collaborative decision     3 weibull  
 
Table 27:  Summary of Simulation Delays (Minutes) 
ORGANIZATIONAL ALTERNATIVES SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
Thirteen runs with a limit of 200 targets per run were conducted in each 
EXTEND6TM model.  The results were exported to Minitab for initial analysis.  
The models show statistically significant differences in expected systems 
performance. 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA, general linear model) evaluation of these 
results was conducted with a null hypothesis that all systems and providers were 
equal.  Summary results show that provider (F statistic=154, p=0.0000) and 
system (F statistic=391, p=0.0000) have statistically significant differences in 
response time, therefore at least one system and provider was different from the 
others.  The main effects plot, Figure 67, graphically represents these 























Main Effects Plot (fitted means) for task delay
 















Boxplot of task delay vs System
 




ANOVA comparison of the data assumes normal distributions which is 
not the case for the simulation results.  In order to better compare the 
systems, a non-parametric analysis was conducted.  The Kruskal-Wallis 
results are show in Table 28. 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Delay 
System  N Median Ave Rank Z 
CJFSN      1753 8.873  3045.1 16.43 
DJFSN    1701 5.696  1673.0 -30.53 
SQ+       1689 8.822  2986.5 14.00 
Overall          5143   2572.0 
H = 933.16  DF = 2  P = 0.000 
Table 28:  Test on Delay 
DJFSN was the quickest overall system as evident from both ANOVA 
and Kruskal-Wallis tests.  There was no significant difference between 
CJFSN and Status Quo Plus results based on the Kruskal-Wallis test 
because this is a one-way (single variable) test.  The delay effect attributed to 
provider (target type) may mask the potentially significant three minute 
improvement shown in the main effects plot.  The preponderance of company 
level targets may unfairly advantage the Status Quo Plus system.  The 
assumption that a permissive fire environment with the company having the 
capability to self-deconflict fires on roughly half the targets applies to a 
permissive ROE environment and not a cross section of potential future 


















Boxplot of task delay vs Alternative, target
 
Figure 69:  Tasking Order Processing Delays 
Target type 4, which required an air asset to prosecute, shows 
numerous outliers that are due to the limited number of providers.  With no 
consideration for servicing the target with a different asset within the 
simulation, these requests waited in the queue until the next aircraft showed 
up, on a 2 per 40 minute cycle. 
The box plot also displays a fairly consistent median response time for 
both the CJFSN and DJFSN systems.  The increasing response times for 
status quo plus was expected due to the hierarchy built into this alternative.  
Comparing the CJFSN and Status Quo Plus alternatives shows the CJFSN 
appears quicker at the battalion level and higher.  The target set (50% 
company level targets) assumption is masking a potentially statistically 
significant improvement of the CJFSN alternative over Status Quo Plus. 
Removal of all company level targets and evaluating the simulation 
data for all higher echelon commands with the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis 
test yields the results in Table 29. 
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Kruskal-Wallis Test on Delay 
 
System             N   Median   Ave Rank  Z 
CJFSN       975    8.786     1358.7    -2.12 
DJFSN     921    5.656      694.9   -32.38 
SQ+        909   15.745     2168.0     34.64 
Overall          2805           1403.0 
 
H = 1517.91  DF = 2  P = 0.000 
H = 1517.91  DF = 2  P = 0.000  (adjusted for ties) 
Table 29:  Higher Echelon Non-Parametric Results 
The results for higher echelon providers show statistically significant 
differences in all three alternatives.  The centralized system is slightly better than 
average, while the decentralized had the fastest and status quo plus the slowest 
time to process a request and task a provider.  This implies that both alternatives 
present an improvement over the status quo plus system when an individual 
company does not have assets or authority to employ offensive fires without 
involvement of higher headquarters. 
 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 In order to examine the effects of the various distribution means on the 
performance of each system, sensitivity analysis was conducted.  Each 
parameter was systematically varied (individually) and overall average tasking 
times were calculated for 30 runs.  The results are tabulated in Table 30. 
Task Time (min) Status Quo + CJFSN DJFSN
Baseline 11.02 9.83 6.20
Unlimited Assets 10.52 9.33 5.79
Unlimited Engagements 10.87 9.39 6.04
Double CO Decision 12.62 11.63 7.27
Double BN Decision 12.34 10.41 6.80
Double BD Decision 11.78 10.03 6.38
Double JF/Concur/ASOC 11.20 14.07 8.53
Double Report Time 11.82 10.07 6.62
Target Set 2 12.28 9.36 5.90  
Table 30:  Sensitivity Analysis of Tasking Times 
 Decision times were individually doubled to examine the impact of lower 
echelon decision times.  The Joint Operations Cell, GIG process, and 
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JOCC/ASOC/DASC times were then doubled to compare impact of the time 
required for higher level decision processes.  Asset quantities were set to 10 
times their original value and engagement limitations removed to assess impact 
of these initial assumptions.  Finally, a second target type distribution was input 
into each model to compare performance of each alternative against fewer 
company level targets. 
Removing limitations on assets and engagements improved all systems, 
while increasing decision times degraded all systems. The only parameter that 
demonstrated a system interaction was the target set, Table 31.  As more targets 
requiring response above the company level are generated, the SQ Plus system 










Table 31:  Target Distributions 
Process Delay Distributions 
Random number generators and statistical distribution functions were 
used to model time delays for each of the alternatives.  Consistency with time 
delays and distributions were made to allow a comparison of the alternative 
architectures. 
 The lognormal distribution was used to model engagements.  All of the 
results are positive and the central tendency of the function limits the number of 
very rapid (near zero) engagements. 
 Human-in-the-loop decision delays were modeled by Weibull distributions. 
The shaping and location values for all were kept the same, the center value 
changed based on Project Team consensus as to what the average delay should 
be.  There is a greater probability of a very quick decision being made using this 
distribution vice a lognormal.  During routine operations, it was agreed that the 
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decision makers would more rapidly assess, assign, or concur with a tactical aid 
recommendation thus these low values were probable. 
 
Response Time Data 
 Open source response time data was collected from several sources to 
baseline inputs for the various models. 
 Dr. De et al. reported average response times for close air support 
depending on target type and threat density about from 5 to 10 minutes.  Artillery 
response times were recorded with an average response of about 3.5 minutes, 
and naval gunfire at 2 to 4 minutes.  “Digital artillery, mortar and naval surface 
fires missions executed twice as fast as air missions. This is because all 
necessary information for resource management is readily available in the fully 
digital artillery, mortar and naval surface fires missions. In the air missions, two 
different systems: AFATDS and TBMCS are necessary to assign an aircraft to a 
mission.”67 
 RAND Corporation68  references 15 minutes as a typical response time for 
aircraft engagements, with significant variability based on CAS employment 
(stack vs. deck launched) and flight times based on geography. Additionally, 
prosecuting a second target could be very quick for an attack helicopter “(b)ut a 
bomber employing JDAM usually required about ten minutes between drops to 
enter new coordinates and to reposition itself, a considerable time when friendly 
troops were under fire”.69  Their modeling used 15 minute time estimate for the 
prosecution of 2 mobile targets with a section of aircraft.70 
 
                                                 
67 U. S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development, “Marine Corps Fire Mission 
Profiling Through Experimentation with Real and Simulated Systems,” Raytheon, 2006, pp. 15. 
68 Pirnie, Vick, Grissom, Mueller, Orletsky, “Beyond Close Air Support,” RAND, Santa Monica 
CA, 2005, p. 78. 
69 Ibid, p. 88. 
70 Ibid, p. 151. 
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Process Delay Times 
 
 Generate and Send Request (All Alternatives) 
Figure 70 depicts the default reporting delay (30 sec) added to all targets.  
The team assumed a process where data is entered (preferably automatically) 
and digitally transmitted to the next higher authority.  Occasionally requests may 
take more than a minute to send due to transmission delays or need to use voice 
calls. 
  
Figure 70:  Default Reporting Delay 
 
 
 Army Surface Fires Engagements (All Alternatives) 
Figure 71 depicts the engagement process that was modeled for 
company, battalion and brigade assets as a lognormal distribution (3 +- 0.6 min).  
The time does not count against the tasking message, but along with finite 
simultaneous engagements may cause the target queues to fill up. 
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Figure 71:  Army Engagement Process Delay 
 
 
  CAS and NSFS Engagements (All Alternatives) 
 Figure 72 depicts the Close air support and naval fires (both gun fire and 
TLAM) which were estimated with the below distribution.  The distribution (10 +- 
2 min) may be optimistic depending on asset position relative to target and actual 
unit readiness.  Engagement time is used to limit simultaneous engagements and 
does not directly add to the tasking time of the fires request.  Aircraft were not 
returned to a ready for tasking state following the engagement, but naval fires 
were. 
 




GIG-Enabled Distributed Processing 
 
  Decision Processes (GIG and All Lower Echelon Engage Orders) 
 
 After much discussion, “near-perfect connectivity” of brigade and higher 
echelon commands (basically O-5/O-6 and senior commands) was evaluated as 
a reasonable level of distributed control.  Figure 73 depicts that with the quantity 
of HQ units it was proposed to use a 3 minute delay for all commands to concur 
on a provider-target pair.  Addition of lower echelon commands connected to the 
GIG and participating in a distributed pairing process would drastically increase 
the amount of message traffic and yield a significantly higher expected 
processing delay.  Tasking of lower echelon commands was assumed to be via a 
local digital network and considered as part of the 3 minute delay. 
 
Figure 73:  GIG Lower Echelon Decision Process Delay 
 
CJFSN Decision Processing 
 
  Centralized Decision Process and Lower-Echelon Tasking 
 Figure 74 depicts that the centralized Joint Fires Coordination Cell using 
pairing algorithms and tactical aides was determined to be able to deconflict, 
pair, authorize, and transmit provider tasking in about 5 minutes.  Lower echelon 
commands use similar processes to prioritize and translate the tasks to their 
organic providers with the same time-delay distribution. 
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Status Quo Plus Processing 
 Separate delays were used for company and all higher echelon 
commands in the status quo plus alternative. 
 
  Status Quo Plus CO Engagement Decision 
 Figure 75 illustrates that under the status quo plus, requests arrive at the 
company for processing.  With limited assets, it was assumed that the company 
would decide to prosecute or forward the request in about 3 minutes.  Actual 
engagement by company assets follows the lognormal distribution described 
above. 
 
Figure 75:  CJFSN Lower Echelon Decision Process Delay 
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  Engagement Decision for BN/BDE and JOCC 
 The battalion, brigade and Joint Operations Centers were assumed to 
take longer than the company to decide whether assets were capable or 
available to provide support.  The team modeled this decision process at about 5 
minutes per step.  Adding the engagement delay time of 10 minutes with the 
above lognormal distribution matches historical data on close air support call-to-
engage times of about 15 minutes referenced in Response Time Data Section 
illustrated in Figure 76.  Naval fires, both guns and Tomahawk were pooled and 
given the same average delay of CAS to not show a preference for response 
time in the models. 
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APPENDIX K. EXTEND MODELING OF PAIRING PROCESSES 
Common Assumptions 
Calls for fire were modeled as discrete events with three attributes.  Target 
type was uniformly distributed from 0-9; target location uniformly distributed in the 
battlespace; and desired effects were determined (10% harass; 15% disrupt; 
50% neutralize; 25% destroy).  The target set was randomly generated then fixed 
for inject into the three models. 
 Weapon effectiveness was based on target type and desired effects.  It 
was assumed that a single provider was tasked and the effectiveness applied to 
the target was tagged as another attribute on the request.  Effectiveness was 
fixed and involved a table lookup. 
 Providers were represented by Army Artillery, USMC Artillery, AF CAS, 





 Figure 77 represents the target generation and pairing algorithm.  Targets 
are generated from the program block on the left.  Target type, desired effects, 
and target location are read and exported to an excel spreadsheet.  This 
spreadsheet determines the notional best provider from all that can strike the 
target based on location.  The DE equations then determine which provider to 
task based on a resource representing the provider being available to task.  The 

































































Figure 77:  Target Generation and Provider Selection 
 Figure 78 represents an engagement block, USMC artillery in this case.  
The request enters the engagement queue, target type and desired effects are 
then determined.  The effectiveness of the given weapon is then tagged onto the 
request, representing how well the target was engaged.  The resource (artillery 




























Figure 78:  Engagement and Applied Effects Section 
 Following the engagement section, the targets are combined and sent 
through a process that outputs the target type, provider, desired effects and 
















































Figure 79:  Data Output Section 
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Status Quo Plus 
 The status quo plus system prioritization scheme was based on 
preference for Army artillery fires, followed by USAF CAS then Navy and Marine 
Corps assets on a effectiveness basis.  This bias towards own-service and 
existing stove-pipes resulted in a lower average effectiveness applied to the 
target set. 
 
CJFSN and DJFSN Joint Asset Pairing 
 Both Centralized and Distributed Joint Fire Support Networks used a 
pooling of all available assets to make a pairing decision.  The time delays 
generated from the communications model are the fundamental difference in the 
models.  These delays, with the given asset availability for this target set, 
resulted in nearly identical results for the two systems. 
 
Optimal Pairing Solution 
 To determine the maximum effectiveness that the providers could apply to 
the given target set, an ‘optimal pairing solution’ was designed.  This system 
used an unlimited quantity of providers so that only target location limited the 
ability to task the best asset to any given target.  Removing the location limitation 
would have resulted in a perfect effectiveness ratio, with every target being 
assigned the best asset.  Figure 80 depicts a portion of the Excel spreadsheet 











Figure 80:  Provider-Pairing Process and Prioritization Spreadsheet 
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MINITAB14 TM Data Analysis Results 
 The resultant data was imported into MINITAB14TM for analysis.  Analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) and non-parametric ranking (Kruskal-Wallis) methods were 
used for data reduction. 
 Effectiveness ratio was used as a surrogate for weapons effects.  It was 
calculated as (effects applied) divided by (max weapon effects available).  If 50% 
effects was the maximum available (from the weapon effects table) then 50% 
applied = 1.0 effectiveness and 25% applied = 0.5 effectiveness. 
 
Assumption of normality is suspect as shown in Figure 81, the normal 
probability plot.  ANOVA analysis was conducted regardless and compared to 
non-parametric analysis.  The null hypothesis for all analysis is that there is no 
















Normal Probability Plot of the Residuals
(response is Effect ratio)
 




Figures 82 and 83 represent ANOVA results which show that at least one 


















Interval Plot of Effect ratio vs Alternative
95% CI for the Mean
 
Figure 82:  Mean Effectiveness Applied by Alternative 
 
Analysis of Variance for Effect ratio, using Adjusted SS for Tests 
 
Source         DF    Seq SS    Adj SS      Adj MS      F         P 
Alternative     3    47.0023   18.5371     6.1790      82.39  0.000 
Asset             4 9.3043     9.3043      2.3261      31.02  0.000 
Error        3992   299.3896  299.3896  0.0750 
Total        3999     355.6962 
Figure 83:  Effect Ratio ANOVA 
Figure 84 represents the overall effectiveness versus the Alternative and Asset 























































































Boxplot of Effect ratio vs Alternative, Asset
 
Figure 84:  Effect Ration vs. Alternative Boxplot 
 
Non parametric analysis in Figure 85 shows the optimal solution is 
significantly better than the proposed alternatives.  The optimal solution 
represents the absolute best solution possible.  The difference between Status 
Quo Plus and CJFSN and DJFSN effectiveness ratio is within two standard 
deviations and not statistically significant. 
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Kruskal-Wallis Test: Effect ratio versus Alternative 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Effect ratio 
 
Alternative             N          Median    Ave Rank       Z 
CJFSN  1000       0.9039    1735.9          -8.37 
DJFSN  1000       0.9039    1734.2          -8.42 
Optimal           1000       1.0000    2862.9           27.27 
SQ+    1000       0.7810    1669.0          -10.48 
Overall           4000       2000.5 
 
H = 745.75  DF = 3  P = 0.000 
H = 790.06  DF = 3  P = 0.000  (adjusted for ties) 
Figure 85:  Effect Ratio vs. Alternative 
Conclusions 
 Consideration of all joint fires providers available to prosecute a target 
improves effects applied to the targets.  Using actual weapons data in the 
effectiveness table could yield results that indicate militarily significant differences 
in the proposed systems.  Target sets for a variety of scenarios could then be 
generated to examine resource requirements to achieve desired effects. 
 An algorithm to pair available assets to requests for fire can be built and 
meet the assumed processing time (3 to 5 minutes) used in the communications 
model.  The Extend-Excel simulation processed 1000 targets in under 3 minutes.  
Software designed for this processing should be able to meet or exceed this 
constraint. 
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APPENDIX L. MANA MODELING 
Building the Model 
The Project Team built a model using MANA (Map Aware Non-uniform 
Automata), an agent based model to define agent behaviors and states, dictate 
topography, routes, and weapons. 
 
The Battlefield 
 The first step in building the Urban scenario was battlefield layout.  Google 
Earth provided the graphic for an urban area (in this case, downtown Baghdad).  
It is important to note the vertical and lateral limits of the graphic in terms of units 
of distance.  For this simulation we chose a 10 mile by 6.6 mile area of Baghdad.  
This directly corresponded to battlefield dimensions of 1000 by 660 pixels (units), 
yielding a pixel distance of 52.8 feet.  This graphic was then converted to an 8-bit 
bitmap.  This format is required by MANA to distinguish terrain features, each of 
which is defined by a RGB (Red-Green-Blue) value.  Each color thus represents 
a specific terrain feature, and each terrain feature has three associated 
attributes; Going (ease of transit), Cover (terrain which will block incoming 
rounds) and Conceal (terrain which acts as camouflage, but doesn’t prevent 
agents from getting shot).  After the picture (.jpg) is converted to bitmap (.bmp), it 
is then touched up using Microsoft Paint.  Users must ensure that there are only 
the desired colors, and that they are continuous.  If there is a break in color, 
agents exhibit unintended manner. 
MANA automatically inserts six terrain features (Billiard Table, Wall, 
Hilltop, Road, Light Brush and Heavy Brush), each with their own color.  The user 
is then able to add 5 additional terrain features and define their 3 attributes (or 
delete the default settings and define 11 user-specific terrain features).  For 
simplicity and expediency, 3 terrain features were used; Roads (Going 1, Cover 
0, Concealment 0), Heavy Urban (.3, .5, .5) and Light Urban (.6, .3, .3).  The 




Figure 86:  Terrain Map (From70) 
 
Figure 87:  Terrain Layout 
70 Google, Google Earth © .jpg image, [www.google.earth], Oct 06, 
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Entities (Agents) 
 After the Battlefield was built, the principal players were inserted into the 
simulation.  This began with one red squad of a single agent and 1 blue squad of 
a single agent.  Each squad has properties which can be manipulated to 
determine agent behavior.  The Squad Properties menu is depicted below in 
Figure 88. 
 
Figure 88:  Squad Properties Menu Window 
General Control Window 
 The General window allows you to name each squad, enter the number of 
agents, and allocate fuel (not used for this simulation).  The copy squad button is 
the most useful feature of the simulation, because all squad properties 






 The map window allows the user to determine the squad’s starting point 
(with a user-defined region of uncertainty so that each time the simulation is 
reset, the squad starts at a different location).  As shown in Figure 89 the 
waypoints for the squad to transit are also available.  Inserting waypoints is as 
easy as a left mouse click.  The only difficulty in selecting waypoints is the agents 
traverse the waypoints in reverse order. 
 
 
Figure 89:  MANA Map Window 
Personality 
 The personality window is what gives the simulation its agent-based 
behavior.  As shown in Figure 90, this screen allows the user to give each agent 
relative behaviors for Enemy contact, including three separate enemy threats and 
an “Ideal Enemy” (i.e., a tank for a Javelin gunner).  Tendency towards the 
enemy and blue forces (either injured or uninjured), the next waypoint in series 
and Cover and Concealment are included.  Variation from direct routing is 
adjusted through the “Line Center” slide bar. 
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 Tendency toward enemy engagement can be adjusted from -100 to +100, 
with the two extremes representing complete retreat and charging the enemy 
respectively.  Each squad has a threat attribute in the Range window which is 
realized upon detection (once the entity is detected by the enemy, the enemy 
recognizes what threat class the entity represents).  This allows a separate 
response for each of the three enemy threats.  Also included are adjustments for 
tendencies based on proximity to another agent (i.e., do not apply this attribute to 
agents within XX units (Min App), or apply this weighting to agents within YY 
units (Max Inf)).  The cluster option prevents agents from congregating within a 
small area by applying the opposite tendency towards aggregation when XX 
agents are present.  This attribute was used only during Enemy Contact states 
(discussed later).  Situational awareness tendencies were not used in  
this simulation. 
 






 Inherent in MANA is the use of trigger states.  Trigger states are transitory 
states of a user-specified duration that elicit a specific behavior.  As shown in 
Figure 91, there are dozens of trigger states, and separate controls for each of 
the Personality, Range and Weapons windows.  Because of the exponential 
increase in complexity with additional trigger states, the simulation uses two 
states:  the default state for patrolling, and the Enemy Contact state for actual 
engagements with enemy agents (for both the red and blue forces).  Each state 
allows separate settings, which may lead to confusion when transiting states.  
Care must be taken to document and understand state changes and how they 
affect agent behavior. 
 
Figure 91:  MANA Trigger States Menu Window 
Ranges 
 The ranges window allows the user to select the agent icon for each 
trigger state.  This is useful for differentiating which state the agent is in during a 
simulation.  The team’s urban scenario used a patrolling (Default) and 
engagement (Enemy Contact) icon.  Allegiance is either White (neutral), Red 
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(Enemy) or Blue (Friendly).  Only red and blue are represented in our simulation.  
Threat classes range from 0 to 9999, although only threat classes 1 through 3 
are available for specific trigger state response.  Agent class is used to determine 
order of engagement for enemy forces (i.e., target priority).  Movement speed is 
based on a per time unit basis (i.e., 100/100 is 1 step per time unit).  The danger 
of using any number greater than 100/100 is agents may then be able to step 
through walls which are 1 unit thick within a single time step.  Typical foot patrol 
speeds of up to six miles per hour yield a speed of between one half (50/100) 
and one (100/100) for each time step.  Each time step is equivalent to  
one minute. 
 Enemy interaction in the form of hits-to-kill, % concealment per turn and 
Armor are included as well.  Percent concealment per turn represents a 
cumulative concealment for the agent on a time-step basis.  In other words,  
50% concealment after 2 time steps is the equivalent of 25% concealment  
((1-.5)^2).  Armor thickness is measured in millimeters.  Agents were given either 
a single or two shot hit-to-kill based upon body armor and support (medical, etc.).  
Neither percent concealment nor armor attributes were used in the simulation. 
 
Weapons 
 Available weapons for each agent include kinetic energy and indirect fire 
weapons.  Also included are options for agent, squad or inorganic situational 
awareness cueing (weapons firing using outside sensors).  As shown in Figure 
92, up to four weapons may be defined for use in each trigger state.  The JFS 
simulation used only weapon 1 and a single trigger state (default).  Each agent 
was given nearly unlimited ammunition (10,000 rounds).  The Range to Shooter 
(R) table allows for decreasing Pk with increasing range, with the ability to linearly 
interpolate between two values.  Soldier agents in the simulation were 
guaranteed a hit at zero range, and a near-zero probability of hit at 1,000 yards 
(3,000 feet or 60 distance units).  Priority order and non-target classes may be 
entered as well.  The remaining settings for target engagement capability, 
penetration and threat levels were not used. 
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Figure 92:  MANA Weapons Window 
Squad SA 
 As illustrated in Figure 93, situational awareness for the squad is 
composed of a communications delay within the squad and contact persistence.  
All values were left at default (0 and 30, respectively). 
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Figure 93:  MANA Squad Situational Awareness (SA) Window 
Inorganic SA 
 Extensive use was made of the Inorganic SA window.  Communication 
between squads is entirely controlled by the matrix of allowed communications 
shown in Figure 94.  Communication implies situational awareness to the extent 
that contact information is passed over the communications link as shown above.  
Message delivery can be made in either a Fire-and-Forget context, or in the case 
of this simulation, an acknowledged receipt (Guaranteed Delivery).  Accuracy 
and reliability, as well as parameters for latency and message memory can be 
changed to suit the scenario. 
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Figure 94:  MANA Squad Communications Window 
Algorithm 
 The algorithm window shown in Figure 95 was left at default settings for 
the simulation (Stephen Algorithm) as changing the algorithm had little effect on 
the outcome of multiple simulation runs. 
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Figure 95:  MANA Algorithm Window 
Conclusion 
 In summary, the MANA simulation provided the project with a means to 
test agent behavior in a specific, controlled environment in order to draw 
conclusions about the efficacy of each of the alternatives.  A summary of 
simulation settings is shown below in Table 32. 
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Sqd 1 7 778 321 60/80 -20/20 45/50 50/0 30/30 10/50 10/50 1 1 50/100 2 70/75 KE/Sqd SA 60 
Sqd 2 7 810 148 60/80 -20/20 45/50 50/0 30/30 10/50 10/50 1 1 50/100 2 70/75 KE/Sqd SA 60 
Sqd 3 7 390 60 60/80 -20/20 45/50 50/0 30/30 10/50 10/50 1 1 50/100 2 70/75 KE/Sqd SA 60 
Sqd 4 7 845 603 60/80 -20/20 45/50 50/0 30/30 10/50 10/50 1 1 50/100 2 70/75 KE/Sqd SA 60 
Arty 1 6 912 252 100/100 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 10/50 10/50 3 2 0 5 70/75 HE/Inorg SA 700 
Arty 2 6 201 550 100/100 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 10/50 10/50 3 2 0 5 70/75 HE/Inorg SA 700 
Sqd 1 5 642 311 -50/100 0/100 0/0 0/0 0/0 30/30 60/30 1 1 50/100 1 74/80 KE/Agent SA 50 
Sqd 2 5 560 355 -50/100 0/100 0/0 0/0 0/0 30/30 60/30 1 1 50/100 1 74/80 KE/Agent SA 50 
Sqd 3 5 552 253 -50/100 0/100 0/0 0/0 0/0 30/30 60/30 1 1 50/100 1 74/80 KE/Agent SA 50 
Sqd 4 5 142 286 -50/100 0/100 0/0 0/0 0/0 30/30 60/30 1 1 50/100 1 74/80 KE/Agent SA 50 
Sqd 5 5 405 340 -50/100 0/100 0/0 0/0 0/0 30/30 60/30 1 1 50/100 1 74/80 KE/Agent SA 50 
Sqd 6 5 614 538 -50/100 0/100 0/0 0/0 0/0 30/30 60/30 1 1 50/100 1 74/80 KE/Agent SA 50 
Sqd 7 5 899 443 -50/100 0/100 0/0 0/0 0/0 30/30 60/30 1 1 50/100 1 74/80 KE/Agent SA 50 
niper 1 1 619 193 -50/100 0/100 0/0 0/0 0/0 30/30 60/30 2 2 0 2 71/80 KE/Squad SA 70 
niper 2 1 385 528 -50/100 0/100 0/0 0/0 0/0 30/30 60/30 2 2 0 2 71/80 KE/Squad SA 70 
niper 3 1 264 222 -50/100 0/100 0/0 0/0 0/0 30/30 60/30 2 2 0 2 71/80 KE/Squad SA 70 
Sqd 1 905 167 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0 0 3 10/10 None N/A 
Co. 1 908 166 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0 0 3 10/10 None N/A 
Btn 1 905 167 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0 0 3 10/10 None N/A 
Bde 1 905 167 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0 0 3 10/10 None N/A 
AGTF 1 905 167 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0 0 3 10/10 None N/A 
JFC 1 905 167 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0 0 3 10/10 None N/A 
BCD 1 905 167 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0 0 3 10/10 None N/A 
SCC 1 905 167 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0 0 3 10/10 None N/A 
  
Table 32:  MANA summary of simulation settings
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